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Abstract 
 
Many ethicists believe that if it is possible to know a true moral proposition, it is always possible 
to ascertain a priori the normative content of that proposition. I argue that this is wrong; the only 
way to ascertain the normative content of some moral propositions requires the use of a 
posteriori information. 
I examine what I call determinate core moral propositions. I assume that some of these 
propositions are true and that actual agents are able to know them. Ethicists whom I call core-
apriorists believe that it is always possible to ascertain a priori the normative content of such 
propositions. Core-aposteriorists believe that this is false, and that sometimes a posteriori 
information must be used to ascertain that normative content. 
I develop what I call the a posteriori strategy to show that core-apriorists are likely to be 
wrong, and so core-aposteriorists are correct. The strategy examines the details of particular 
core-apriorist theories and then shows that the theories have one of two problems: either some 
of the knowable determinate core moral propositions in the theories are not knowable a priori, or 
some of the propositions are not determinate, so they cannot perform the epistemological work 
required of them. Therefore, some knowable determinate core moral propositions are only 
knowable with the aid of a posteriori information. 
I apply the strategy to four different core-apriorist theories. The first is Henry Sidgwick’s 
theory of self-evident moral axioms, as recently developed by Katarzyna de Lazari-Radek and 
Peter Singer. The second is Matthew Kramer’s moral realism. I then examine Michael Smith’s 
moral realism, and Frank Jackson and Philip Pettit’s moral functionalism. The a posteriori 
strategy shows that there are serious difficulties with all four theories. I conclude that it provides 
good evidence that the core-apriorist is mistaken, and that the core-aposteriorist is right. 
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Chapter 1 – Introduction 
 
In this thesis, I want to argue for the following epistemological claim: 
 
Central Claim: There is at least one determinate core moral proposition the normative 
content of which can only be ascertained as true by using a posteriori or 
mixed methods. 
 
Many ethicists who endorse the possibility of agents having moral knowledge have held moral 
epistemological theories that would reject the claim.1 Such theories imply that the normative 
content of determinate core moral propositions, if it is knowable, can always be known a priori 
(for example, through a process of a priori reasoning). I want to argue that this is mistaken, by 
demonstrating that theories that reject the Central Claim land themselves in serious difficulties. 
In this introduction, I first define the terms used in the Central Claim to show more clearly 
what it states. I will frame the debate as being between core-aposteriorists, who accept the 
Central Claim, and core-apriorists, who reject it. I will also give some reasons why rejecting the 
Central Claim may look plausible. In chapter 2, I will outline the strategy that I will use to defend 
the Central Claim. This strategy requires the examination of theories that reject the Central 
Claim, and I carry out this examination in chapters 3-5. Finally, I will briefly consider what the 
consequences of accepting the Central Claim are for both core-aposteriorists and core-
apriorists. 
 
1 – Normative content and the a posteriori 
 
Moral propositions are propositions that express moral norms. They therefore have normative 
content. Assume that the moral proposition ‘Drink-driving is morally impermissible’ is true. To 
know that it is true, we may need to know that drink-driving causes fatal accidents. It appears, 
though, that accident statistics are just descriptive, non-normative information. Consequently, 
one could coherently accept that drink-driving causes fatal accidents but hold that it is 
                                                             
1 E.g. Kant (1996); Ross (2002); Shafer-Landau (2003); Kramer (2009); Parfit (2011). 
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nevertheless morally permissible to drink-drive. To accept the proposition as true, we need 
normative premises that entail (for example) that causing fatal accidents is morally 
impermissible. These premises justify the normative content of the proposition. 
It is very popular to think that the normative content of a moral proposition can be 
ascertained as true a priori. However, there has been a significant push over the last few years 
for the claim that the normative content of moral propositions is, or is only, ascertainable a 
posteriori. The philosophers defending this idea often claim that we can use evidence from 
psychology, anthropology and other such disciplines to attain a posteriori knowledge of such 
normative content (From now on, I will use a priori/a posteriori moral knowledge’ to mean ‘a 
priori/a posteriori knowledge of the normative content of true moral propositions’.).2 
Whilst I will not be too concerned with the exact definitions of ‘a priori’ and ‘a posteriori’, I do 
need to say a little about them. Some philosophers explicitly claim that they are identical to the 
concepts ‘non-empirical’ and ‘empirical’ respectively, but there is no clear agreement on this.3 
For example, Immanuel Kant claims that a priori knowledge is knowledge attained completely 
independently of experience.4 Philip Kitcher points out that if Kant is right, this appears to imply 
that only innate knowledge can be a priori. This is problematic, because there is no reason why 
the endorsement of a priori knowledge should entail endorsing innate knowledge.5 Kitcher’s own 
analysis entails that ‘if a person knows a priori that p then she could know that p whatever 
sufficiently rich experience she had had’ in her life.6 Whatever life the agent lived, there would 
be a similar process to that in her actual life that would allow her to know that p.7 This separates 
a priori knowledge from empirical knowledge, since in cases of empirical knowledge, there may 
be possible worlds in which the agent lives and has a sufficiently rich experience, but where 
there are no similar processes that allow her to know empirically the propositions she knows in 
her actual life. 
Another analysis, given by Philip Stratton-Lake, holds that a proposition is a priori knowable 
if it is knowable ‘solely on the basis of an understanding of [the proposition]’.8 Again, on this 
analysis, empirical knowledge is not a priori. One cannot know that one is looking at something 
                                                             
2 E.g. Boyd (1988); Nichols (2004); Prinz (2007); Flanagan, Sarkissian and Wong (2008). 
3 E.g. Kramer (2009), p. 47. 
4 Kant (1998), A3/B7-A6/B10. 
5 Kitcher (1984), p. 21. 
6 Kitcher (1984), p. 24. 
7 Since I am only using Kitcher’s analysis of the a priori as an example, I will not examine exactly what ‘sufficiently rich 
experience’ means. 
8 Stratton-Lake (2002), p. xliv. 
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blue simply by understanding the proposition ‘I am looking at something blue’. One must use 
perception as well. I am not going to subscribe wholesale either to Kitcher’s analysis or Stratton-
Lake’s analysis, but I do want to retain the idea that empirical knowledge is not a priori 
knowledge. This implies that empirical knowledge is a type of a posteriori knowledge, even if 
these two types of knowledge are not identical. Given that core-aposteriorists frequently hold 
that one can ascertain the normative content of at least some moral propositions only by using 
empirical knowledge, this is all they need to distinguish their position from the core-apriorist’s. 
According to such core-aposteriorists, it is not always possible to ascertain the normative 
content of a determinate core moral proposition without the use of empirical information (and 
consequently, it cannot be known without the use of an a posteriori or mixed method). 
A priori and a posteriori propositions are propositions which, if they are true, can be known a 
priori or a posteriori respectively. We should note that it may be possible to know the same 
proposition both a priori and a posteriori. Calling a proposition ‘an a priori proposition’ merely 
means that it is knowable a priori. It says nothing about whether it is also knowable a posteriori. 
The same is true, mutatis mutandis, for a posteriori propositions.  
A method is simply a mode of access by which one can ascertain the truth of the normative 
content of a moral proposition. I will place no restrictions here on what this mode of access 
might be; it could be a process of practical reasoning, some form of empirical discovery, 
recognition of the truth as self-evident in some way, or something else. 
If the normative content of a proposition can be ascertained as true using an a priori method, 
it is possible to ascertain that truth a priori. This implies that the normative content has an a 
priori status, even if it can also be known a posteriori. Similarly, if the normative content can be 
known by using an a posteriori method, its truth can be ascertained a posteriori and it has an a 
posteriori status.9 
It is important to remember that a priori and a posteriori methods are not the only types of 
methods available. One may be able to discover a truth a priori, purely from the armchair, or a 
posteriori, for example through scientific examination of the physical world. However, 
knowledge of certain propositions may require a combination of these methods. For example, 
suppose that we can only discover that proposition A is true via an argument that requires 
                                                             
9 The a priori/a posteriori status of a particular claim is therefore determined by whether it can be known via an a priori 
method or an a posteriori method respectively. 
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premises B and C. Premise B can only be discovered a priori, and premise C can only be 
discovered a posteriori. We cannot discover that A is true simply via an a priori method, 
because of C, or via an a posteriori method, because of B. Nevertheless, since there is an 
argument for A, there is a method to attain knowledge of A. This method is a mixed method, as 
it uses a combination of a priori and a posteriori methods. 
A mixed method to ascertain the truth of the normative content of a moral proposition would 
therefore be a method that uses a combination of a priori and a posteriori methods to ascertain 
the truth. Whilst I will frequently talk of a posteriori methods in this thesis rather than a posteriori 
and mixed methods, this is merely for convenience. My defence of the Central Claim does not 
imply that mixed methods are impossible or even unlikely, and I will return to this point in the 
conclusion. The defence does not entail that we can or should remove mention of mixed 
methods from the Central Claim. 
Furthermore, also for convenience, I will usually say that there are a priori, a posteriori and 
mixed methods to know a moral proposition, rather than say that the methods are methods to 
ascertain the truth of the normative content of a moral proposition. 
 
2 – Core moral propositions 
 
The Central Claim is about core moral propositions. The term ‘core moral proposition’ is 
something of a placeholder, because different moral theories will flesh out in different ways what 
the exact content of a core moral proposition is. However, core moral propositions comply with 
the Core Moral Proposition Criterion (‘CMPC’): 
 
CMPC: A proposition is a core moral proposition iff it is part of the set of propositions 
that is the smallest possible set of determinately true propositions that can 
justify on its own the determinately true normative content of every moral 
proposition. Whilst no individual core moral proposition necessarily justifies the 
determinately true normative content of every moral proposition, or is 
necessarily part of the justification of that normative content, there are 
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necessarily core moral propositions within that set that do, either individually or 
collectively. 
 
Whilst ‘core moral proposition’ is my own term, the idea frequently occurs amongst ethicists. For 
example, Henry Sidgwick has self-evident axioms, Michael Smith has a priori moral platitudes, 
and Matthew Kramer has basic moral principles.10 All of these are core moral propositions. This 
is why it is difficult to specify precisely what the exact content of a core moral proposition is, 
because philosophers such as Sidgwick, Smith and Kramer all make different claims about what 
that content is. 
A good way of thinking about core moral propositions is that we can use them as normative 
premises in arguments for other moral propositions, and that they provide fundamental reasons, 
explanations or grounds for the truth of the normative content of non-core moral propositions.11 
We can give a non-moral example here of a fundamental reason: suppose I know that my train 
is not running because the train operator has cancelled it. I know a reason why the train is not 
running, but this might not be the fundamental reason. The fundamental reason may be that the 
train’s engine has broken down, forcing the train operator to cancel it. Similarly, core moral 
propositions provide us with the fundamental reason why the normative content of certain non-
core moral propositions are true. They justify the non-core moral propositions, in the sense that 
there is a good argument from the set of the core moral propositions to the conclusion that the 
normative content of the non-core moral propositions is true.12 Suppose that ‘Physical attacks 
on sentient beings for revenge are morally impermissible’ is a core moral proposition. If I want to 
know the reason why I may not beat someone up because they have cheated me financially, 
this proposition may provide the fundamental reason: people are sentient beings, and beating 
someone up is a form of physical attack. It is therefore morally impermissible. 
One reason why many ethicists are core-apriorists, who favour a priori methods over a 
posteriori and mixed methods, and who therefore reject the Central Claim, relates to a long-
standing metaethical problem: how we can attain normative knowledge at all. The thought is 
that we can use a posteriori information to attain knowledge in many situations, but all such 
                                                             
10 I will discuss all these ideas later in the thesis. 
11 For the purposes of this thesis, I treat ‘reasons’, ‘explanations’ and ‘grounds’ as interchangeable. 
12 I discuss justification and knowledge more in section 4 of this chapter. A good argument here is an argument 
(deductive or otherwise) that provides good evidence for a true conclusion, even if it does not guarantee that the 
conclusion is true. 
12 
 
knowledge appears to be descriptive, not normative. We can discover a posteriori how humans 
act, what they believe and how they form moral judgements, but that will not tell us anything 
about how they should act, what they should believe, and how to form correct moral 
judgements. A posteriori evidence can only contain descriptive information that yields 
descriptive conclusions, not normative conclusions (or at least not normative conclusions that 
are moral). So, the thought continues, we can only attain moral knowledge a priori, since it is 
impossible to do so a posteriori. This line of argument can be fleshed out in different ways. For 
example, Derek Parfit claims that certain normative claims cannot be identical to empirical 
causal and psychological claims because they cannot have the same meaning.13 Evidence for 
the empirical claims thus cannot be identical to the evidence for the normative claims. Another 
core-apriorist, Patrick Clipsham, argues that disagreements about moral claims are intelligible 
even when there is no way to resolve them empirically.14 Empirical evidence alone, being 
descriptive and non-normative evidence, will not let us know if the claims are true or false.  
The idea that moral propositions are a priori goes back a considerable distance. Possibly the 
most famous example comes from Immanuel Kant in 1785. Kant tries to base his moral theory 
on the idea that we can ascertain what is morally right through a process of practical reasoning. 
He talks of imperatives, which express a command of reason that the will must obey – that is, 
the will of a practically rational agent must conform to the commands, otherwise the agent is not 
practically rational. Categorical imperatives command an agent to avoid actions that are 
intrinsically wrong, no matter what the agent (or anyone else) personally desires to be the case. 
In fact, Kant only allows for one categorical imperative:15 
 
CI: Act only in accordance with that maxim through which you can at the same time will that 
it become a universal law.16 
 
The practically rational agent can ascertain the categorical imperative a priori, and then use it to 
guide her behaviour. For example, consider a man who borrows money, having promised to 
repay it later even though he knows that he cannot. He makes a promise that he plans to break 
                                                             
13 Parfit (2011), pp. 325-327 (see also pp. 332-341). 
14 Clipsham (2014). 
15 Kant (1996), sections 4.415-4.421. Kant gives more than one formulation of the categorical imperative, but claims that 
they are all equivalent (section 4.436). It is open to debate whether they really are. 
16 Kant (1996), section 4.421. 
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because he desperately needs the money, According to Kant, this breaches the categorical 
imperative, because rational agents cannot coherently will that the maxim ‘Break your promises 
when it is necessary for your own welfare’ be a universal law. The practice of promising 
presupposes that promises will be reasonably believed. If the maxim were a universal law, then 
no promises could be reasonably believed, and so the practice of promising would not exist. 
This entails that the maxim is asking us to do the impossible: one cannot break a promise if 
there are no such things as promises in the first place. Such a universal law would contradict 
itself, and therefore borrowing money by making promises that you will break because of 
desperate need will contravene the categorical imperative.17 As we can discover the 
contradiction without appealing to any a posteriori evidence, we can work out that making false 
promises when one needs to for one’s welfare is morally wrong a priori. 
All moral propositions must comply with the categorical imperative. The categorical 
imperative therefore helps to justify or refute the normative content of a moral proposition a 
priori. A Kantian may thus endorse a proposition such as ‘You should always act in accordance 
with CI’ as an a priori core moral proposition. The core moral proposition implies that moral 
agents cannot accept as true moral propositions that endorse maxims that cannot be willed as 
universal laws.18 
In the 1930s, W.D. Ross developed another famous moral theory that endorses a priori 
moral knowledge. He claims that it is a mistake to examine a posteriori 
 
‘a variety of types of act that are commonly called right [in order] to find, or argue that they 
have some characteristics in common, e.g. that of being comparatively highly evolved, and 
then to assume that this is what ‘right’ or ‘obligatory’ means.’19 
 
Even if everyone acts as though a certain property is a moral property because of evolutionary 
influence on our moral views, that does not mean that the moral property is identical with that 
property, or that we can correctly identify moral properties by examining evolutionary history.20 
                                                             
17 Kant (1996), section 4.422. 
18 I should note that I use the categorical imperative as an example here, and I will not argue against Kantian ethics as 
an instance of a core-apriorist theory in this thesis. Given the large amount of literature on Kantian ethics, it would be 
difficult to do it justice here for reasons of space. My defence of the Central Claim will instead focus on examining more 
contemporary examples of core-apriorist theories (in chapters 3-5). However, if my defence is successful, then it should 
be successful against Kantian ethics as a core-apriorist theory as well. 
19 Ross (1939), p. 12. 
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Ross thought that we have what he calls self-evident prima facie duties, which give us 
insight into the ‘broad principles of morality’.21 This insight will not tell us what is morally required 
on every occasion, but it will tell us how we should behave in general. ‘Self-evident’ means 
‘evident without any need of proof, or of evidence beyond itself’.22 To discover the truth of a self-
evident proposition, all one needs to do is understand what it claims, and then one will know 
without further argument that it is true. Self-evident truths include those relating to various moral 
duties, logical validity and mathematical axioms. So, for example, it is a self-evident principle 
that there is generally a duty to keep promises, and we can know the principle a priori. 
Therefore the proposition ‘One should generally keep one’s promises’ is an example of an a 
priori core moral proposition. 
More recently, we find that moral theories that endorse a priori moral knowledge are still 
going strong. Derek Parfit writes that we have ‘an a priori guarantee’ that some things are 
intrinsically good, and cannot be explained as good by reference to something else.23 Parfit 
compares moral truths to mathematical truths, with the implication that the two types of truth 
work in the same way. For example, it is true that 2 is greater than 1, but mathematical truths do 
not exist ‘in an ontological sense’. They do not actually or even possibly exist. When we say that 
no number exists that is both odd and even, what we are doing is saying that such a concept is 
inconsistent or contradictory. We are not making an ontological claim about numbers.24 
Since there is no ontological claim, one can argue a priori for the existence of mathematical 
truths, because ‘existence’ here carries no ontological implications. To argue that something 
ontologically exists, one may have to discover it a posteriori, for example in the laboratory. But 
since mathematical truths do not ontologically exist, there is no reason to think that we can or 
must discover them a posteriori.25 
Parfit claims that even in an empty universe in which nothing ontologically existed (stars, 
planets, people, etc.), some irreducibly normative truths would still exist, but in a non-ontological 
sense, otherwise the universe would not be empty.26 Moral propositions about such moral truths 
are propositions about intrinsic value, not instrumental value. It is difficult to see how anything 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
20 Ross (1939), p. 14. 
21 Ross (2002), p. 14. 
22 Ross (2002), p. 29. This does not mean that self-evident propositions are obvious or easy to know. 
23 Parfit (2011), pp. 430-431. 
24 Parfit (2011), pp. 479-481. 
25 Parfit (2011), p. 485. 
26 Parfit (2011), p. 486. 
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could be instrumentally good in an empty universe, because there is nothing that it could be 
good for. Such propositions about intrinsic value are good candidates for being a priori core 
moral propositions. 
Parfit also compares morality to mathematics when writing of necessary truths. He claims 
that mathematical truths are necessary truths, and we do not discover these truths by using 
abilities such as perception. We can discover these truths merely by thinking about them.27 
Similarly, we can do so with normative truths. We have reason to believe that 2+2=4 whatever 
our world is like, and to care about certain things whatever our world is like. Parfit comments 
that ‘[s]ince our fundamental normative beliefs are not contingent features of the world, we do 
not need to have empirical evidence for their truth’.28 
There are many other examples of contemporary metaethical theories that endorse a priori 
core moral propositions. However, we must remember that some metaethical theories do not 
endorse any core moral propositions, or even allow that moral knowledge is possible. For 
example, emotivist theories reject the possibility of moral knowledge entirely. Moral propositions 
do not have truth values, so there are no methods to ascertain the truth of their normative 
content. I want to focus exclusively on the debate between core-apriorists and core-
aposteriorists, so I will make two assumptions in this thesis: at least some moral propositions 
are true, and it is not exceptionally difficult for actual agents to know them. Most core-apriorists 
and core-aposteriorists share these assumptions, and in this thesis I will only consider those 
who do. 
One possible problem with claims that core moral propositions are a priori concerns 
analyticity. One could argue that a priori propositions are analytic, and that this entails that core 
moral propositions cannot be a priori. 
We can know whether an analytic proposition is true or false by examining the meaning of 
the terms in the proposition. The proposition ‘If Bert is a bachelor, then Bert is unmarried’ is 
analytic, because we can check its truth by unpacking the definition of ‘bachelor’. Synthetic 
propositions are not analytic. The proposition ‘If Ernie is a bachelor, then Ernie is unhappy’ is 
synthetic, as the definition of ‘bachelor’ does not include the criterion that bachelors are 
                                                             
27 Parfit (2011), p. 489. 
28 Parfit (2011), pp. 517-518. 
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unhappy. The distinction between the analytic and the synthetic is not entirely uncontroversial, 
but we need not investigate the matter here.29 
The trouble is that many analytic propositions are what I will call ‘vacuous’. Suppose that 
‘Cruelty is bad’ is an a priori core moral proposition. If we include in the definition of cruelty that 
it is bad, then the proposition says that something bad is bad. This gives no new information 
about the badness of cruelty, so it is difficult to see how the proposition can justify any further 
moral claim. Since it just says that something bad is bad, we can do without it. 
Consequently, it appears that the core-apriorist must hold that a priori core moral 
propositions are synthetic.30 However, Frank Jackson and Philip Pettit have made a rescue 
attempt for a priori propositions that I will call ‘non-vacuously analytic’. Propositions such as 
‘The property of fairness is whatever plays the role of having characteristics X, Y and Z’ (where 
we define X, Y and Z in a particular way) are analytic a priori. But they are not vacuous, 
because they help identify what natural property in the world is the property of fairness.31 Since 
such propositions are analytic, but can provide new information, they are non-vacuously 
analytic. 
Later, I will argue that the propositions that Jackson and Pettit identify as non-vacuously 
analytic are not a priori, so the core-apriorist cannot use their metaethical theory to refute the 
Central Claim. For now, though, I will grant for the sake of argument that there may be a priori 
non-vacuously analytic propositions. I will not object to core-apriorist theories on the basis of 
analyticity. 
 
3 – Determinate moral propositions and determinate truth values 
 
The Central Claim relates to determinate propositions, and the CMPC relates to determinately 
true propositions. Importantly, these types of determinacy are not the same. Determinately true 
propositions have determinate truth values; that is, they have one unique truth value. For 
example, Fermat’s Last Theorem is either true or false. We may never have found its truth 
value, but its truth value would still be determinate. Propositions such as ‘He is tall’ can have 
indeterminate truth values, since whilst some men are clearly tall and others are clearly not, 
                                                             
29 E.g. Quine (1980). 
30 For example, Kant claims that the categorical imperative is synthetic a priori ((1996), sections 4.388, 4.420). 
31 Jackson and Pettit (1995). 
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there is no definite cut-off point where all men over X cm in height are tall and all men under it 
are not. Similarly, there may be moral propositions with indeterminate truth values because of 
moral vagueness. It is not that we cannot know whether a particular action is morally 
permissible or not, but rather that it is indeterminate whether it is. Furthermore, there may also 
be incommensurable values, which cannot be compared against each other. If values 1 and 2 
cannot be compared, the propositions 
 
a) Value 1 is morally better than value 2 
b) Value 2 is morally better than value 1 
c) Value 1 and value 2 are equal in moral worth 
 
are all false, even though they appear at first to exhaust all the possibilities when one attempts 
to compare the values. Not every philosopher accepts that incommensurable moral values 
exist, but for simplicity I will not take a stand on the issue.32 
The determinacy of a proposition is not the same as the determinacy of a proposition’s truth 
value. It may be quite possible for there to be determinate propositions with indeterminate truth 
values. In order to avoid confusion, from now on I will use the term ‘determinate’ to refer to the 
determinacy of propositions unless otherwise stated. 
The determinacy of a proposition is based on the content of the terms within it. For example: 
 
1) Humans should never drink-drive 
 
is a fairly determinate moral proposition. It is clear to whom the proposition applies (human 
beings), and ‘drink-drive’ is a term with fairly precise application conditions; that is, it is fairly 
clear in which circumstances the term can be applied. Agents using it know what drink-driving 
is, the conditions under which someone can be described as drink-driving, and so on. 
By contrast, the proposition 
 
2) Humans should generally be nice to other humans 
                                                             
32 There has been much debate on moral incommensurability; for example, Nagel (1979), chapter 5; Williams (1979); 
Richardson (1994), chapter 5; Dworkin (2004), chapter 4. 
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is less determinate than (1), because the term ‘nice’ has far less precise application conditions 
than ‘drink-drive’. Many agents would flesh the term out in different ways. Does being nice entail 
indulging an agent’s every desire? Does it mean never upsetting them? Simply telling someone 
that they should be nice may leave it completely unclear what they should do, but telling them 
not to drink-drive is a direct appeal to stay away from alcohol if they are going to drive. It is not 
just that agents disagree over what the precise application conditions of ‘nice’ are, but that the 
application conditions themselves are imprecise. 
The more precise that the application conditions of the terms in a proposition are, the more 
informative the proposition becomes, and hence the more determinate it becomes. (2) is not 
very determinate, as it is not very informative. It tells us very little about what niceness consists 
of, what humans have to do in order to be nice, and so on. The use of the term ‘generally’ also 
has an effect, as (2) does not inform us exactly when the exceptions occur when it is 
permissible not to be nice. As for (1), ‘drink-drive’ has more precise application conditions than 
‘nice’, and so it is clearer what humans have to do according to (1). Furthermore, the term 
‘never’ allows for no exceptions, so we know that humans should always refrain from drink-
driving. Consequently, (1) is more determinate than (2) because it is more informative. 
I will use the phrase ‘a determinate proposition’ as shorthand for ‘a proposition that is more 
determinate than most other propositions’ and the phrase ‘a non-determinate proposition’ as 
shorthand for ‘a proposition that is less determinate than most other propositions’. ‘Determinate’ 
is a comparative term, like ‘tall’, and so there is no firm division between determinate and non-
determinate propositions. The determinacy of a proposition depends on the precision of the 
application conditions of the terms in the proposition, and there is no clear tipping point where 
the precision of the application conditions becomes great enough for a proposition to turn from 
being non-determinate to being determinate. We should expect a grey area of propositions that 
are not particularly determinate or non-determinate. For convenience, I will ignore this grey area 
as I wish to concentrate on propositions that do not fall into it. 
Calling a proposition ‘determinate’ does not mean that other propositions cannot be more 
determinate. Compare (1) to 
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3) Humans should never operate any car for 48 hours after consuming any alcohol 
 
In some cases, it may be unclear when drink-driving occurs. If a driver has a sip of wine thirty 
minutes before driving, is that really drink-driving? (3) eliminates more borderline cases such as 
these than (1) does because it is more informative and tells us more about how humans should 
behave. 
It may be possible for determinate propositions to have indeterminate truth values. Here is 
an example: assume that a thief is going to jail. Given the facts of the case, it is morally 
permissible to jail him for six months, but not for sixty years. At some point, the punishment will 
be long enough to become morally impermissible. But when will this happen? It may be that 
there is no exact time at which point the punishment is so long that it becomes morally 
impermissible. Assume that there is an exact time, T. This implies that jailing the thief for T-
minus-two-seconds is morally permissible, and jailing him for T-plus-two-seconds is not. But on 
what basis could a difference of only four seconds make such a large moral difference? We 
may answer the question by saying that there is no basis, so there cannot be a time T. There is 
a period of time where it is indeterminate whether it is morally permissible or impermissible.33 
Suppose that a punishment lasting exactly five years sits inside this grey area. The 
proposition ‘Jailing the thief for exactly five years is morally permissible’ thus has an 
indeterminate truth value. However, it seems to be a determinate moral proposition. It applies to 
a certain thief, and we know exactly what the punishment is. It is therefore a determinate moral 
proposition with an indeterminate truth value. 
Similarly, non-determinate propositions may have determinate truth values. ‘Nice people are 
nice’ clearly has a determinate truth value, but the proposition is not determinate because it 
gives very little information. It does not tell us much about how to identify nice people, what 
makes them nice, what specific actions nice people perform, and so on. 
The determinacy of a proposition depends on the terms within the proposition. Can terms 
have application conditions independently of their occurrence in a proposition? Do they only 
have application conditions when they are included in a proposition? Our answers to these 
questions depend on our philosophy of language, and I will remain neutral on this issue here. All 
                                                             
33 This example is based on Matthew Kramer’s ((2009), pp. 109-113). 
20 
 
we need is that terms have application conditions that affect the determinacy of the proposition 
in which they appear. 
A proposition may be non-determinate even if some of the terms in it have very precise 
application conditions, because the proposition also includes other terms with less precise 
application conditions. Take 
 
4) Humans should generally keep promises to other humans 
 
We might think that ‘promise’ is a term with fairly precise application conditions. Most of the 
time, we can identify when a promise has been made, and we know the conditions under which 
a promise is kept or broken. However, (4) is non-determinate, because it includes the term 
‘generally’. What does ‘generally’ mean here? Should we keep promises unless it is 
inconvenient? Unless keeping promises conflicts with other moral norms? Does it mean that in 
most possible situations humans should keep promises, or in most actual situations? (4) gives 
no information about when the exceptions occur, and there may be lot of exceptions. So (4) is 
non-determinate, despite the fact that the term ‘promise’ has fairly precise application 
conditions. We can swap the term ‘generally’ with ‘always’ to get 
 
5)  Humans should always keep promises to other humans 
 
This proposition is more determinate, as it allows no possible exceptions to humans keeping 
promises to other humans. 
A proposition’s determinacy is not necessarily related to its status as an a priori or an a 
posteriori proposition. The a priori proposition ‘An agent is nice if they are nice’ and the a 
posteriori proposition ‘Animals consume things’ are both non-determinate. Similarly, the a priori 
proposition ‘Bachelors are unmarried’ and the a posteriori proposition ‘In 2000, the Queen of 
England was the Queen of Canada’ are both more determinate. 
Core moral propositions can be determinate or non-determinate. Theories that endorse a 
priori core moral propositions are more attractive if at least some of the propositions are 
determinate, because the normative content of non-core moral propositions are justified by core 
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moral propositions. If the core moral propositions are non-determinate, it may be unclear what 
exactly they can justify. Suppose that there is only one core moral proposition: ‘Being nice to 
others is morally obligatory’. ‘Nice’ has quite imprecise application conditions, so it is unclear 
which other moral propositions it can justify that can help to guide our actual moral behaviour. 
We can give the term ‘nice’ more precise application conditions, but that will make the 
proposition more determinate. In fact, a theory that only contains non-determinate core moral 
propositions will be much less capable of justifying the normative content of various non-core 
moral propositions. I will examine this point in greater detail in section 3 of chapter 2, as it is 
essential for the core-aposteriorist’s defence of the Central Claim. 
One can interpret Kant’s, Ross’s and Parfit’s moral theories as endorsing the existence of a 
priori determinate core moral propositions. We already know that they endorse a priori core 
moral propositions, so it is not a great leap to say that some of these propositions are 
determinate. Take Kant and drink-driving. Could it be morally permissible to get drunk and drive 
a car? No, because no rational agent could will a maxim that allowed such a theory to be a 
universal law. The Kantian’s endorsement of the categorical imperative can be expressed with 
the determinate core moral proposition 
 
6) Humans should always act in accordance with the categorical imperative 
 
The Kantian can claim that we can discover a priori both what the categorical imperative is and 
that humans should always act in accordance with it, so (6) is an a priori determinate core moral 
proposition. It can be used in the following argument: 
 
6) Humans should always act in accordance with the categorical imperative 
7) Drink-driving is an act that always contravenes the categorical imperative 
 Therefore 
8) Humans should never drink-drive 
 
(7) is a descriptive proposition, and (6), an a priori core moral proposition, justifies the normative 
content of (8), a non-core moral proposition. 
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One might object that (6) cannot be determinate because it is too abstract a proposition. 
Propositions can be more or less abstract than other propositions, and the determinacy of a 
proposition is necessarily linked to how abstract it is. I use Matthew Kramer’s criterion for 
abstractness here. Moral principle A is more abstract (and less concrete) than moral principle B 
if and only if the falsity of A would affect the truth value of a wider range of moral principles than 
the falsity of B would.34 The objection is that the more abstract a proposition is, the less 
determinate it must be. The categorical imperative is very abstract – it says nothing explicitly 
about particular moral duties we have (to develop the skills we have, to support those in need, 
to keep promises even when it does not benefit us, etc.) or particular situations that actual 
agents may find themselves in. For this reason, the objection claims, (6) cannot be a 
determinate proposition. Conversely, the proposition ‘Mary should give £2 to the person 
collecting for Cancer Research UK that she just passed on Tottenham Court Road’ is a 
concrete moral proposition, and it is very determinate. 
This objection fails, though, because the distinction between determinate and non-
determinate propositions has no necessary link with the distinction between abstract and 
concrete propositions. First, abstract propositions can be just as determinate as concrete 
propositions. Take: 
 
White: It is always morally permissible to tell white lies 
Social: It is morally permissible to tell white lies to Mr Jones, the complete stranger 
whom you have just met at tonight’s dinner party (and expect never to meet 
again) to save some slight personal embarrassment 
 
White implies Social, but Social does not imply White. In fact, Social appears to apply to only 
one situation: this particular dinner party, this particular stranger, this particular motive for lying 
.The truth value of White affects the truth value of a wider range of moral principles than the 
truth value of Social, and so White is more abstract (and less concrete) than Social. However, if 
we are able to determine just what a white lie is, and under which conditions one may be 
correctly said to be telling a white lie, then White may be just as determinate as Social. This 
                                                             
34 Kramer (2009), p. 10. Kramer characterises his metaethics partly with the use of the distinction between abstract and 
concrete moral principles, and it is important to remember this point in chapter 4, where I examine his moral realism. 
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does not mean that it is as concrete as Social, because it is still the case that the truth value of 
White affects the truth value of a wider range of moral principles than the truth value of Social 
does. Therefore, if a proposition is abstract, that does not imply that it is non-determinate. 
Furthermore, we cannot assume that a concrete moral proposition is determinate. Take 
 
Friend: It is morally obligatory for Jack to be particularly nice to Jill today because she is 
under a lot of stress from her upcoming exams right now 
 
This is a concrete moral proposition, as it applies to a particular agent, Jack, and a particular 
situation. But it is a non-determinate proposition, since we may have no idea what exactly Jack 
must do to be particularly nice to Jill. 
Returning to (6), we now see that (6) can be determinate even though it is more abstract 
than many other moral propositions. It may not tell you whether many particular moral 
propositions are true or false, but this is because (6) is abstract, not because it is non-
determinate. 
These points also apply to another distinction, that between general laws and particular 
cases. White, if it is true, is a general law regarding the moral permissibility of telling white lies. 
Social and Friend are propositions about particular cases. However, the fact that White is a 
general law does not imply that it is non-determinate, and the fact that Friend concerns a 
particular case does not imply that it is determinate. 
I am aware that I have used a number of terms in the Central Claim that do not appear in the 
literature, and one might think that it would be better instead to defend a well-known claim from 
the literature that is similar to the Central Claim. As we see in this chapter, there are clearly 
existing disagreements in the literature between ethicists who believe that various normative 
moral claims can only be defended with a posteriori evidence, and ethicists who reject this idea. 
However, I have concentrated on the Central Claim for two reasons. The first is that whilst there 
are clearly disagreements between the two groups of ethicists, we need to articulate precisely 
what the disagreements are about. The Central Claim presents a way of formulating one such 
disagreement. I do not wish to defend any specific claims made by any particular core-
aposteriorist theory, as such claims may not be made by other core-aposteriorist theories. All 
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core-aposteriorist theories imply the Central Claim, though, and my defence of the Central 
Claim does not rely on any particular core-aposteriorist theory being correct. The second reason 
is that the Central Claim is actually a rather narrow claim about the place of the a posteriori in 
the attainment of moral knowledge. It does not imply that (for example) every true moral 
proposition can be justified a posteriori, and it does not deny that a priori evidence is often 
important or essential for ascertaining the truth of the normative content of various particular 
moral propositions. What I want to show in this thesis is that a posteriori evidence is necessary 
for ascertaining the truth of the normative content of at least some moral propositions. 
Defending the Central Claim is a good way to do this. 
 
4 – Knowledge and justification 
 
The Central Claim is a specific claim concerning moral epistemology, and therefore I will not be 
concerned with other metaethical issues, such as the existence of moral properties. However, I 
will say a little about knowledge, justification and the relationship between them. 
Gettier cases show that it is not sufficient simply to have a justified true belief that p in order 
to know that p.35 Suppose that I know that Jones has ten coins in his pocket, and that I have 
good justification to believe that he got a coveted job yesterday. I form the justified belief that a 
man with ten coins in his pocket got the job. Actually, Smith got the job. Unbeknownst to me, 
Smith also has ten coins in his pocket. My belief that a man with ten coins in his pocket got the 
job is justified and true, but I did not know that a man with ten coins in his pocket got the job. 
The truth of my belief depends largely on luck. A lucky belief cannot be knowledge. 
Perhaps knowledge is justified true belief plus something else that excludes luck. Whilst this 
strategy tries to eliminate Gettier cases, it still defines knowledge in terms of justification and 
belief. Consequently, knowledge is not a basic term. However, this idea has been increasingly 
challenged. For example, Linda Zagzebski argues that no matter what you add to justified true 
belief to get knowledge, there is always a way to adapt Gettier cases to ensure that it is not 
knowledge.36 Timothy Williamson has famously defended the claim that knowledge is a basic 
term. He believes that knowing that p is a mental state of an agent, just like believing that p is. 
                                                             
35 Gettier (1963). 
36 Zagzebski (1994). 
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Furthermore, ‘[o]ne’s evidence [for p] justifies [a] belief… if and only if one’s knowledge justifies 
that belief’.37 Justification is not conceptually prior to knowledge. Knowledge comes first. It 
justifies our beliefs, instead of being what is justified. It is thus a mistake to define knowledge in 
terms of justification. 
It would take too much space to adjudicate this issue here. For my purposes, all I need is a 
necessary link between knowledge and justification. I will point out, though, that we can accept 
such a connection whether Williamson is right or not. If knowledge can be defined in terms of 
justification, then one cannot have knowledge without justification. If Williamson is right, then if 
something cannot justify any belief, it cannot be knowledge. At minimum, knowledge that p can 
justify the belief that p. One’s knowledge that p implies that one’s belief that p is justified. 
The exact meaning of the term ‘justify’ can change from author to author. At one end of the 
spectrum, it can mean something like ‘guarantee as true’. For example, X only justifies Y if X 
guarantees the truth of Y. If Y is not true, then X cannot be either. Towards the other end of the 
spectrum, ‘justify’ can mean something like ‘increases the likelihood of’. For example, my belief 
that Helen is now in France may be justified by the fact that I saw her booking a stay in a 
Parisian hotel for today, as this fact makes it more probable that she is in France. However, it 
does not guarantee that she is in France (She might have changed her mind about going.). We 
might even take ‘justify’ to be weaker than this; it might mean ‘make rationally permissible to 
believe that’ or ‘render intelligible a belief that’. I am not going to fully define the term ‘justify’ in 
this thesis, but my position is closer to the former end of the spectrum than the latter. If X 
justifies Y, then Y is much more likely to be true than not, even if Y’s truth is not guaranteed. 
It may still be the case that having a justified true belief is not the same as having 
knowledge, but as I have said, all we need is a necessary connection between justification and 
knowledge. One cannot have knowledge of X without having access to a justification of X, either 
because justification is a necessary constituent of knowledge, or (if we agree with Williamson’s 
views) because knowledge of X always entails that X is justified. 
 
5 – Why accept core-apriorist theories? 
 
                                                             
37 Williamson (2002), p. 9. 
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One reason why core-apriorist theories have been so popular is because of the difficulty of 
showing that one can ascertain the truth of moral propositions simply through a posteriori 
methods. W.D. Ross claims that if you only provide a posteriori explanations such as 
sociological explanations for why we have moral belief X, this neither justifies nor refutes the 
belief. The truth or falsity of X is independent of the sociological explanation for us having the 
belief, and Ross believes that we use other methods to ascertain the belief’s truth.38 These 
methods, claims the core-apriorist, are a priori methods. 
One might think that Ross rejects sociological explanations simply because of the difficulty 
(or impossibility) of using descriptive information to justify normative conclusions. If sociological 
explanations are purely descriptive, they have no normative implications. However, Hallvard 
Lillehammer points to another explanation of Ross’s view, which is that sociology, like other 
sciences, analyses natural systems. Moral beliefs are not like natural systems, as moral beliefs 
have characteristics ‘of being true or false, of resting on knowledge or of being the product of 
wishes, hopes and fears’.39 Natural systems do not, yet it is these characteristics that give moral 
beliefs any normative authority they may have. Sociology and other sciences therefore do not 
provide the necessary tools to discover if moral beliefs are true or false. This objection is not the 
same as the objection that purely descriptive information cannot have normative implications, so 
it is a separate reason why the core-apriorist may reject the Central Claim. 
Both objections, however, imply that sociological study simply does not have the tools to 
justify any normative moral conclusions. When sociological evidence is used in moral 
arguments, it does no normative work. It therefore does not justify the normative content of a 
moral argument’s conclusion. The objections can be extended to apply to other types of a 
posteriori evidence. We can see an example of this with Selim Berker’s objection to Joshua 
Greene’s argument that consequentialist theories are preferable to deontological theories. 
Berker claims that the empirical psychological research that Greene cites to support his 
argument is irrelevant to the argument’s conclusion. The core-apriorist will add to this that all the 
normative work in the argument must be done a priori, contrary to what Greene believes. 
Greene argues that deontologists normally make moral judgements based on quick, 
automatic emotional responses, and if reasoning takes place it is to rationalise the judgements 
                                                             
38 Ross (2002), chapter 1. 
39 Ross (2002), p. 13; Lillehammer (2016), pp. 105-106. 
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after they have been made. He claims that ‘there is a remarkable correspondence between 
what rationalist deontological theories tell us to do and what our emotions tell us to do’, and he 
bases his conclusions on a large body of neurophysiological experiments.40  Since our 
deontological judgements are emotionally driven, rather than rationally driven, we have no 
reason to trust such judgements. Emotions are not a reliable guide to moral truth.41 In general, 
then, we should be dubious about deontological theories. Consequentialist judgements are less 
likely to have this problem, and hence they are preferable. 
This argument is problematic. Suppose that Professor X, a deontologist, holds that one 
should not torture children, even when the consequences of such torture would be good. 
Greene may claim, using a posteriori research, that Professor X’s judgement was emotionally 
generated, and so she has no reason to hold this view. The smaller problem with this claim is 
that we cannot just assume that Professor X does not make her moral judgements rationally, 
especially if she is an ethicist herself. It is still an open question how far philosophical training 
can help us avoid mistakes when making moral judgements.42 Deontological judgements may 
yet have a rational basis. 
The larger problem is that it does not matter what Professor X believes. What matters is 
whether the argument that she provides for her belief is correct. Suppose that Joe beats me in a 
competition. Upset, I accuse him of cheating. I honestly believe that he has cheated, because I 
am unaware of how upset I am. I unwittingly use my reasoning to construct a plausible 
argument for how he could have cheated. It then turns out that he did cheat in the way I 
claimed. I did not know that he cheated, because my belief was not based on the argument I 
gave. However, the argument provides a method to know whether Joe cheated. It is irrelevant 
that I did not actually use this argument to form my belief. 
At most, if an agent makes a moral judgement based on quick, automatic emotional 
responses, that could give us a reason to pause before accepting it. But that does not 
necessarily mean that we should reject the judgement. Obviously, the deontologist must provide 
convincing arguments for her judgements, but this shifts the debate from ‘Why do you believe 
                                                             
40 Greene (2007), p. 68. See also Greene (2014). 
41 I assume here that agents must use rational, not emotional methods to attain moral knowledge. Philosophers such as 
Jesse Prinz (2007) will object, but that debate is not relevant to the points I make here. 
42 Jonathan Haidt points to evidence that philosophers are more likely to use reason than others ((2001), p. 819), but 
Greene disputes this ((2014), pp. 719-720). 
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this?’ to ‘If this is true, what methods could be used to know it?’ The deontologist’s 
psychological state drops out of the picture.  
Greene’s argument tries to show that deontological judgements are decided by emotional 
responses, which are normatively irrelevant.43 Selim Berker suggests that Greene’s argument is 
something like the following: 
 
1)  Deontological judgements are influenced by emotional responses that are triggered by 
certain factors. 
2) These factors are normatively irrelevant. 
3) So the emotional responses that influence deontological judgements are triggered by 
factors that are normatively irrelevant. 
4) So deontological judgements have no genuinely normative force.44 
 
(2) is problematic for Greene, claims Berker, because the experimental results that Greene uses 
to make his argument do not support it.45 Berker points out that the normative content of the 
argument – the part that is doing the philosophical heavy lifting – is not obtained from the a 
posteriori research that Greene cites. He cannot use his experimental results to ascertain which 
factors in moral judgement-making are normatively relevant, which means that he cannot use 
the results to conclude that deontological judgements rely on morally irrelevant factors. 
Consequently, we do not need to examine a posteriori how people actually make deontological 
judgements in order to reach the conclusion that such judgements are unjustified. It is 
unimportant precisely how people make these judgements. All Greene needs is the argument 
 
5) Deontological judgements are based on certain factors. 
6) These factors are normatively irrelevant. 
7) So deontological judgements have no genuinely normative force. 
 
We do not need any information about the emotional dispositions or neurophysiology of actual 
agents to reach the conclusion that consequentialism is preferable to deontological theories. 
                                                             
43 Greene (2007), pp. 67-70. 
44 Adapted slightly from Berker (2009), p. 322. 
45 Berker (2009), p 322. 
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Berker does not say that we cannot use a posteriori research to find out which factors in 
moral judgement-making are morally irrelevant. He limits his criticisms to the neurophysiological 
research that Greene uses. However, his criticism is consistent with a stronger type of 
argument, one that has a core-apriorist conclusion: 
 
8) Determinate core moral propositions have normative content. 
9) Moral agents can know at least some true determinate core moral propositions. 
10) If an agent uses the wrong method to ascertain the truth of the normative content of a 
true moral proposition, he cannot know the proposition. To know the proposition, he 
must use an appropriate method. 
11) Any method that is based on a posteriori research will fail, for the same reason that 
Greene’s attempt fails. The research will have no relevant normative implications, and if 
we try using the research to reach relevant normative conclusions, we will find that any 
such conclusions we draw are not based at all on the research. We reached the 
conclusions without it. 
12) But moral agents can know some true determinate core moral propositions, so there 
must be a method to ascertain the truth of a moral proposition’s normative content. 
13) Since this method cannot utilise information obtained a posteriori, it must be a priori. 
 
I am not going to develop this argument here, though it is worth saying that the core-
aposteriorist will disagree with (11), I use the argument simply to show one way that one can 
support core-apriorist theories. Neither do I want to argue that Greene’s argument is ultimately 
correct. My defence of the Central Claim is entirely independent of Greene’s argument. 
Some core-apriorists have used something like the argument (8)-(13) to defend their 
position. For example, Patrick Clipsham uses what he calls the ‘What’s at issue?’ argument 
(‘WA’) to argue that there is something very different epistemologically between moral 
disagreements and non-moral naturalist disagreements. It is not entirely clear what he takes the 
WA to show, but it can be interpreted as a version of the argument (8)-(13).46 
                                                             
46 Clipsham bases the WA on his interpretation of Allan Gibbard (2003), pp. 23-29. Gibbard might not agree with him, 
because Gibbard argues in that passage that the meaning of moral terms is empirically indeterminate, which is not what 
the WA claims. Neither does Gibbard use the WA against Shaun Nichols when Nichols criticises Gibbard’s metaethics 
on empirical grounds (Nichols (2004), pp. 90-96; Gibbard (2006)). 
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Clipsham claims that we can resolve non-moral naturalist disagreements a posteriori in three 
ways.47 If Jack and Jill disagree over whether something is a horse, they can do three things to 
resolve the disagreement: 
 
14) agree on a complete definition of ‘horse’ and check a posteriori whether the thing 
matches the definition; 
15) agree on what the a posteriori evidence is, so that they can match it to the criteria for 
something being a horse, having also agreed on how those criteria should be applied; 
or 
16) agree on belief-formation norms regarding horses; that is, agree under what conditions 
we should believe that something is a horse. 
 
If the disagreement cannot be resolved in one of these ways, it becomes ‘baffling’ what the 
disagreement is really about.48 However, moral disagreement is different. Suppose that Jack 
and Jill disagree whether it is morally right to torture a terrorist for information that will save 
lives. It seems that they can 
 
17) agree on a definition of ‘right’;  
18) agree on all the relevant non-moral facts about the situation; and 
19) agree on when agents should form beliefs about moral matters; but 
20) disagree on whether torturing the terrorist is morally right. 
 
Clipsham states that the disagreement may be entirely reasonable, and it seems intuitive that it 
is a real moral disagreement.49 Deontologists and consequentialists, he claims, can disagree 
over moral dilemmas even when they agree on all the non-moral facts about the dilemmas, and 
they are not confused or irrational to do so. Such disagreements must be about moral 
propositions that cannot be justified by a posteriori evidence. 
But why is this the case? The core-apriorist will give an answer such as the argument (8)-
(13). Moral disagreements are normative disagreements, and so if we tried to resolve them by 
                                                             
47 Clipsham uses the term ‘empirical’ rather than ‘a posteriori’, but this makes no practical difference. 
48 Clipsham (2014), pp. 216-217. 
49 Clipsham (2014), pp. 221, 225-226, 228. 
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using a posteriori evidence to argue for or against a particular moral proposition, we would fail. 
We can only ascertain the truth of the normative content of the moral proposition by using an a 
priori method. 
 
6 – The Core-Apriorist Thesis 
 
In order to argue for the Central Claim, I will argue that the core-apriorist is wrong, which entails 
that the core-aposteriorist is right. To do so, I need to refute the positive thesis that the core-
apriorist holds. This is the Core-Apriorist Thesis (‘CAT’): 
 
CAT: In the group of determinate core moral propositions that a possible moral agent 
can know, for any proposition in that group, either: 
 
a) the normative content of the proposition can only be ascertained by 
using exclusively a priori methods, or 
b) if the normative content of the proposition can be ascertained by using 
a posteriori or mixed methods, it can also be ascertained by using an a 
priori method, and the a priori method has explanatory precedence over 
the a posteriori and mixed methods. 
 
Philosophers such as Parfit would hold part (a), and those such as Ross would hold part (b). 
Core-aposteriorists must reject it entirely, as it implies that the Central Claim is false. If part (a) 
is correct, then we cannot know the truth of any determinate core moral propositions with a 
posteriori or mixed methods. If part (b) is correct, then if the truth of a particular determinate 
core moral proposition can be known with a posteriori or mixed methods, it can always be 
known with a priori methods as well. The a priori methods have explanatory precedence over 
the other methods. The core-aposteriorist will therefore accept neither part (a) nor part (b). 
It is possible to reject both the Central Claim and the CAT. This third position holds that if 
there is an a posteriori or mixed method to ascertain the truth of the normative content of a 
determinate core moral proposition, there is also an a priori method to do so, but the a priori 
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method has no explanatory precedence over the other method. I am going to ignore this 
position because when I criticise the CAT later in the thesis, I do so by showing that there are 
most likely some determinate core moral propositions that can only be known through the use of 
a posteriori information. This entails that the third position is automatically unsuccessful. Since I 
want to exclude this third position from the debate between the core-apriorist and the core-
aposteriorist, I will make a little more precise what a core-apriorist holds. Core-apriorists accept 
the CAT, and hence reject the Central Claim. My strategy will be to show that we can 
reasonably reject the CAT, and this is good evidence that the Central Claim is correct. I will do 
this in two stages, by rejecting part (b) of the CAT in chapter 2, and arguing against part (a) in 
the rest of the thesis. 
Part (b) introduces the idea of explanatory precedence. We can show what explanatory 
precedence is by using what I call the mathematics analogy.50 An agent can work out that 
2+2=4 a priori from particular mathematical axioms, or a posteriori by counting apples. He can 
get the correct answer with each method, and both methods are reliable. However, the a priori 
method takes explanatory precedence over the a posteriori method. The reason why 2+2=4 is 
because the calculation is justified by certain mathematical axioms that are true, rather than 
because certain apples were counted first or because apples were used instead of oranges. 
The a priori method explicitly uses the axioms to make the calculations, whereas the a posteriori 
method does not.51 The a priori method thus has explanatory precedence, because if the 
axioms were false, the truth of the calculations may have been different. Changing apples for 
oranges could never affect the truth of the calculations. 
If I count apples to find out that 2+2=4, I still have good reason to believe that 2+2=4. I can 
explain why I got the answer that I did, by grouping apples together in a particular way. 
However, mathematicians do not hold that 2+2=4 simply because every time we count physical 
objects, we find out that two objects plus two objects equal four objects. Mathematicians search 
for an explanation why 2+2=4 that has more explanatory power, and they find it by discovering 
certain mathematical axioms that (as far as we know) are true. 
                                                             
50 I use the mathematics analogy as an illustration, and so I am not endorsing any philosophy of mathematics it may 
imply. 
51 The analogy assumes that mathematical knowledge can be a priori. We will see in section 1 of chapter 2 that this 
assumption can be challenged, but for the moment I will ignore this complication. 
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The mathematics analogy claims that moral knowledge is similar to mathematical knowledge 
in this way. Even if there are a posteriori methods to attain moral knowledge, these methods are 
only useful because there are a priori methods to attain the same knowledge, and so the a priori 
methods have explanatory precedence over the a posteriori methods. So if we use an a 
posteriori method to ascertain a determinate core moral proposition, part (b) of the CAT kicks in. 
The a posteriori method may let us attain determinate core moral knowledge, but only because 
there is an a priori method to attain the same knowledge that has explanatory precedence over 
the a posteriori method. 
Core-apriorists are less likely to endorse part (b) of the CAT than part (a), but it should be 
included in the CAT for two reasons. First, one can find something like part (b) in the writings of 
some core-apriorists. For example, W.D. Ross appears to endorse it.52 Second, part (b) does 
not actually concede that much to core-aposteriorists. As we will see shortly, when core-
aposteriorists endorse a posteriori or mixed methods to attain moral knowledge, they often 
imply that the methods utilise fundamental reasons or explanations for the truth of various moral 
propositions. To use a very simple example, a core-aposteriorist may hold that the fundamental 
reason why moral proposition X is true is because natural property Y exists, and we can only 
ascertain via a particular a posteriori or mixed method that Y exists and implies the truth of X. 
Therefore if a method has explanatory precedence over other methods, it will be an a posteriori 
or mixed method, contrary to part (b) of the CAT. 
It is helpful to see how the CAT applies to a particular example. Haidt et al have conducted 
experiments to show that people often make moral judgements based on their emotional 
reactions to moral scenarios. For example, they feel that incest is disgusting, so they believe 
that it is morally wrong under any circumstances, and they tend to persist in their belief even 
when all their stated reasons for their belief have been debunked.53 Jesse Prinz uses these 
experiments as part of his argument that we attain moral knowledge by experiencing certain 
emotional dispositions.54 Is incest wrong? If you are disposed to have particular emotional 
reactions towards it, then yes. 
                                                             
52 Ross (2002), pp. 32-33. See also Ross (1929), p. 121, where he claims that ‘that something can be inferred does not 
prove that it cannot be seen intuitively’. 
53 Haidt et al (2000). 
54 Prinz (2007), pp. 29-32. 
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If Prinz is right and the prohibition against incest is only knowable a posteriori, then it cannot 
be justified by an a priori determinate core moral proposition. Therefore, if Prinz is right, then 
part (a) of the CAT is wrong. Obviously, core-apriorists who endorse part (a) of the CAT will turn 
this around: since part (a) is correct, Prinz must be wrong. Haidt et al’s experiments can only 
describe actual people’s behaviour when they make moral judgements. The experiments do not 
reveal which moral propositions are true or how they can be known. 
If part (b) applies, then Prinz’s a posteriori method to attain moral knowledge may work, but 
there will also be an a priori method to attain the same knowledge, and this a priori method will 
have explanatory precedence over Prinz’s a posteriori method. However, given the details of 
Prinz’s metaethics, this is impossible. Prinz believes that the method works because moral 
properties simply are properties that dispose observers to experience certain emotions.55 The 
fundamental reason why genocide is wrong is because it consists of mass murder, which 
provokes outrage in observers. This therefore implies that no other method can have 
explanatory precedence over Prinz’s method, because there is no more fundamental reason. 
We thus see here a core-aposteriorist theory that would reject part (b) of the CAT because the 
theory entails that a posteriori methods have explanatory precedence. 
Richard Boyd is another core-aposteriorist. His moral realism is similar to scientific realism, 
which holds that scientific theories seek to describe real phenomena and that ‘ordinary scientific 
methods constitute a reliable procedure for obtaining and improving (approximate) knowledge of 
the real phenomena that scientific theories describe’.56 We assess our scientific beliefs by 
observing the world around us, and we should do the same with our moral beliefs. 
 
‘[G]oodness is a property quite similar to other properties studied by psychologists, historians 
and other social scientists, and observations will play the same role in moral enquiry that 
they play in other kinds of enquiry about people.’57 
 
The properties that are discovered by psychologists, historians and social scientists are 
commonly discovered a posteriori. One cannot discover the results of the 1829 British general 
election without a posteriori investigation of contemporary evidence. But if moral properties are 
                                                             
55 Prinz (2007), pp. 20-21, 92. 
56 Boyd (1988), p. 181. 
57 Boyd (1988), p. 206. 
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so similar to historical and psychological properties, it is very unclear how there could be any 
purely a priori method to attain knowledge of moral properties. If we cannot do so with historical 
properties, how could we do so with moral properties? Boyd does not even hint that an a priori 
method could be possible, and we can guess why. As moral properties are natural properties, 
we should be able to know them in the same way that we know other natural properties. If we 
cannot know natural properties a priori, then we cannot know moral properties a priori.58 Since 
no a priori methods to attain moral knowledge are possible, this entails rejecting both parts (a) 
and (b) of the CAT.  
The lesson to draw from Prinz and Boyd is that many philosophers who want to explain how 
moral agents attain core moral knowledge also have other metaethical aims, such as the 
metaphysical task of explaining what moral properties are, and this shapes their epistemological 
commitments. This is why core-aposteriorists do not want to endorse part (b) of the CAT. Their 
epistemological commitments entail that if any method has explanatory precedence over other 
methods, this method is an a posteriori or mixed method. 
Having laid out the debate, we can now begin defending the Central Claim. 
 
 
 
 
  
                                                             
58 I ignore here the objection that some natural properties are knowable a priori; for example, Kant thought that some 
knowledge of causation and time is a priori ((1998), A64/B89-A83/B109). It is clear that Boyd is thinking of natural 
properties that can only be known a posteriori. 
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Chapter 2 – The a posteriori strategy 
 
In this chapter, I will first reject part (b) of the CAT. I will then examine two strategies to reject 
part (a). The first strategy, which involves examining the cognitive abilities of moral agents, 
initially looks promising, but it is a dead end. The second strategy, which seeks to refute the 
CAT, is more successful, and will take up the rest of the thesis. 
 
1 – The mathematics analogy 
 
Part (b) of the CAT can be defended with the mathematics analogy. If a priori mathematical 
knowledge exists, and if moral knowledge is sufficiently like mathematical knowledge, then that 
is good evidence that a priori moral knowledge exists. 
The core-aposteriorist could try arguing against the possibility of a priori mathematical 
knowledge. She could claim that mathematical axioms cannot be known a priori, and so the 
propositions that they justify cannot be known a priori. Therefore there are no a priori methods 
to attain mathematical knowledge, and the analogy collapses. This is an obvious strategy to try. 
If mathematical knowledge is indeed similar to moral knowledge, then if there is no a priori 
mathematical knowledge, we have no reason to think that there is any a priori moral knowledge. 
However, this is actually a difficult route to take, as I will now show. We will see that the core-
aposteriorist would do better to argue differently, and to claim that the mathematics analogy is 
actually redundant when it comes to defending core-apriorist theories. 
How do we choose which mathematical axioms to accept? Justin Clarke-Doane points out 
that your philosophy of mathematics is very likely to influence the axioms you choose.1 For 
example, George Boolos cheerfully declares himself untroubled by the existence of infinitely 
many natural numbers, but he balks at some of the theorems that are provable in ZFC, a type of 
set theory. ZFC’s axioms prove the existence of orders of infinity so high that Boolos becomes 
sceptical. He admits that he does not have ‘very good evidence’ for rejecting such orders, and 
he does not categorically deny their existence. But the burden of proof, he claims, is on the set 
theorist to justify the axioms. ZFC’s axioms are ‘so removed from experience and the 
                                                             
1 Clarke-Doane (2014), p. 241. 
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requirements of the rest of science (including mathematics)’ that we need better reasons to 
accept the axioms that generate those theorems.2 
Clarke-Doane writes that when we accept mathematical axioms, what we really do is begin 
with particular propositions that we deem plausible and seek general principles which 
systematise those propositions.3 Boolos appears to be doing just that. Unable to accept 
unimaginably large numbers, he rejects the axioms that produce them. Certainly the axioms 
mathematically imply the existence of such numbers, but why should we accept those axioms in 
the first place? 
Interestingly, Boolos appeals to science, not just mathematics, for evidence of the existence 
of numbers. This should trouble the core-apriorist, as much of science is a posteriori. If a 
posteriori evidence helps to show which mathematical axioms to accept, then the axioms are 
not accepted on a priori grounds. Mathematical knowledge is not a priori, so the core-apriorist 
cannot use the mathematics analogy to defend part (b) of the CAT. 
However, we cannot just assume that mathematical knowledge is ultimately a posteriori. We 
have to show that it is, and there are philosophical theories that claim to do so. I will outline two 
well-known types of such theories here. Unfortunately, neither is particularly promising. If we 
want to show that mathematical knowledge is a posteriori, and so the mathematics analogy is 
harmless to the core-aposteriorist, there is a lot of work to do. 
First, mathematical nominalism claims that there are no abstract entities, which numbers are 
typically taken to be. There is a large variety of nominalist theories, which hold that concrete 
entities in the universe play the roles that numbers are supposed to play.4 Consequently, the 
nominalist can say that a mathematical proposition is true, but this depends on what the 
concrete universe is like. The structure of the concrete universe determines what is available to 
play the roles of numbers in a mathematical theory, and knowledge of the concrete universe 
may be a posteriori. 
A second option is to become a fictionalist.5 Fictionalism claims that numbers are fictional 
just like literary characters are, and so no mathematical propositions are true. Therefore we 
cannot really have any knowledge of true mathematical propositions, either a priori or a 
                                                             
2 Boolos (1999), p. 121. 
3 Clarke-Doane (2014), p. 240. 
4 Burgess and Rosen (1987) provide an overview of the different types of nominalism. 
5 E.g. Field (1989), chapter 1. 
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posteriori, though we may use mathematical discourse as a way – not the only way – to 
describe physical phenomena, such as the Earth’s orbit around the sun. 
If either of these theories works, then the last thing that the core-apriorist wants is to show 
that moral knowledge works in the same way as mathematical knowledge. However, the 
theories come with various problems, so we cannot just pick one of them and conclude that the 
mathematics analogy fails. Fictionalism is in trouble if the only way that we can describe 
physical phenomena is mathematically. That would entail that fictional entities are essential for 
correct descriptions of the phenomena, which is highly implausible. If, however, fictionalism 
works, then the core-aposteriorist had better hope that the moral error theorist cannot now use 
the mathematics analogy. The moral error theorist believes that every possible moral 
proposition is false, and his version of the mathematics analogy would run like this: fictionalism 
entails that knowledge of true mathematical propositions is impossible. Mathematical 
epistemology works like moral epistemology, and therefore knowledge of true moral 
propositions is impossible. The core-aposteriorist does not want this result any more than the 
core-apriorist does. 
If the core-aposteriorist chooses to endorse mathematical nominalism, she avoids the 
problems with fictionalism, because the analogy becomes harmless. If mathematical knowledge 
is like moral knowledge, then moral entities will be concrete entities in the universe as well. But 
it is an open question whether mathematical nominalism is plausible. For example, we may ask 
if there are enough concrete entities in the universe to play all the roles that mathematics 
requires. Do we really want to hold mathematical theorems hostage to the amount of concrete 
entities in the universe? What if there are not enough concrete entities to play the roles of 
numbers in a mathematical system? Mathematical nominalists are not even agreed on what 
‘concrete’ means. 
Other problems will also arise depending on the core-aposteriorist’s specific moral theory. If 
she is a non-reductionist natural moral realist, for example, then she believes that moral 
properties are natural properties. But she also believes that we cannot reduce moral properties 
to non-moral natural properties, so it seems unlikely that she can say that particular concrete 
properties can play the role of moral properties. Doing so would imply some sort of 
reductionism. 
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Objecting to the mathematics analogy by showing that mathematical knowledge is a 
posteriori turns out to be a difficult task, and the core-aposteriorist may try instead to find 
another way forward. Fortunately, there is a much simpler way to neutralise it, by showing that it 
is of no use to the core-apriorist. 
The mathematics analogy assumes that we attain moral knowledge in the same type of way 
that we attain mathematical knowledge. But why do we not get moral knowledge in the same 
type of way that we get knowledge of chemistry? In chemistry, we use a posteriori experiments 
to discover chemical laws, which is very different from discoveries in pure mathematics. We 
cannot work out how chemicals react with each other just by reasoning a priori. So why is 
morality like mathematics and not like chemistry? We can appeal here to the ‘natural sciences 
analogy’, which claims that we attain moral knowledge in the same way that we attain 
knowledge of the natural sciences.6  
The core-apriorist may object that when we examine the world a posteriori, we discover what 
there is, but not what there necessarily is. I discover a posteriori that there are birds in my 
garden, but this is contingent. There may have been none. The core-apriorist could claim that 
when it comes to necessary facts, we can only discover what is necessarily the case by using a 
priori methods. This even applies to necessary facts about the natural world. It is a contingent a 
posteriori fact that Bert is a bachelor, but we discover a priori that since he is a bachelor, he is 
necessarily unmarried. So, the core-apriorist continues, scientific necessities must be a priori. If 
the natural sciences analogy holds, then moral necessities must also be a priori. The natural 
sciences analogy therefore does not help the core-aposteriorist. 
The core-aposteriorist can reply that if moral necessities exist, then at least some of them 
are a posteriori necessities. Saul Kripke has argued that metaphysical necessities can be a 
posteriori. Suppose that it is true that water is necessarily H2O. After all, it seems impossible 
that any substance could be water without also being H2O. But we did not find this out by using 
a priori methods, and it is difficult to see how we could have done. Instead, we had to use a 
posteriori research, and so we discovered the necessary fact a posteriori.7 Scientific 
necessities, if they are metaphysical necessities, therefore need not be a priori, so they cause 
                                                             
6 Richard Boyd’s moral epistemology, for example, is based on the natural sciences analogy. 
7 Kripke (1972), pp. 35-38, 100-105. 
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no problem for the core-aposteriorist’s use of the natural sciences analogy. Why can moral 
necessities not act like metaphysical necessities? 
It is important to realise that I am not arguing here that the natural sciences analogy in 
particular is correct. For one thing, the natural sciences analogy implies that there is an a 
posteriori method to ascertain the truth of the normative content of determinate core moral 
propositions, and so it ignores the possibility of mixed methods to ascertain the truth. It also 
ignores the possibility that there is an a posteriori method to do so that is very different from the 
a posteriori methods we use in the natural sciences. The reason I bring up the natural sciences 
analogy is to illustrate only one way that the core-aposteriorist may choose to reject the 
mathematics analogy. Both the core-aposteriorist who endorses a posteriori methods and the 
core-aposteriorist who endorses mixed methods are committed to rejecting it. Furthermore, one 
of the three types of method must be correct. If we cannot know the truth of a particular 
knowable moral proposition via a priori methods, a posteriori methods, or mixed methods, it is 
difficult to see how we can know it at all. 
My point, then, is that if there are alternatives to the mathematics analogy that favour the 
core-aposteriorist, such as the natural sciences analogy, we need to know why the core-
apriorist urges us to accept the mathematics analogy. I will show now that he does so because 
he makes a particular assumption, but this assumption renders the mathematics analogy 
redundant. If the assumption is false, then the mathematics analogy cannot work. If it is true, it 
already disproves the Central Claim, so the core-apriorist does not need the mathematics 
analogy. 
First, if the mathematics analogy is wrong, then there must be a method to know at least 
some knowable moral propositions that is not an a priori method, otherwise the moral 
propositions are not knowable. The only types of method left are a posteriori methods and 
mixed methods, and therefore the analogy poses no threat to the core-aposteriorist. 
Assume, then, that the mathematics analogy is correct. The core-apriorist wants to say here 
that there are always a priori methods to ascertain determinate core moral propositions that 
have explanatory precedence over a posteriori and mixed methods. But if this is so, then the 
mathematics analogy is redundant against the core-aposteriorist. The mathematics analogy 
relies on the key assumption that a priori methods always exist to ascertain determinate core 
41 
 
moral propositions. If this assumption is false, then the mathematics analogy fails. But if the 
assumption is true, then the assumption automatically disproves the Central Claim without the 
need for the mathematics analogy or explanatory precedence. It would show that there is no 
core determinate moral proposition the normative content of which can be ascertained as true 
only via a posteriori or mixed methods. Consequently, either the mathematics analogy is wrong 
or it is right but redundant, because the real work against the Central Claim is done by the key 
assumption.8 
The core-aposteriorist can therefore ignore part (b) of the CAT. The real issue is whether 
there are any true determinate core moral propositions that can only be known via an a 
posteriori or mixed method, and this debate need not concern explanatory precedence. 
 
2 – Moral cognitive abilities 
 
We come now to the first strategy to defend the core-aposteriorist. There have been moves 
recently amongst ethicists to use a posteriori information about our actual cognitive abilities in 
support of core-aposteriorist theories. In this section, I will argue that these moves are 
frequently unsuccessful. 
Shaun Nichols, a core-aposteriorist, thinks that in order to make what he calls ‘core moral 
judgements’, an agent needs to have a normative theory (which may be nothing more than just 
a collection of moral norms) and some emotional mechanism. Core moral judgements are moral 
judgements about the causing of harm.9 Nichols claims that to make such judgements, we must 
have the ability to feel particular emotions; we have strong emotional reactions against causing 
harm, which is a judgement that it is wrong.10 Furthermore, the reason why one moral norm 
overrides another may be because of our emotional reactions to the norms. Our emotional 
reaction not only tells us which norm overrides the other, but it also dictates whether the 
overriding happens. It is therefore difficult to see how we could know a priori when overriding 
happens, if the overriding depends on our emotional reactions. 
                                                             
8 This is similar to Christopher Cowie’s objections to companions in guilt arguments. Such arguments claim that moral 
facts are similar to other kinds of non-moral facts, and since these non-moral facts uncontroversially exist, there is no 
special problem that prohibits the existence of moral facts. Moral error theories are therefore unsuccessful. Cowie 
objects that these arguments either fail or only succeed if there are independent reasons to reject moral error theories, 
so the arguments are redundant ((2014); (2016)). 
9 Nichols (2004), pp. 6-7, 16-18. Nichols uses the term ‘core’ differently from me, and there is no necessary relationship 
between them. 
10 Nichols (2004), p. 135. 
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Nichols uses a posteriori psychological research concerning how people make core moral 
judgements to argue that if an agent cannot feel these emotions, she cannot make such 
judgements.11 I want to argue here that work such as Nichols’s gives the impression that we can 
use such a posteriori work directly to disprove the CAT, but this impression is mistaken. 
R.J.R Blair has conducted influential experiments to show that psychopaths cannot tell the 
difference between moral transgressions (such as hitting people) and conventional or social 
transgressions (such as school pupils not paying attention to the teacher).12 This is known as 
the moral/conventional distinction. Blair claims that psychopaths can recognise when a moral 
transgression is committed, but they treat all transgressions, moral or conventional, in the same 
way. Non-psychopaths differentiate between the types. Furthermore, psychopaths are much 
less likely to claim that a moral transgression is wrong because of the harm that the 
transgression causes. 
If psychopaths cannot recognise the moral/conventional distinction, does this mean that they 
are incapable of recognising moral norms as moral, and that they cannot attain genuine moral 
knowledge? Since Blair’s work, philosophers and psychologists have been arguing about what 
the distinction really shows.13 Fortunately, I need not settle the debate here, as I am only using 
Blair’s work as an example. Suppose, then, that psychopaths cannot recognise the 
moral/conventional distinction, and therefore they cannot recognise true moral propositions. To 
a certain extent, the psychopath’s endorsement of particular moral norms is just him copying 
what non-psychopaths do. The next question is why psychopaths cannot attain moral 
knowledge. What cognitive deficit do they have that prevents them from identifying moral 
transgressions as moral? 
Nichols argues that it cannot be a defect in the psychopath’s rationality.14 The problem is not 
that the psychopath lacks the ability to see the point of view of other people, or that he has a 
rational deficiency of some other type, or that he suffers from ‘intellectual arrogance’ and insists 
that he is right without being able to explain why. If Nichols is right, the psychopath can be just 
as rational as anyone else. His moral deficiency must therefore have a non-rational cause. 
                                                             
11 Nichols (2002); (2004). 
12 Blair (1995). 
13 E.g. Kelly et al (2007); Prinz (2008); Aharoni, Sinnott-Armstrong and Kiehl (2012). It is also difficult to define exactly 
what the distinction is (e.g. Southwood (2011)). 
14 Nichols (2002). 
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If this is true, then rationality by itself is not enough for an agent to be moral. Suppose further 
that what prevents psychopaths from recognising the moral/conventional distinction is an 
inability to feel various emotions. Therefore, in order to attain knowledge of a moral proposition, 
human moral agents must be able to have certain emotional attitudes towards the propositions 
under certain conditions. 
Take the following moral proposition: 
 
Torture: Torturing sentient beings for pleasure is morally impermissible 
 
Assume that Torture is a true determinate core moral proposition. If Nichols is correct about the 
psychopath, how can moral agents know that it is true? It appears that if most reasonably 
intelligent people with functioning moral cognitive abilities conclude that it is true, that is good 
evidence that it is true. ‘Cognitive abilities’ is a very broad term here. They include any abilities 
that agents can use to attain any sort of knowledge, whether mathematical, moral, scientific, 
perceptual, and so on. Moral cognitive abilities are the cognitive abilities an agent uses to attain 
moral knowledge. 
Most non-psychopathic people have particular emotional dispositions when considering 
Torture, whilst the psychopath does not. Given what Nichols has told us, we discover this by 
using a posteriori psychological evidence. So now it seems that we can find out whether Torture 
is correct depending on what our emotional dispositions are when we think about it. If Torture 
never triggers any emotional reaction in any agent who considers it, then this is good evidence 
that it is not true. Our confidence in the truth of Torture depends on the cognitive abilities that 
we actually have, and we find out a posteriori about these abilities. The psychopath provides the 
opportunity to observe an actual agent who cannot attain moral knowledge, and we can 
examine how he is cognitively different from actual moral agents. A posteriori examination of the 
difference tells us what cognitive abilities are required for agents to obtain evidence of true 
determinate core moral propositions. Armed with this knowledge of our moral cognitive abilities, 
we know that if a particular proposition can be ascertained as true via these abilities, we can 
have confidence that it is true. 
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The idea that we can use a posteriori information about our cognitive abilities to attain moral 
knowledge can also be found in work by Owen Flanagan, Hagop Sarkissian and David Wong. 
They endorse ‘ethical naturalism’. 
 
‘[M]oral philosophy should not employ a distinctive a priori method of yielding substantive, 
self-evident and foundational truths from pure conceptual analysis. The claims of ethical 
naturalism cannot be shielded from empirical testing. Indeed, the naturalist is committed to 
there being no sharp distinction between her investigation and those of relevant other 
disciplines (particularly between epistemology and psychology)… [E]thical science must be 
continuous with other sciences.’15 
 
Replace ‘naturalist’ in this quote with ‘core-aposteriorist’, and this would be a good description 
of some of the core-aposteriorist’s beliefs. 
Taking their cue from W.V.O. Quine, Flanagan, Sarkissian and Wong separate what they call 
‘naturalized epistemology’ into two parts: a descriptive-genealogical component and a 
normative component.16 As far as moral epistemology goes, the first component describes the 
characteristics that humans have (such as sympathy, egoism, empathy, etc.), how emotions are 
involved in our actual moral judgements, how we develop moral systems, what actually 
happens when people make moral judgements, and so on. This involves the study of 
psychology, neuroscience, anthropology, and other sciences.17 The second component involves 
‘the gathering together of norms of inference, belief, and knowing that lead to success in 
ordinary reasoning and in science’. We cannot discover these norms simply by analysing actual 
moral practice, but doing so is an essential element of the discovery. We discover the norms by 
looking at actual moral practice and then ‘abstracting successful epistemic practices from 
unsuccessful ones… The database is, as it were, provided by observation of humanity’.18 
A typical objection is that we cannot use the descriptive-genealogical component to tell us 
anything about the normative component. We cannot use descriptive information about our 
actual moral practices to tell us about what our moral practices ought to be. Flanagan, 
                                                             
15 Flanagan, Sarkissian and Wong (2008), p. 5. Ethical naturalists do not believe that moral norms and values can be 
explained by invoking supernatural forces (p. 2). 
16 Quine (1969). 
17 Flanagan, Sarkissian and Wong (2008), p. 12. 
18 Flanagan, Sarkissian and Wong (2008), p. 12. 
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Sarkissian and Wong think that this objection is a little odd, considering typical practice in moral 
philosophy. They claim that ‘everyone thinks that philosophical psychology… has implications 
for ethics’.19 Flanagan, Sarkissian and Wong are not claiming that we can prove that certain 
moral principles are correct merely by looking at descriptive information, but they do think that it 
is essential to do so. 
They make two general claims. First, we can investigate actual moral practices a posteriori. 
This provides information about the cognitive abilities we use to engage in those practices. We 
must use particular abilities when discovering moral truths. The second claim is that despite the 
objection that we cannot simply go from the descriptive to the normative, we commonly use a 
posteriori information about our actual moral practices to help identify true moral principles. ‘The 
normative component [of moral epistemology] involves the imaginative deployment of 
information from any source useful to self/social examination, forming new or improved norms 
or values, improving moral education practices, training moral sensibilities, and so on’.20  
In other words, we can investigate a posteriori the cognitive abilities we use to reach moral 
truth and attain moral knowledge, and this information tells us something about how we should 
do so. The core-aposteriorist’s hope is that some of these truths can be expressed with 
determinate core moral propositions. We have already seen how this idea could be fleshed out 
by using Blair’s work on psychopaths. If Nichols is right, psychopaths cannot attain moral 
knowledge because they lack certain emotional abilities. If we investigate further how moral 
agents use these emotional abilities to attain moral knowledge, we will be able to discover what 
the content of this knowledge is. 
Unfortunately, there is a major problem with this hope, which is that when we recognise 
moral truths, we do not commonly do so by investigating our cognitive abilities. When we make 
moral judgements, we think we are doing more than drawing on knowledge of what is 
happening cognitively. Take the argument 
 
1) There is a table in front of me. 
2) If I use perceptual ability PA correctly, I will know that there is a table in front of me. 
                                                             
19 Flanagan, Sarkissian and Wong (2008), p. 13, emphasis in the original. 
20 Flanagan, Sarkissian and Wong, (2008), p. 17, emphasis in the original. The emphasis on ‘any’ source implies that 
they are happy to use both a priori and a posteriori sources, in which case they would endorse mixed methods to 
ascertain the truth of the normative content of determinate core moral propositions. 
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3) I use perceptual ability PA correctly. 
4) I know that I have perceptual ability PA. 
 Therefore 
5) I know that there is a table in front of me. 
 
Assume that all the premises are true. The question is what premise (4) is doing here. We can 
derive (5) from premises (1)-(3) alone; it is not necessary for me to know anything about the 
perceptual abilities that I use. All I need to do is use them correctly. I do not need to know what 
they are, or that I must use them in a particular way. Similarly, whilst we can investigate our 
moral cognitive abilities a posteriori, we do not need to know about these abilities when 
recognising moral facts. All we have to do is use the abilities, which does not imply that we need 
to know facts about them that can be used as premises in moral arguments. 
So where did the core-aposteriorist go wrong? The problem is that she has reached too far. 
It is true that an agent cannot recognise any truths unless they have the cognitive ability to do 
so. Knowledge of the limits of our cognitive abilities can help outline the limits of what we can 
recognise as true or false, but these limits are extremely general. Knowing the limits of what we 
can morally know does not provide us with a list of particular true moral propositions. A 
psychopath may be unable to recognise any moral propositions as specifically moral because 
they lack certain emotions, but that does not mean that when we successfully argue for moral 
propositions, we must use evidence about our cognitive abilities as premises in the argument. 
This is similar to mathematics. In order to do mathematics, we need certain cognitive 
abilities. If we do not have them, then we do not have access to mathematical truths. But we do 
not reach mathematical truths by finding out what these abilities are. The abilities allow us to 
attain knowledge of the premises needed to reach mathematical conclusions, but they are not 
part of the premises themselves. Furthermore, whilst we can investigate a posteriori the 
cognitive abilities we use to attain mathematical knowledge, this does not entail that we attain 
mathematical knowledge a posteriori. Similarly, the fact that we can use certain cognitive 
abilities to attain moral knowledge does not mean that knowledge of these abilities is used to 
attain moral knowledge. We only need to use those abilities. Suppose that, as Nichols thinks, 
we can use particular emotions to attain some moral knowledge. We do not need to know that 
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we are experiencing these emotions; merely feeling them provides us with moral knowledge. 
We need not even be able to put the feelings into words. We can also argue analogously with 
colour perception. If I investigate how humans see colour, I can work out the range of colours 
that we can see. But this knowledge is not part of the perceptual process that occurs when I 
look at something blue. I just know, thanks to my perceptual abilities, that I see something blue. 
I need have no knowledge about how my perceptual abilities work. 
We can sum up this problem to make clear how it strikes against the core-aposteriorist. It 
may be possible to work out a posteriori what cognitive abilities we use to make mathematical 
calculations. However, we do not use this information to make mathematical calculations, and 
so the fact that we work out what our mathematical cognitive abilities are a posteriori does not 
imply that we work out mathematical calculations a posteriori. Similarly, if we can work out what 
our moral cognitive abilities are a posteriori, this does not imply that we recognise moral truths a 
posteriori. The hope that a posteriori analysis of our actual cognitive abilities will provide us with 
moral knowledge ultimately fails. 
 
3 – The a posteriori strategy 
 
The core-aposteriorist cannot argue against the CAT by appealing to a posteriori information 
about our cognitive abilities. Neither can she argue against the CAT simply by developing an a 
posteriori or mixed method to ascertain the truth of the normative content of determinate core 
moral propositions, because there may be an a priori method to do the same thing. Instead, the 
core-aposteriorist must show that core-apriorist theories are not viable. She can do so by using 
the a posteriori strategy, which takes the following form: 
 
a) At least some true determinate core moral propositions are not a priori self-evident. 
These determinate core moral propositions are either a posteriori self-evident, or can be 
known by using other propositions as premises. 
b) At least some of these propositions are not knowable solely by using a priori 
propositions as premises. Any attempt will fail either because some of the purportedly a 
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priori propositions contravene the principle Sufficient Determinacy or are really a 
posteriori propositions. 
c) Since moral agents have determinate core moral knowledge, it is reasonable to assume 
that these determinate core moral propositions are knowable. 
d) As they cannot be knowable via an a priori method, they must be knowable via an a 
posteriori or mixed method. 
 
This strategy relies on the following principle, which I will argue for shortly: 
 
Sufficient Determinacy: If a proposition is able on its own to justify the normative 
content of a determinate moral proposition, the justifying 
proposition is also determinate. 
 
The a posteriori strategy denies that all knowable determinate core moral propositions are 
knowable via a priori methods. The CAT is therefore false. Since the propositions are knowable, 
though, they must be knowable via a posteriori or mixed methods. So the Central Claim is true. 
The drawback of the strategy is that it does not provide a single argument that can be 
applied across the board. Such an argument against the CAT would work against all core-
apriorist theories, whatever the particular details of those theories were. The a posteriori 
strategy does not have this benefit. What it does is take a particular core-apriorist theory and 
analyse it to show where the theory breaks down as a core-apriorist theory. It investigates the 
details of that particular theory, which means that any core-apriorist theory that has sufficiently 
different details will remain unaffected until it itself is subjected to examination. It is therefore an 
inductive strategy, rather than a deductive one. 
This is a considerable drawback, as it would be more conclusive to have an argument that 
slices through all core-apriorist theories in one go. However, the strategy has considerable 
advantages. First, since it involves refuting core-apriorist theories by examining the content of 
those theories, it will be less vulnerable to the objection that it does not directly address the 
claims that core-apriorist theories make. Second, it claims nothing controversial about the 
cognitive abilities of actual or possible moral agents, so it avoids the problem discussed in 
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section 2 of this chapter. Third, whilst the strategy cannot provide certainty that all core-apriorist 
theories are incorrect, it can at least provide considerable evidence in the core-aposteriorist’s 
favour. If it works against the most plausible types of core-apriorist theories, then the core-
apriorist will have to rely on ever more unlikely theories to escape the strategy. The unlikely 
theories will have their own problems before they are touched by the a posteriori strategy. So 
although the strategy has a drawback, we should examine whether the price is worth paying. I 
believe that it is. 
Before we can use this strategy, though, we need to show that Sufficient Determinacy is 
true. I will spend the remainder of this chapter showing that it is. 
Determinate moral propositions have normative content, and for moral agents to know 
determinate moral propositions that are not self-evident, there must be one or more premises 
that justify the normative content. Sufficient Determinacy implies that if there is only one such 
premise, that premise must be determinate. If there is more than one, then the proposition that 
is the conjunction of the premises must be determinate. We will examine both cases separately, 
but before starting we should recall how I am using the term ‘justify’. Following what I have said 
in section 4 of chapter 1, if proposition X justifies proposition Y, then Y is much more likely to be 
true than not. If proposition X is part of a justification of proposition Y, then Y is much more likely 
to be true than not, and this would not be the case if X were not part of the group.21 
Take the following moral propositions: 
 
Nice: One should be nice to others 
Drive: One should not drink-drive 
 
Assume that Nice is a core moral proposition and that we can attain knowledge of Drive by 
using Nice as its only normative premise. If Nice is a priori, this means that the argument for 
Drive is an a priori method to attain knowledge of Drive, since the normative content of the 
argument is provided by Nice. 
Suppose that Drive is a determinate moral proposition. Sufficient Determinacy denies not 
that Nice is a priori, but that Nice can by itself be used as the sole normative premise for Drive. 
                                                             
21 This last condition ensures that X is not a redundant member of the group.  
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The term ‘nice’ can be fleshed out in numerous ways, so if ‘nice’ has such imprecise application 
conditions, how can we use it in any justification of determinate moral propositions? Take the 
following argument: 
 
1) One should be nice to others. 
2) Drink-drivers are not nice to others. 
 Therefore 
3) One should not drink-drive. 
 
We cannot verify the soundness of this argument without further information. How do we check 
the truth of (2) without working out first what the application conditions of ‘nice’ are? If the 
application conditions are too imprecise, then different agents will have different understandings 
of the terms, and they will all understand the argument differently. We thus need to tighten up 
the application conditions of ‘nice’ so that (1) becomes more determinate than it previously was. 
However, that means that Nice, as it stands, cannot be used in the argument (1)-(3). It will be 
replaced by Nice*, a more determinate premise, which can be used to justify Drive. Nice fails to 
justify Drive because it contravenes Sufficient Determinacy. Nice* does not. 
Replacing Nice in the argument with another proposition that is just as non-determinate will 
not help. Whatever non-determinate proposition we replace it with, we will get the same 
problem. Different agents will interpret the terms in the proposition in different ways, because 
the terms’ application conditions will be imprecise and open to multiple interpretations. 
Another argument for Drive, with more determinate premises, is 
 
4) One should not perform acts that are likely to kill and injure others. 
5) People who drink-drive perform acts that are likely to kill and injure others. 
 Therefore 
6) One should not drink-drive. 
 
If this argument is sound, then (4), being the single normative premise in the argument, 
complies with Sufficient Determinacy. One could try arguing against Sufficient Determinacy by 
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claiming that (4) must itself be justified by normative premises that contravene Sufficient 
Determinacy. For example, suppose that (4) is justified by the following argument: 
 
7) One should be nice to others. 
8) One is nice to others only if one does not perform acts that are likely to kill and injure 
others. 
 Therefore 
9) One should not perform acts that are likely to kill and injure others. 
 
The problem with this argument is that it is too similar to the argument (1)-(3). Just as we cannot 
verify the truth of (2) without making (1) more determinate, we cannot verify the truth of (8) 
without making (7) more determinate. We still need to give the term ‘nice’ more precise 
application conditions in order to work out exactly when an agent is nice and under what 
conditions he should be nice (Respecting the rights of others, for example, may sometimes 
entail being not very nice at all.). If there is a lot of disagreement, then the term ‘nice’ is not 
doing very much. It seems to be obscuring the truth rather than illuminating it. 
So we still have to make the application conditions of ‘nice’ more precise. When we do that, 
Nice becomes Nice*, and the original problem reappears because Nice* is a determinate 
proposition. Nice is not meaningless, but it fails to justify the normative content of determinate 
moral propositions because such propositions themselves contain terms with fairly precise 
application conditions. To justify them, therefore, we need more determinate premises than 
Nice. When we say ‘Don’t hit your brother because it isn’t nice’, we are making a number of 
assumptions about what being nice entails – not causing unnecessary pain, or respecting the 
brother’s rights, or having certain virtues, and so on. We assume that the listener shares these 
assumptions, or imply that they should. 
We can note here that we cannot provide counterexamples to Sufficient Determinacy by 
appealing to the distinction between abstract and concrete moral propositions, or the distinction 
between general laws and particular cases. We saw in section 3 of chapter 1 that such 
distinctions are not the same as the distinction between determinacy and non-determinacy. 
Consequently, providing examples of general laws that justify the normative content of particular 
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cases, or examples of abstract moral principles that justify the normative content of concrete 
moral principles, will not show that Sufficient Determinacy is wrong. 
We now turn to the second case, which we can examine by looking at W.D. Ross’s core-
apriorist moral theory. Ross believes that there are a priori self-evident prima facie duties. The 
duties are prima facie because they are not actual duties, as they can be overridden in various 
circumstances. Ross only reluctantly calls them duties for this reason. They are, however, 
related to duties in a special way.22 For example, you may have a duty to keep a particular 
promise because there is a prima facie duty to keep promises in general, but that does not 
mean that we have a duty to keep promises in all circumstances. If there are sufficiently good 
reasons for breaking a promise, such as avoiding the deaths of innocent people, you should 
break it.23 Prima facie duties are also non-determinate, not because they can be overridden, but 
because it is an open question what the circumstances in which they can be overridden are. 
Because there is always a possibility of prima facie duties being overridden, we cannot 
generate a list of such duties as a set of hard-and-fast moral rules, but they certainly feature in 
justifications of morally right acts. They are, to a certain extent, the default position. Generally 
speaking, we should keep promises, even when the net benefit is slightly lower than if we did 
not.24 This means that when we try to ascertain the truth of the determinate moral proposition 
‘Given conditions C, I should keep my promise that I will X’ (where C and X have sufficiently 
precise application conditions), part of the argument in favour of its truth will be that there is a 
prima facie duty to keep a promise. The argument will not be valid without it. 
I want to highlight here the prima facie duties’ status as non-determinate. Take ‘One should 
generally keep promises’. This prima facie duty does not tell you specifically when to keep 
promises, just that you generally should. Furthermore, there is no single principle that says that 
one duty trumps another. That depends on a variety of factors that are not self-evident. So the 
prima facie duty is non-determinate. Other prima facie duties are even more non-determinate, 
such as the prima facie duty to ‘improve the conditions of others in respect of intelligence’.25 
Does this mean that we have a duty to make others more intelligent? In what way? What types 
                                                             
22 Ross (2002), p. 20. 
23 Ross (2002), p. 19. 
24 Ross (2002), pp. 34-35. 
25 Ross (2002), p. 21. 
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of intelligence are we talking about? It is difficult to work out just what the duty tells us to do, 
which entails that it will not tell us what to do in particular situations. 
We can use Ross’s theory to see how Sufficient Determinacy deals with multiple premises 
for the normative content of a determinate moral proposition. Take the following argument: 
 
10) You have a prima facie duty to keep promises. 
11) This prima facie duty can only be disregarded if the set of non-normative circumstances 
X applies. 
12) You have promised to pay back today the money I lent you. 
13) Regarding your promise in (12), nothing in the set of circumstances X applies. 
14) The prima facie duty to keep promises holds regarding your promise in (12).  
 Therefore 
15) You should keep your promise to me. 
 
Assume that (10)-(13) are true, and that ‘X’ can be clearly defined. (10) and (11) are normative 
premises. This is clear in the case of (10), since it just expresses a prima facie duty. (11) 
outlines more determinately when one should abide by the prima facie duty, and when it is 
permissible to ignore it. (12) and (13) are not normative. 
The conclusion is a determinate moral proposition. We know what the promise is, who has 
made it, and so on. Its normative content is justified by (10), which is non-determinate, and (11), 
which is determinate.26 Following what I have said about single propositions that justify the 
normative content of determinate moral propositions, it cannot be the case that we can alter the 
argument to drop (11) and keep (10) as the sole premise justifying the normative content of 
(15). However, we can drop (11) and alter (10). Suppose we change (10) to 
 
10*) You have a duty to keep promises unless the set of non-normative circumstances X 
applies. 
 
                                                             
26 The core-aposteriorist can therefore argue against Ross on the grounds that even if prima facie duties are knowable a 
priori, they are non-determinate, and so cannot justify determinate moral propositions on their own. We need to combine 
them with other premises that are only knowable a posteriori. Since we must justify determinate moral propositions with 
a combination of a priori and a posteriori premises, this entails that we must use a mixed method, and so the CAT is 
false. I will not pursue this argument here, though. 
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(10*) is equivalent to the conjunction of (10) and (11). It is a single normative premise to justify 
the normative content of (15). It also complies with Sufficient Determinacy, as it itself is 
determinate. It tells us precisely when we have a duty to keep promises. 
We can now see how Sufficient Determinacy implies that the conjunction of the premises 
that justifies the normative content of a determinate moral proposition is itself determinate. We 
can keep (10) and (11), or replace them with (10*). (10*) is determinate, since the application 
conditions of the terms in the proposition are sufficiently precise for us to know in most cases 
whether we should keep promises or not. As (10*) is equivalent to the conjunction of (10) and 
(11), the conjunction must also be determinate. Naturally, the core-aposteriorist will want to add 
that (10*) is not knowable a priori, but this is an additional claim. Sufficient Determinacy itself 
makes no claims about the a priori or the a posteriori. 
There is thus good reason to believe that Sufficient Determinacy is true. Non-determinate 
propositions cannot by themselves justify the normative content of determinate moral 
propositions. Only determinate propositions can. This means that we can use Sufficient 
Determinacy in the a posteriori strategy. In the following chapters, I will use the strategy against 
four particular core-apriorist theories. 
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Chapter 3 – The Sidgwick, de Lazari-Radek and Singer theory 
 
Whilst core-apriorists agree that there are a priori methods to know a determinate core moral 
proposition, they can disagree over what those methods are. We can broadly divide core-
apriorists into two camps, intuitionists and coherentists, according to the particular methods that 
they choose. 
This division is epistemological rather than moral, because one can be an intuitionist or a 
coherentist regarding non-moral types of knowledge as well. The difference between the two 
types of theory is shown by a problem with justification. If proposition A is justified by proposition 
B, we can ask what justifies proposition B. Suppose that proposition B is justified by proposition 
C. What justifies proposition C? If it is justified by proposition D, what justifies proposition D? An 
infinite regress opens up, as each new proposition introduced to justify the others will always 
need justification itself. Intuitionism and coherentism propose different solutions to this 
problem.1 
Moral intuitionist theories claim that there are self-evident propositions, which justify 
themselves without the need to appeal to any other proposition, and the regress thus stops at 
that point. I use the term ‘moral intuitionism’ in this thesis in the same way that Hallvard 
Lillehammer uses the term ‘ethical intuitionism’. It is ‘the thesis that some ethical claims (such 
as self-evident principles of practical reason) can play the role of non-inferentially grounded 
justifiers or defeaters in ethical theory’.2 This does not mean that the moral intuitionist thinks that 
the claims are justified by some type of moral intuition that moral agents have. He might do, but 
it is far from essential, as we will see in this chapter. We should also note that sometimes moral 
intuitionist theories are taken to say that we must be able to know self-evident moral claims 
thanks to some special epistemological faculty that we have. A common objection to such 
theories is that it is utterly mysterious how such a faculty is meant to work.3 However, moral 
intuitionist theories need not make such a claim, so I will ignore this objection here. 
Moral coherentist theories claim that moral propositions must form a coherent set. Each 
proposition in that set is justified by other propositions in that set. The regress becomes 
                                                             
1 Intuitionism and coherentism are not the only possible solutions to this problem, but they are the main standard 
answers. 
2 Lillehammer (2011), p. 80. 
3 E.g. Mackie (1977), pp. 38-39. 
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harmless, because we are not always appealing to new propositions to justify the propositions 
that we have already identified.4 A maximally coherent set of moral propositions is the largest 
coherent set of moral propositions such that if any other moral proposition were added, the set 
would become incoherent. 
The core-apriorist can freely choose whether to be a moral intuitionist or a moral coherentist. 
However, introducing the distinction divides core-apriorist theories into two types. If the core-
apriorist is a moral intuitionist, he will claim either that all determinate core moral propositions 
are a priori self-evident (thus rejecting step (a) of the a posteriori strategy) or that they are 
justified by a priori premises that are themselves self-evident (thus rejecting step (b) of the a 
posteriori strategy). If the core-apriorist is a moral coherentist, the core-apriorist will accept step 
(a), as he does not believe that determinate core moral propositions are self-evident, but will 
reject step (b). In this chapter and the next, I will concentrate on moral intuitionist core-apriorist 
theories.5 In chapter 5, I will turn my attention to two moral coherentist core-apriorist theories. 
By endorsing moral intuitionism, the core-apriorist hopes to show either that true determinate 
core moral propositions can be known a priori non-inferentially, or that true determinate core 
moral propositions are justified by a priori premises that can themselves be known non-
inferentially. In this chapter, I examine what I will call the SLS theory (the Sidgwick, de Lazari-
Radek and Singer theory). This core-apriorist theory has recently been developed by Katarzyna 
de Lazari-Radek and Peter Singer, based on their interpretation of Henry Sidgwick’s moral 
philosophy. The second intuitionist theory, which I will examine in the next chapter, is Matthew 
Kramer’s moral realism as a moral doctrine. The theories differ substantially in their details, but 
the core-aposteriorist can effectively use the a posteriori strategy to criticise them. 
 
Henry Sidgwick bases his metaethics on a set of what he takes to be self-evident axioms, 
where ‘self-evident’ can be taken as another way of saying ‘true and not justified by appeal to 
other propositions’. This does not mean that the axioms cannot be inferred from other 
propositions, and Sidgwick allows that this may be possible.6 His point is that they do not need 
                                                             
4 An obvious objection is that this justification is circular, and so moral coherentist theories are mistaken. I will not 
examine this objection here, but moral coherentists have responded to it (e.g. Brink (1989), pp. 122-125). 
5 Intuitionism was particularly popular in the early twentieth century, with prominent intuitionists including G.E. Moore 
(1993) and W.D. Ross (2002). More recently, it has seen a revival thanks to intuitionists such as Russ Shafer-Landau 
(2003) and Robert Audi (2004). Ross, Shafer-Landau and Audi are core-apriorists. 
6 Sidgwick (1879), pp. 106-107. 
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to be. Whilst he did not think that the axioms could justify all true moral propositions by 
themselves, he did believe that they are necessary for such justifications. Let us take Sidgwick’s 
moral axioms to be at least some of the core moral propositions that the SLS theory endorses. 
De Lazari-Radek and Singer believe that the axioms can be rationally ascertained a priori. I 
will specifically argue that at least some of Sidgwick’s axioms in their original wording cannot be 
used to justify the normative content of determinate non-core moral propositions, since the 
axioms contravene Sufficient Determinacy. We can alter these axioms to correct this problem, 
but the amended axioms turn out to be knowable only a posteriori. Hence, if these axioms are 
core moral propositions, some of the core moral propositions are only knowable a posteriori. I 
will also argue that the SLS theory’s response to Sidgwick’s dualism of practical reason, and its 
theory of the good, can only be defended on a posteriori grounds. 
Before starting, though, we should note a couple of points about reading Sidgwick’s 
metaethics as a core-apriorist theory. There is a danger of attributing anachronistic views to 
Sidgwick if we are not careful. 
 
1 – A historical introduction 
 
The first point relates to terminology. Moral intuitionist theories, as I define them, need make no 
claims about moral intuitions. This is particularly important when examining Sidgwick’s 
metaethics, because Sidgwick does not use the term ‘intuitionism’ as I use it. For Sidgwick, 
intuitionism claims that ‘the common moral sense of ordinary mankind’ can be used to attain 
moral knowledge.7 As I use the term, intuitionism need make no claims about common moral 
sense, and I will entirely ignore Sidgwick’s use of the term ‘intuitionism’ in this context. 
De Lazari-Radek and Singer follow Sidgwick’s use of the term. Elsewhere, Singer has been 
very wary of moral intuitions. He believes that we do not reach many of our moral intuitions by 
rationally deliberating, and for that reason we cannot use them as justifications of moral 
judgements.8 As Singer reads Sidgwick, when Sidgwick appeals to moral intuitions in support of 
utilitarianism (Sidgwick’s preferred normative moral theory), this is simply to confirm a result that 
                                                             
7 Sidgwick (1981), p. 200. See also pp. 96-97. 
8 Singer (2005). 
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Sidgwick also argues for on other independent grounds.9 Sidgwick’s point, according to Singer, 
is that even if we are intuitionists in Sidgwick’s sense of the term, we can accept his 
utilitarianism based on intuitionist grounds. 
Sidgwick’s metaethics is intuitionist (in my sense of the term) because the self-evident 
axioms that Sidgwick bases his moral theory on are non-inferentially grounded justifiers or 
defeaters of moral claims. This brings us to the second point, which is how far we can treat 
Sidgwick’s metaethics as a core-apriorist theory. The core-apriorist theory that I want to 
examine may not entirely be Sidgwick’s, particularly since I am looking at it through de Lazari-
Radek and Singer’s interpretation. This is important because Sidgwick does not appear to 
concentrate very much on whether his axioms are a priori or a posteriori.10 He is more 
interested in showing that they are self-evident, which does not imply that the axioms are a 
priori. If I look at a patch of blue, it may be self-evident to me that the proposition ‘I am looking 
at something blue’ is true, but the proposition is not justified by appeal to any other propositions. 
However, the proposition is not a priori. A core-apriorist may assume that, given the nature of 
moral propositions, any self-evident moral propositions must be a priori, because there do not 
seem to be any a posteriori methods to attain knowledge of a self-evident moral proposition. 
Unlike the colour case, for example, it is dubious that we can tell that something is self-evidently 
morally wrong solely by perceiving it. However, I will not pursue this line of thought. It is 
important to note, however, that even if Sidgwick’s axioms are not self-evident, this does not 
imply that they are not a priori. The core-aposteriorist therefore cannot defend the Central Claim 
merely by showing that the axioms are not self-evident. 
Whilst Sidgwick might not agree that his metaethics is a core-apriorist theory, it is easy to 
develop it as one. For example, Sidgwick was well aware of the ethical controversy that Charles 
Darwin had caused with the theory of evolution.11 If all our moral beliefs are the product of blind 
evolution, asked some critics, does that not show that they have no justification? Even if we 
reject this criticism, the idea that evolutionary research can influence moral philosophy is very 
much alive today. How far such research should affect our moral views is a hotly debated topic. 
But in his major work The Methods of Ethics, Sidgwick never mentions evolutionary theory in 
                                                             
9 Singer (1974), p. 498. 
10 Hallvard Lillehammer points out that saying that Sidgwick’s axioms are knowable a priori may be anachronistic 
((2010), p. 373). 
11 Darwin (2004), part 1, chapter 4. 
59 
 
connection with his self-evident axioms. Elsewhere, he even writes that ‘[e]volution… has little 
or no bearing upon ethics’.12 He argues that merely finding out how a principle (whether moral 
or non-moral) is derived tells us nothing about its truth or falsity, which is a point that we have 
seen W.D. Ross also make. Sidgwick argues that if we should distrust our moral judgements 
just because they are an evolutionary product, we should distrust all our judgements, as they 
are evolutionary products as well. 
Evolutionary debunkers such as Sharon Street would probably point out that moral 
judgements are not like other judgements.13 If a moral judgement aids the survival of the agent 
making the judgement, claims Street, the survival value of the judgement is unrelated to its 
truth. The survival value of non-normative judgements is often related to their truth, though. If I 
judge that there are no tigers near me when there are, I will be more likely to become a tiger’s 
lunch than I would be if I had a true belief about the tigers nearby. However, I will not investigate 
Sidgwick’s argument here. I use it simply to show that Sidgwick seems to believe that a 
posteriori research on the formation of moral judgements says nothing about an agent’s ability 
to attain moral knowledge. 
So whatever Sidgwick’s exact attitude towards core-apriorist theories would have been, it 
does not take much to see his metaethics as a core-apriorist theory. De Lazari-Radek and 
Singer take it as such. It is not necessary for my purposes to dig too deeply into philosophical 
history here. Maybe the real Sidgwick is to a certain extent different from de Lazari-Radek and 
Singer’s Sidgwick, but not so much that they are presenting an imaginary figure. However, since 
we cannot be certain about Sidgwick’s exact attitude, I cannot say that the core-apriorist theory 
examined in this chapter is Sidgwick’s theory. This is why I call it instead the SLS theory, to 
mark it as de Lazari-Radek and Singer’s development of Sidgwick. The SLS theory claims that 
there are particular self-evident axioms that are knowable a priori and that can be used to attain 
moral knowledge. If the axioms are core moral propositions, then the SLS theory is a core-
apriorist theory. 
There is one more historical point to make, this time about Sidgwick’s ‘dualism of practical 
reason’. However, I will leave this discussion until after we have seen the self-evident axioms 
that Sidgwick identifies. 
                                                             
12 Sidgwick (1876), p. 54. 
13 Street (2006). See also Lillehammer (2010), p. 368. 
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2 – What self-evident axioms are there? 
 
Sidgwick thinks that there are only a few self-evident axioms that a plausible moral system will 
be based on. He lists four conditions that would ‘establish a significant proposition, apparently 
self-evident, in the highest degree of certainty attainable’. 
 
1) ‘The terms of the proposition must be clear and precise.’ 
2) ‘The self-evidence of the proposition must be ascertained by careful reflection.’ 
3) ‘The propositions accepted as self-evident must be mutually consistent… [I]t is obvious 
that any collision between two intuitions is a proof that there is error in one or the other, 
or in both.’14 
4) ‘[T]he denial by another [judge] of a proposition that I have affirmed has a tendency to 
impair my confidence in its validity.’15 
 
We will see shortly that criterion (1) is extremely important, so we should clear up a possible 
misunderstanding. The words ‘clear and precise’ in the criterion are Sidgwick’s words, and he 
does not use them as I do. My use of the word ‘precise’ applies to the application conditions of 
terms with a proposition. For example, a determinate moral proposition contains terms that have 
very precise application conditions. The less precise the application conditions are, the less 
determinate the proposition will be. However, Sidgwick is not talking about the application 
conditions of a term. Furthermore, he concedes that the axioms alone are not sufficient to justify 
many moral propositions. We need to add a normative moral theory (such as utilitarianism). I 
will say more about this shortly. In any case, I do not want to claim that Sidgwick uses the word 
‘precise’ in exactly the same way that I do. 
An example from de Lazari-Radek and Singer can help show how to interpret (1). They take 
the candidate axiom ‘We ought to give every man his own’ and argue that ‘his own’ is not 
sufficiently clear and precise.16 It is not at all clear what ‘his own’ is supposed to mean. We can 
                                                             
14 Sidgwick is slightly imprecise here, because this is not a condition for an axiom, but for a group of axioms. However, it 
makes no important difference. 
15 Sidgwick (1981), pp. 338-342. 
16 De Lazari-Radek and Singer (2014), p. 115; Sidgwick (1981), p. 215. 
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of course change ‘his own’ into something clearer, and so make the candidate axiom more 
precise, but we must be careful. First, we could end up with a vacuously analytic proposition, 
such as ‘We ought to give each man what it is right that he should have’. Second, we could end 
up with a proposition that contravenes the other criteria. 
The criteria do not say that the self-evident axioms must be able by themselves to justify any 
true determinate moral propositions. Sidgwick addresses this point, as he criticises purported 
axioms that do not ‘enable us to give clear and unhesitating decisions’.17 If a set of purported 
axioms leaves us completely in the dark about what moral judgements we should make, they 
are not worth much. The reason why determinacy (as I use the term) is not implied by criterion 
(1) is because a proposition can be a self-evident axiom even if it cannot directly justify 
determinate moral propositions. Axioms need not be determinate themselves. Sidgwick’s aim is 
to have a set of axioms that enable us to give clear and unhesitating moral decisions when we 
join them to an appropriate normative moral theory. He believes that the most appropriate 
theory is utilitarianism. Therefore we can say that we have to alter the axioms by adding the 
‘other resources’ of utilitarianism, so that the axioms are determinate. The axioms thus become 
determinate core moral propositions, and can be used to ascertain the truth of the normative 
content of determinate non-core moral propositions.18 
Sidgwick states that 
 
‘[C]ertain absolute practical principles [that are manifestly true]… are of too abstract a 
nature, and too universal in their scope, to enable us to ascertain by immediate application of 
them what we ought to do in any particular case; particular duties have still to be determined 
by some other method.’19 
 
By ‘method’, Sidgwick means the application of a normative moral theory, such as utilitarianism 
or egoistic hedonism.20 De Lazari-Radek and Singer argue that Sidgwick can use the resources 
of utilitarianism together with his self-evident axioms to produce a determinate utilitarian moral 
                                                             
17 Sidgwick (1981), p. 215. 
18 The term ‘other resources’ is de Lazari-Radek and Singer’s ((2014), p. 148). 
19 Sidgwick (1981), p. 379. 
20 Sidgwick’s use of the term ‘method’ is thus very different to my own use, and there is no necessary connection 
between the two. 
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system.21 Sidgwick objects to purported axioms that cannot provide justification for what we 
should believe or how we should act even when we have settled on a particular normative moral 
theory. 
I shall follow de Lazari-Radek and Singer in their identification of Sidgwick’s self-evident 
axioms.22 They are: 
 
Treatment: ‘[I]t cannot be right for A to treat B in a manner in which it would be wrong for B 
to treat A, merely on the ground that they are two different individuals, and 
without there being any difference between the natures or circumstances of the 
two which can be stated as a reasonable ground for difference of treatment.’ 
Prudence: ‘[One ought to aim at] one’s good on the whole… [where] Hereafter as such is 
to be regarded neither less nor more than Now.’ (A good does not become 
lesser or greater simply because it will happen sooner rather than later, or later 
rather than sooner.) 
Impartiality: ‘[T]he good of any one individual is of no more importance, from the point of 
view… of the Universe, than the good of any other; unless, that is, there are 
special grounds for believing that more good is likely to be realised in the one 
case than in the other.’ 
Aim: ‘[A]s a rational being I am bound to aim at good generally, - so far as it is 
attainable by my efforts, - not merely at a particular part of it.’23 
 
We can derive the ‘maxim of Benevolence’ from Impartiality and Aim: 
 
Benevolence: ‘[E]ach one is morally bound to regard the good of any other individual 
as much as his own, except in so far as he judges it to be less, when 
impartially viewed, or less certainly knowable or attainable by him.’24 
 
                                                             
21 De Lazari-Radek and Singer (2014), pp. 147-148. 
22 It is not entirely clear how many separate axioms Sidgwick identifies, but we need not settle the matter here. 
23 Sidgwick (1981), pp. 379-382, emphasis in the original. 
24 Sidgwick (1981), p. 382. 
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The axioms are not analytic, and hence they are not vacuous. However, they do not by 
themselves justify determinate moral propositions. Should we ban slavery? Treatment only tells 
us that if A can (or cannot) be enslaved, then B can (or cannot) be either, just because they are 
different individuals. Impartiality gives us no way to measure the goods of individuals, so it 
cannot tell us if the good produced by slavery is more or less than the good produced 
otherwise. This also affects Aim. Importantly, the term ‘good’ in the axioms does not mean 
‘moral good’. It refers to any type of good, moral and non-moral. 
However, we have already seen that we need to alter the axioms by adding the ‘other 
resources’ of a normative moral theory to them to solve this problem. We can use the following 
method to justify a true determinate moral proposition: 
 
a)  One or more of the self-evident axioms must be a premise in the argument for the 
proposition. 
b)  The ‘other resources’ of a normative moral theory (such as utilitarianism) may provide 
other premises. The normative content of the axioms and the other resources must be 
knowable a priori, otherwise the SLS theory is not a core-apriorist theory. 
c)  There may be other non-moral facts that are relevant to the justification of the 
determinate moral proposition. These facts can be used as premises, and may be 
ascertainable a priori or a posteriori. However, they do not have normative content. The 
normative content is provided by the axioms and the normative moral theory. 
d)  The premises collectively justify the determinate moral proposition. As the self-evident 
axioms and the ‘other resources’ of the normative moral theory are a priori, this entails 
that the determinate moral propositions that they justify have an a priori basis, and 
hence the SLS theory is a core-apriorist theory. 
 
Direct act utilitarians hold that acts are morally right if they produce the greatest amount of 
utility, and that we are always required to perform such acts. They might argue that agents 
should not drink-drive as follows:25 
 
                                                             
25 Sidgwick is not a direct act utilitarian. I use this argument only as an example. 
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e) Sidgwick’s self-evident axioms are true. 
f) Benevolence is true. (from (e)) 
g) Morally right acts are those that produce the greatest utility for everyone in general. 
(from (e), (f), and the ‘other resources’ of direct act utilitarianism) 
h) You should perform acts that produce the greatest utility for everyone in general. (from 
(f) and (g)) 
i) Refraining from drink-driving produces greater utility for everyone in general than drink-
driving does (a posteriori observation) 
 Therefore 
j) You should not drink-drive. (from (h) and (i)) 
 
This gets us from self-evident axioms to determinate moral propositions. The axioms cannot 
justify determinate moral propositions on their own, but they are premises in the above 
argument, and so we can attain a priori determinate moral knowledge since the normative 
content of (j) is justified by the self-evident axioms. 
There is a final important point. Why use utilitarianism as the normative moral theory? 
Sidgwick ultimately wants to show that utilitarianism is rationally justified by the self-evident 
axioms. If he can do this, then we get the result that the axioms justify the normative theory, and 
the normative theory in turn can be used in conjunction with the axioms to justify true 
determinate moral propositions. There is a problem with this claim, called the dualism of 
practical reason. I will return to this problem in section 6, as it is significant for the SLS theory. 
For now, though, I place it to one side. 
 
3 – A closer look at Aim 
 
In this section, I am going to argue that Aim in its current form contravenes Sufficient 
Determinacy, and any attempt to alter it so that it is more determinate carries a high risk that the 
altered version is only knowable a posteriori. This means that the core-apriorist cannot use it as 
an example of an a priori determinate core moral proposition. Other axioms, though perhaps not 
all of them, suffer from the same problem. 
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The axioms do not merely apply to moral good, but to good in general (Remember that 
Benevolence follows from the axioms; it is not an axiom itself.). De Lazari-Radek and Singer are 
explicit about this. When they discuss examples of Prudence, for instance, their examples do 
not concern moral good. The axioms apply to normative good in general, which can come in 
many forms – prudential, aesthetic, financial, and so on. For instance, in many cases it is good 
to have laws that comply with the axioms. This is partly because it could be morally good to 
have such laws, but this need not be the only reason. It is morally good to ban slavery, but it is 
also good for me on grounds of self-interest. It ensures that nobody can legally enslave me. I do 
not need to think it morally wrong to be enslaved; I might just want to avoid it because I think it 
would be unpleasant. Similarly, a legal system that was not impartial may become unworkable 
and lead to social breakdown. This would be a moral failure, but I might also fear it for personal, 
non-moral reasons. It might affect my friends, whom I care about because they are my friends, 
rather than because of some specifically moral reason. 
When making laws, we have to ask what we want from them. What is the aim? How can we 
best achieve it? It cannot be assumed that we can discover this a priori. We may want a well-
functioning society because we have seen a posteriori, or can predict a posteriori what happens 
if our society does not function well. This leads to a suspicion that Sidgwick’s axioms may 
presuppose some facts about human nature. Maybe they are a priori only given the assumption 
that they apply to humans, so they may not be true if we tried applying them to aliens.26 The 
core-apriorist could object that whatever type of good humans aim at, they would still be aiming 
at the good, and it is a priori that neither humans nor aliens can (for example) rationally choose 
a lesser good over a greater good. Aim and the other axioms apply to every type of good. But 
how easy is it to give a plausible interpretation of Aim? 
Suppose I discover that the morally best thing to do would be to sell all I have, donate the 
proceeds to charity, go to a severely impoverished country, and spend my life performing 
charitable work that I would hate. This would make the world a slightly better place than if I 
continued my current lifestyle. According to Aim, I am bound to aim for the good, but it would be 
hard to say that it would be rational for me to change my life like this. I might morally applaud 
someone who did, but that does not mean that it is a rational action, or that I would be rational 
                                                             
26 Lillehammer (2010), pp. 372-374. 
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to do the same myself. If I did, it would look rather like moral fetishism. Moral fetishists are 
agents whose every act is dictated by what they believe to be morally best, regardless of any 
other considerations. For example, they choose to do A rather than B because A is slightly 
morally better than B, even though A is much more difficult to perform (physically, 
psychologically, or in some other way), or even though B has much more non-moral value than 
A. 
We can also use cases of non-moral fetishism to create problems for Aim. Consider the case 
of parents with a severely disabled child. It does not seem irrational for them to give up great 
sources of personal good to obtain extra goodness for him, just because he is their child, and 
even though his personal goodness has no chance of matching theirs. Neither does it seem 
intrinsically irrational for society in general to do the same for a group of disadvantaged people, 
simply because they are members of society who need help. Aim does not appear to allow for 
this possibility. Aiming at the good ‘generally’, as Aim demands, appears to mean aiming at 
everyone’s good, not simply at the good of a disadvantaged minority.  
The problem of moral fetishism is not simply a possible danger for utilitarianism, or even for 
consequentialist theories generally. If a Kantian decides that she should adhere to the 
categorical imperative at all times and in all situations, regardless of any other considerations, 
this too looks like a form of moral fetishism (Even if it is not, the Kantian must explain why it is 
not.). Lying is forbidden, claims the Kantian moral fetishist, whatever the cost, and that cost may 
destroy lives.27 The idea that moral agents can and must abide by every true moral norm, no 
matter how great the difficulty or how trivial the moral benefit, is not obviously true, even if it is 
true. 
Sidgwick seems aware of the danger of moral fetishism. He knows that if we are always 
consciously aiming at maximising utility, it may be counter-productive. We may gain more utility 
by not consciously aiming at it.28 Sidgwick even writes that it may be better from a utilitarian 
perspective if many people are not utilitarian.29 
I want to examine the idea that if the interpretation of Aim that we have been using is wrong, 
there may be other, more plausible interpretations. If I always aim at good generally, it would 
not only be psychologically exhausting, but counter-productive. So perhaps Aim is not meant to 
                                                             
27 See Langton (1992). 
28 Sidgwick (1981), pp. 405-406, 413. 
29 Sidgwick (1981), pp. 489-490. 
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be read as saying that on every occasion we must aim at good. If there are multiple ways that 
we can read Aim, though, then the terms in Aim as it currently stands have rather imprecise 
application conditions. If we read Aim as meaning that we are always obliged to aim at good 
generally, then we are going to believe that Benevolence morally requires us to always regard 
the good of others as having the same weight as our own good. If we read Aim as meaning that 
our general aim should be the good, but that we do not have to aim at the good at every 
opportunity, then that will lead to a different reading of Benevolence. Maybe occasionally not 
aiming at the good is morally permissible even though generally it is not. 
The objection I am developing is not directed against utilitarianism, but I will continue using 
utilitarianism as an example to show what the target really is. Direct act utilitarians may read 
Aim as 
 
A-Aim: As a rational being, I am bound to aim at good generally with my every act, not 
merely at a particular part of it.30 
 
The wording of A-Aim keeps as closely as possible to the wording of Aim, and I have only 
altered it to specifically apply to direct act utilitarianism.31 A-Aim’s problem is that direct act 
utilitarianism appears to encourage a form of fetishism. Aiming for the greatest good with every 
act is highly difficult (if not impossible) and often counter-productive. This makes A-Aim 
extremely dubious, but utilitarians can turn instead to indirect forms of utilitarianism. Rule 
utilitarianism holds that rules, rather than acts, are morally right if overall they produce the 
greatest amount of utility, and that we should follow these rules.32 For example, rule utilitarians 
may sometimes not perform a particular act that maximises utility, because the rules they follow 
tell them not to. The justification for this is that following the rules will in the long run produce a 
greater amount of utility than not following them. 
Rule utilitarians could read Aim as 
 
                                                             
30 Given Sidgwick’s wording of Aim, I take it as an axiom about how agents should act, as opposed to what makes 
something good. I will discuss the SLS theory’s theory of the good later. 
31 I do not imply here that direct act utilitarians (or any other utilitarians) must accept Sidgwick’s axioms in some form. 
They may justify their utilitarianism in some other way. I am only examining how they read Sidgwick’s axioms if they do 
accept them. 
32 E.g. Brandt (1979), chapter XV. 
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R-Aim: As a rational being, I am bound to always follow a set of rules that aim at good 
generally, not merely at a particular part of it. 
 
It is harder to argue that holding R-Aim is highly difficult, impossible or counter-productive, but it 
may be done. If following a rule means that I should drown the disabled, then surely I need 
better justification for following the rule in this situation than that doing so in general will 
maximise utility. We need to amend the rule. However, if we change the rule to accommodate 
too many amendments, then there is a danger that rule utilitarianism will collapse into direct act 
utilitarianism, which simply requires agents to perform acts that maximise utility. 
The rule utilitarian can argue back. For example, he can claim that just as direct act 
utilitarianism is practically impossible to live by, a rule utilitarianism that has too many 
amendments to its rules would suffer from the same problem.33 Any reasonable rule 
utilitarianism must therefore be different, and there would be a limit on the number of 
amendments that could be made to the rules. However, utilitarians might instead opt for another 
form of indirect utilitarianism, motive utilitarianism. Motive utilitarianism states that 
 
‘one pattern of motivation is morally better than another to the extent that the former has 
more utility than the latter. The morally perfect person, on this view, would have the most 
useful desires, and have them in exactly the most useful strengths; he or she would have the 
most useful among the patterns of motivations that are causally possible for human 
beings.’34 
 
The motive utilitarian could read Aim as 
 
M-Aim: As a rational being, I am bound to always follow patterns of motivation that aim 
at good generally, not merely at a particular part of it. 
 
This might solve the fetishism problem, because the moral agent would not always act to 
produce the morally best outcome on every occasion, and he can avoid the problems I have 
                                                             
33 For a fuller response, see Hooker (2002), pp. 93-99. 
34 Adams (1974), p. 470. 
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mentioned with rule utilitarianism. All he needs is a set of motives that overall motivates him to 
produce greater utility than otherwise. This set of motives may be able to avoid motives that 
would lead to moral fetishism. 
So the fetishism objection is only obviously a problem for the direct act utilitarian. We do not 
need to read Aim in a way that makes it vulnerable to the objection. But note the result: as A-
Aim, R-Aim and M-Aim make clear, there are many different types of interpretation that we can 
choose. Plausible interpretations seem to be plausible, in part, because they take into account 
what human beings and their social world are actually like. We might be able to know with 
certainty which acts have the best results if we could see the future, or if we had enough time to 
calculate, or if we had sufficient information and cognitive skills, but we do not. We might have 
been able to perform the morally best act in every situation if our brains were wired differently, 
or if we never got tired, or if we were psychologically capable of giving up all our other goals, but 
life is not actually like that.  
This leads to a problem for the core-apriorist. As it stands, Aim is in danger of contravening 
Sidgwick’s criteria (1) and (4). It is not sufficiently clear how we are meant to apply Aim, and we 
can reasonably disagree with others about how we are supposed to apply it in arguments for 
determinate moral propositions. Because of this, it also contravenes Sufficient Determinacy. 
The terms in Aim do not have precise enough application conditions for it to be capable of 
justifying determinate moral propositions. It thus cannot help the core-apriorist, even if it is a 
priori. We can make the application conditions more precise (for example, by amending Aim so 
that it becomes R-Aim), but this just creates a new problem. It appears that we make the 
application conditions more precise in part by using information from a posteriori sources, which 
tell us what human beings are reasonably capable of doing and deciding. By amending Aim to 
become R-Aim, we use the other resources of rule utilitarianism, but these resources are not 
entirely a priori. R-Aim may be a determinate core moral proposition, as its terms may have 
sufficiently precise application conditions, and it can be part of the set of propositions that justify 
all other moral propositions. However, since it is not knowable a priori, a moral theory that uses 
it as a determinate core moral proposition cannot be a core-apriorist theory. 
Since Aim in its original formulation risks contravening Sidgwick’s criteria (1) and (4), it is 
unlikely to be a self-evident axiom, whether it is a priori or a posteriori. As far as (4) is 
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concerned, Aim is not uncontroversial in any case, as non-consequentialists are going to be 
suspicious of it. De Lazari-Radek and Singer ask 
 
‘Would it be morally right for you to seek your own happiness if doing so meant sacrificing 
the greater happiness of another human being, without counterbalancing gain to anyone 
else? Sidgwick asserts… [that] as a matter of conscience, the answer would be 
‘unhesitatingly in the negative’… [Sidgwick attempts to] demonstrate that the self-evidence of 
the axiom of benevolence is the only way in which utilitarianism can be put on a rational 
basis…’35 
 
But would it be morally right for you to seek another human being’s happiness if doing so meant 
sacrificing your own greater happiness, without counterbalancing gain to anyone else? Perhaps 
not, but the parents of the disabled child may well disagree. Our own response would probably 
not be ‘unhesitating’ either. Utilitarians, though, have to answer this question with ‘no’, if they 
also answer de Lazari-Radek and Singer’s original question with ‘no’. If granting the axioms 
entails agreeing with utilitarians on both questions, non-consequentialists may have a hard time 
granting the axioms. 
Sidgwick knew that the axioms do not get us all the way to utilitarianism by themselves. They 
do not tell us what the good is. However, they are very favourable to utilitarianism. Impartiality 
and Aim, together with Benevolence, imply that we should be consequentialists, so non-
consequentialists will find the axioms highly dubious. Non-morally, the example of the parents 
with the disabled child shows that we might reasonably prefer a lesser amount of total non-
moral good depending on its distribution amongst agents. As far as moral good is concerned, 
suppose that we calculate that my non-moral good if you were my slave would be greater than 
your non-moral good would be if you were a free person. Deontologists can reasonably object 
that even if slavery produced net non-moral good (however one defines that good), it would be 
morally impermissible, since nobody has the right to enslave anyone else. Indirect utilitarians 
may have an answer to this complaint, but the point is that it is not at all clear that Aim is self-
evident. Deontologists may decide to give Aim up, but utilitarians must retain some version of it. 
                                                             
35 De Lazari-Radek and Singer (2014), p. 110, quoting Sidgwick (1981), p. 382. See also de Lazari-Radek and Singer 
(2014), pp. 120-121. 
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It is one of the two premises for Benevolence, which is key for Sidgwick’s defence of 
utilitarianism. Therefore it is even more important for Sidgwick that it can be fleshed out in a way 
that makes it plausible, and this places heavier reliance on the ‘other resources’ of utilitarianism. 
This brings us back to the original problem, that Aim can only be fleshed out in a way that 
makes it a posteriori. 
De Lazari-Radek and Singer do not really provide a defence of Aim. Instead, they defend 
Benevolence by defending its other premise, Impartiality. They also argue that whilst 
Benevolence implies that the morally best act is always morally obligatory, the alternative is just 
as problematic. It is just as difficult, they think, to claim that the morally best act is not always 
morally obligatory.36 This allows them to avoid the problem of moral fetishism on the basis that 
the alternative is no better, but this response is not very convincing. Their position implies more 
than just moral fetishism. It also means that there can be no morally supererogatory acts. We 
typically believe that even if it is not morally obligatory to, say, volunteer to collect donations for 
cancer research charities, it is morally better than just lying in bed all day. According to de 
Lazari-Radek and Singer, this belief is wrong. If it is morally better to collect donations than all 
other options, then it is morally obligatory. 
De Lazari-Radek and Singer might be right or wrong about this, but the point is that Aim 
does not appear to be self-evident if it raises all these questions. If Aim risks contravening 
criterion (1) because it is not clear and precise, then it also risks contravening criterion (4) 
because of the amount of reasonable disagreement that agents can have about it. 
We therefore have reason to doubt Aim on several grounds. First, in its original form, it may 
contravene criteria (1) and (4) for being a self-evident axiom. Second, even if it is a self-evident 
axiom, it contravenes Sufficient Determinacy and cannot be a determinate core moral 
proposition. Third, we can make Aim more determinate by altering it so that it becomes (for 
example) R-Aim, but this can only be done by using the ‘other resources’ of a normative moral 
theory, and we may only be able to know what these resources are through a posteriori 
investigation. So even if Aim becomes a determinate core moral proposition, it is not knowable 
a priori. 
                                                             
36 De Lazari-Radek and Singer (2014), pp. 133-134. 
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The core-apriorist may object to my use of normative moral theories. I said in the last chapter 
that the core-aposteriorist cannot simply use a posteriori information about the cognitive abilities 
of moral agents to attain determinate core moral knowledge. However, I now seem to be using 
a posteriori information about moral agents to (for example) dismiss direct act utilitarianism. The 
core-apriorist may see a contradiction here. The limitations of a moral agent end up dictating 
how we interpret Aim, but they may not be the fundamental explanation of why Aim is true or 
not. Suppose that the correct interpretation of Aim is R-Aim. R-Aim is true, but the fundamental 
explanation of why it is true may not be that it is the only interpretation of Aim that human 
agents can reasonably use to guide their moral behaviour. 
This is true, but the core-aposteriorist does not need to claim otherwise, and any problems 
with the use of a posteriori evidence lies with the SLS theory, not with the a posteriori strategy. 
It is the SLS theory that insists that we must interpret Sidgwick’s axioms in the light of an 
appropriate normative moral theory in order to discover how we should act in various 
circumstances, and the theory it chooses is utilitarianism. But there are different forms of 
utilitarianism, and we have to choose between them. It turns out that this choice will depend 
upon a posteriori information about human agents. If it did not, then direct act utilitarianism may 
be the correct moral theory after all, and we would be condemned to live by moral standards 
that we could not possibly meet. The core-apriorist, if he is to use the SLS theory, has to find a 
completely a priori justification for the normative moral theory that he chooses. 
Aim thus poses serious difficulties for the core-apriorist. Do any of the other axioms? 
 
4 – Impartiality and Treatment 
 
Could Impartiality contravene Sufficient Determinacy? Impartiality can be rephrased as ‘When 
the goods of two individuals are equal, there is nothing to choose between them. When the 
good of one individual is likely to be greater than the good of another individual if it is realised, 
then the good of the first individual is more important that the good of the second.’ Phrased like 
this, we can see a pressure point more clearly. How are we meant to read ‘important’? If we go 
with de Lazari-Radek and Singer’s interpretation of Sidgwick, it does not mean ‘moral 
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importance’. The axioms are not specifically moral axioms. They are, rather, axioms that we 
base a moral theory on. 
Take the following example: if Smith chooses to ɸ, White will get 20 units of good and 
Jones’s goodness will be reduced by 5 units. The total increase of goodness is 15 units. If Smith 
chooses to not-ɸ, Jones will get 10 units of goodness and White will be unaffected. According to 
Impartiality, it is more important for Smith to ɸ than not-ɸ. But this only works if all the types of 
goodness under examination (moral, aesthetic, prudential, legal, etc.) can be compared. There 
must be a way of working out that a certain amount of aesthetic goodness is equivalent to a 
certain amount of prudential goodness, for example. Sometimes this can be done. It seems 
reasonable for me to give up some financial good as donations to the National Gallery, since 
the financial good I give up is much less than the aesthetic good at stake. But that does not 
imply that this sort of calculation can always be done (even in principle), or that it always helps 
us work out what it is morally better to do. Suppose that White is a loan shark who employs 
Smith to break Jones’s leg, as a result of which White’s other victims will be more likely to pay 
up. White’s (financial) good may be greater if Jones’s leg is broken than Jones’s (prudential) 
good will be if it is not, so in such a case Smith should break Jones’s leg. We would be 
reasonably alarmed by a moral theory that permitted this. 
Perhaps we should read Impartiality as saying that when comparing different amounts of the 
same type of good, the larger amount is more important. But this would give an odd meaning to 
‘importance’. Suppose that a billionaire could get £1,000 or a starving family could get £900, but 
only one of these outcomes can occur. If we examine only the financial good involved, then it is 
more important for the billionaire to get £1,000. This sounds a very strange thing to say. 
Perhaps we should define ‘financial good’ to include the benefits that the money could bring, in 
which case more financial good is produced by giving the starving family £900. But this means 
that the financial good is based on other types of good (in this case, prudential good), and so 
we are actually comparing different types of good that are included in the definition of ‘financial 
good’. 
The core-apriorist can try making a concession. He could grant that when two goods are in 
conflict, we have to resort to a posteriori investigation to work out which good we should prefer. 
We can do this, for example, by working out the consequences of accepting either good and 
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discovering the utility that results. We then pick the good that produces the most utility. What is 
a priori, claims the core-apriorist, is what those goods are. If health is a good, we discover this a 
priori. We then work out a posteriori whether a particular level of health is better, worse or equal 
to a particular level of another good, and hence whether we should prefer it to that other good. 
This has two problems. The first is within the context of Sidgwick’s axioms. Even if the 
axioms are a priori, they give us no way of working out what is good. This is one reason why the 
axioms alone cannot justify determinate moral propositions. So if the core-apriorist is right, he 
must give us an independent way of working out a priori what these goods are. In other words, 
he must give us a theory of the good. We will come back to this point in section 7. The second 
problem is that if the axioms are ultimately not a priori, this also creates a difficulty. Identifying 
anything as good is not enough; we have to also know how to treat goods, and this is what the 
axioms tell us. The core-apriorist cannot just ignore this point. If the axioms are a posteriori, 
then we have to use a posteriori methods to ascertain the truth of determinate moral 
propositions relating to the comparisons of different goods. We make such comparisons 
regularly in everyday life, from deciding whether to go to the cinema or to the theatre, to 
deciding whether to give more government funding to healthcare or to education. If we can only 
work out the answers by using a posteriori methods, then the SLS theory turns out to have 
major a posteriori commitments. We may have an a priori theory of the good, but that is not 
enough to tell us how to behave morally. We need the help of the self-evident axioms, some of 
which now turn out to be only knowable a posteriori. 
Rule utilitarians can solve the problems with Impartiality by interpreting it to mean that the 
good of one individual is not more important than that of another unless there are special 
grounds for believing that under particular rules, more good is likely to be realised in general 
than otherwise. Generally, loan-sharking will not produce a greater amount of good, so any 
reasonable set of rules will not allow it. However, we must once more use the ‘other resources’ 
of a particular utilitarian theory to interpret Impartiality. We are thus landed back with the 
problem that we encountered with Aim. As it stands, Impartiality, like Aim, appears to 
contravene Sufficient Determinacy, as the terms in it such as ‘importance’ have very imprecise 
application conditions. We can use the ‘other resources’ of a normative moral theory to justify 
determinate core moral knowledge, but this has a consequence: if we add more detail to Aim 
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and Impartiality by using a normative moral theory, our choice of theory is affected by a 
posteriori evidence (as we saw in our discussion of Aim). So Impartiality, like Aim, either 
contravenes Sufficient Determinacy or is known via a posteriori evidence. 
If Aim and Impartiality are insufficiently determinate, it also seems unlikely that they can be 
self-evident. For they do not seem to be ‘clear and precise’ (contravening criterion (1)), and we 
can reasonably disagree over how they should be applied and which normative theory to use 
(contravening criterion (4)). Nevertheless, it is important to emphasise that there is no 
necessary connection between self-evident axioms and Sufficient Determinacy. It is not 
necessary that a proposition comply with Sufficient Determinacy for it to be a self-evident axiom. 
Now that we have seen the type of argument that the core-aposteriorist can make against 
Aim and Impartiality, we can apply it to Treatment. Treatment risks contravening Sufficient 
Determinacy because it is unclear what the ‘nature of circumstances’ of individuals should be 
taken to be, and what a reasonable ground for the difference of treatment of individuals is. For 
Treatment, giving the terms in the axiom more precise application conditions will involve 
deciding which normative theory to use. Normative theories may agree that there is a difference 
between a right act and a wrong act, but disagree strongly on what that difference is, and 
whether that difference is always relevant in other cases. If the normative theory we use 
answers those questions with a posteriori evidence, then the axiom itself seems to be knowable 
on a posteriori grounds. 
 
5 – Prudence and timing differences 
 
Prudence claims that individuals should aim at what is good for them, and that the distance in 
time between an agent and the occurrence of the good should not by itself affect the agent’s 
judgement of the good. In this section, I look at its claim about timing differences. In the next, I 
will look at a serious problem for Sidgwick that Prudence generates: the dualism of practical 
reason. 
There are cases in which time appears to have an effect, but for many of such cases this 
impression is wrong. For example, I might prefer to receive £100 now rather than £110 in ten 
years because I reasonably expect inflation over the ten years to wipe out the difference, but my 
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decision is not actually influenced by the time between the two outcomes. The inflation 
influences my judgement, and it just happens to take place over ten years. My judgement would 
be just as reasonable if I could get £110 tomorrow, but the effect of the inflation remained the 
same. Another case would be if I chose to take £100 now because I know that I would find it 
difficult psychologically to wait ten years for £110. It may be rational for me to in effect pay £10 
to avoid the wait, but it would be rational because of my psychological state, not the time 
between my decision and my obtaining the £110. 
Whether timing differences are never relevant, though, is a more difficult question. According 
to Prudence, a life with a lot of pain at the start and a lot of benefit at the end is just as valuable 
as a life with a lot of benefit at the start and a lot of pain at the end, just as long as overall the 
amount of good in each life is equal. Intuitively, this seems wrong. We pity lives that start well 
and go downhill more than lives that start badly and improve. Saying that the two types of life 
are equally worthwhile seems to miss the point. Whilst he does not commit himself on the 
matter, John Broome suggests that we may attribute extra value to lives with good endings, and 
to the expectation that lives should grow better as they continue. If this does not happen, we get 
depressed, which is a negative cost.37 If this is right, then the relevant difference is not actually 
the timing. It is the psychological effect. 
Even if Broome’s response works, there is still a more general objection to Prudence, which 
claims that temporal patterns matter in some way. If two agents have exactly the same amount 
of good in their lives, but that good is distributed throughout their lives differently, one of the 
lives may be rationally preferable to the other. The preferable life may even have a slightly 
lesser amount of good overall. Prudence denies that this is possible. A greater good is 
preferable to a lesser good no matter when they may occur in one’s life. If White can get £100 
now by suffering a very slight electric shock, or in a week just by waiting, Prudence would tell 
him to wait. The electric shock would add pain to his life, and waiting would not. Our intuitions 
may be different, though, even if we accept that White’s life will contain slightly more pain if he 
is shocked. We also feel that it is better for pain to be in the past than in the future, but if timing 
differences are irrelevant, it should not matter whether I underwent major pain a year ago or 
whether I will undergo the same amount of pain tomorrow. Either event will cause the same 
                                                             
37 Broome (2004), pp. 227-228. 
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amount of pain in my life.38 The relief that I feel that a pain is in my past rather than in my future 
or my present is irrational. 
De Lazari-Radek and Singer believe that intuitions against Prudence’s rejection of timing 
differences have no rational justification, and that some of them may be the result of 
evolutionary development (The intuitions were helpful to us in the past, but are no longer so.). 
There may be a rational reason to prefer pain in your childhood to the same amount of pain in 
your adulthood, but this is not because of the timing difference.39 It might seem odd for core-
apriorists to appeal to evolutionary evidence here, but it is a legitimate appeal. De Lazari-Radek 
and Singer argue that timing differences are irrelevant independently of evolutionary evidence. 
They only afterwards use such evidence to explain why we have intuitions about timing 
differences in the first place. 
Whether the intuitions are rational or not, though, if Prudence has such counterintuitive 
consequences, it is unlikely to be self-evident. Given the amount of disagreement that it can 
generate, it may contravene Sidgwick’s criterion (4). Unfortunately, this is not going to help the 
core-aposteriorist, because self-evidence is neither necessary nor sufficient for a proposition to 
be knowable a priori. It is irrelevant. Even if Prudence is not self-evident, it can still be true and 
a priori, which means that the core-aposteriorist cannot use it to argue against the CAT. She will 
have to rely instead on her examination of Aim, Impartiality and Treatment to do so – unless 
there are other criticisms of Prudence that she can use. We come now to the dualism of 
practical reason, a problem that Sidgwick famously confessed himself unable to solve. 
 
6 – The dualism of practical reason 
 
In this section, I first outline the problem. I then examine the SLS theory’s solution to it, and 
show that the solution should deeply worry the core-apriorist. 
Sidgwick wants to use Prudence as part of his moral theory, and part of the justification of 
his utilitarianism. However, he notes that Prudence could also be used in favour of rational 
egoism, which conflicts with the other axioms. In particular, rational egoism conflicts with 
Benevolence, because if I am obliged to favour my own interests, I cannot be obliged to treat 
                                                             
38 Derek Parfit provides examples to test these intuitions, though he does not come down entirely on either side of the 
debate ((1984), pp. 177-178). 
39 De Lazari-Radek and Singer (2014), pp. 126-133. 
78 
 
the interests of others as equal to mine.40 An egoist can use Prudence to rationally claim that he 
should only pursue his own self-interest. So long as he does not claim that everyone else must 
pursue the egoist’s self-interest, he does not violate the principle that nobody’s good is more 
important than anyone else’s ‘from the point of view of the Universe’. If we look at Prudence in 
isolation, leaving aside the other self-evident axioms for the moment, there is nothing incoherent 
in thinking that everyone should pursue their own self-interest, even if one agent’s self-interest 
conflicts with another’s.41 So do we stick with Benevolence, or give it up to become rational 
egoists? 
Sidgwick does not claim that the problem is insoluble, only that he cannot solve it. He 
suggests two possible solutions. The first is to weaken our epistemic standards. If we can take 
certain propositions about the natural (non-moral) world to be true simply because we have ‘a 
strong disposition’ to believe them, and because our beliefs would be incoherent without them, it 
will be difficult to reject a similar assumption in ethics.42 Accepting Benevolence over Prudence 
will avoid incoherent moral beliefs. People usually believe strongly that rational egoism is 
pernicious, so it is better that we choose Benevolence over Prudence. We should be utilitarians 
rather than rational egoists. 
Sidgwick’s second solution is to go theistic. There may be a Divine Lawgiver who wants 
‘general happiness’ amongst humans, and who will reward the just and punish the 
disobedient.43 Sidgwick allows that the existence of God may be ascertained through reason, 
revelation, or both. Reason would demonstrate the existence of God through reasoned 
argument, such as the argument from design. The argument claims that the universe looks 
designed, designed things have a designer, and so this designer must be God. Revelation 
involves the experience of an event that demonstrates the existence of God, such as the 
witnessing of a miracle. Both methods have considerable drawbacks. Every argument for the 
existence of God that has been proposed is, at best, mired in controversy. Revelation only 
works if we can show that miracles are more likely to be genuine than not. Sceptics from David 
Hume onwards point out the difficulty (or even impossibility) of doing so44. 
                                                             
40 Sidgwick (1981), pp. 381-382. 
41 Sidgwick (1981), pp. 420, 497-498. 
42 Sidgwick (1981), p. 509. 
43 Sidgwick (1981), p. 504. Sidgwick does not mention it here, but he was deeply interested in paranormal research. If 
he had found evidence of a benevolent deity, it might have supported this particular solution. 
44 Hume (1999), section X, ‘Of Miracles’. 
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Sidgwick does not develop either solution, and so leaves the dualism of practical reason 
unsolved. Even if they work, they may not be a priori. If his suggestion of lowering epistemic 
standards is correct, then we can ascertain if utilitarianism is true by seeing what our strong 
dispositions are on the subject. However, even if checking our dispositions is an a priori task 
(rather than an a posteriori task), it cannot be the whole story. Our dispositions may be 
hopelessly contrary to those of most other people, so we have to examine other people’s 
dispositions, and this is an a posteriori investigation.  
As for the theological solution, even if we think that miracles are not natural events (perhaps 
they are supernatural), it remains the case that miracles must be experienced by agents if they 
are to demonstrate to us the existence of God. If we see someone miraculously walking on 
water, we see them. The witnessing of a miracle is an empirical occurrence; there have been 
experiments conducted on the effectiveness of prayer to aid various illnesses, for example. 
Arguments for the existence of God do not fare much better, as they frequently rely on a 
posteriori premises. The argument from design collapses if it can be shown that many things 
that look designed do not have a designer. 
It might be that there is no solution to the dualism of practical reason, in which case Sidgwick 
is in real trouble. Some philosophers have been even more pessimistic, arguing that the 
problem can be extended to show that no moral norms can be rationally required.45 So the core-
apriorist is left in an uncomfortable position. If he takes Sidgwick’s solutions seriously, he has to 
show that they work without appealing to a posteriori evidence. Alternatively, he could reject 
Sidgwick’s solutions, in which case he has to come up with another solution. De Lazari-Radek 
and Singer claim to have one, but we will now see that it is not a priori either, and hence it is of 
no help to the core-apriorist. 
Their strategy is to use Sharon Street’s evolutionary debunking argument (‘EDA’) to cast 
doubt on rational egoism, whilst simultaneously shielding Benevolence from the same criticism. 
This defence seems dangerous. If the EDA debunks rational egoism, we need a good reason to 
think that it does not debunk Benevolence as well, and hence that it does not debunk the SLS 
theory. Street’s EDA claims that moral knowledge, if not impossible, is massively unlikely, and 
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we can only reach it through sheer luck if we can reach it at all.46 Since the SLS theory claims to 
give us a reliable way to reach moral knowledge, surely they cannot both be correct. De Lazari-
Radek and Singer thus walk a tightrope. They have to show that the EDA only works in 
particular cases; it is neither a complete failure nor an unqualified success. We will see shortly 
that they cannot do this a priori. Even if Benevolence can escape the EDA, we will only be able 
to know that Benevolence is true a posteriori.  
Street’s EDA objects to value realists who believe that there are at least some evaluative 
facts or truths that hold independently of all our evaluative attitudes.47 It goes as follows: 
 
1) The forces of natural selection have had a tremendous influence on the content of the 
value judgements that humans make. Evolutionary pressures shaped these value 
judgements so that the judgements helped humans to adapt to their environment. 
2) The value realist must tell us what the relationship is between the selective pressures 
on our value judgements and the independent evaluative truths that he thinks that we 
can recognise. There are two options: 
3) The first option is that there is no relationship. Evolution pushed human value 
judgements in a certain direction so that humans could successfully adapt to their 
environment, and it was just coincidental that the judgements were correct. This would 
be incredible. 
4) The second option is that it was to our evolutionary advantage that our value 
judgements track independent evaluative truths. But this is at least highly unlikely, 
because our ability to survive in a certain environment is not improved by having true 
value judgements. We would have had the same success in surviving even if all our 
value judgements were false. So there is no evolutionary pressure on us to have correct 
value judgements. This forces us back to the first option, which is massively 
implausible. 
5) So value realism is untenable. 
                                                             
46 We should note that other types of evolutionary debunking arguments also exist. They can have stronger or weaker 
conclusions; some claim that there are no moral truths, for example (see Joyce (2016)). However, I will only consider 
Street’s specific EDA. 
47 Street (2006), p. 110. Value realists include moral realists who believe that there are moral facts or truths that hold 
independently of our moral attitudes. Street notes that this does not include all moral realists, such as Peter Railton 
(Street (2006), pp. 136-137; Railton (1986)). 
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Street’s EDA presents value realists with a dilemma. Either value judgements track evaluative 
truths, or they do not. If they do not, then they can only be correct by chance. So suppose that 
they do. Many of our non-value judgements can track truths because we evolved the ability to 
make such truth-tracking judgements. The truth of the judgements helps us to survive. 
However, our chances of survival remain the same whether our value judgements are true or 
false. So there is no evolutionary reason for our value judgements to track evaluative truths. It is 
thus mysterious how we could have the ability to do so. Value realists have of course argued 
that Street’s EDA is wrong, but I will not take this line of argument.48 I will instead ask the 
following question: assuming that the EDA works against rational egoism, why do de Lazari-
Radek and Singer think that it does not work against Benevolence? My intention is to show that 
if their solution to the dualism of practical reason works, the solution can only be known a 
posteriori. The solution will therefore not help the core-apriorist.  
De Lazari-Radek and Singer’s specific claim is that Benevolence survives the EDA, but the 
self-interest principle (‘SI’) does not. Benevolence implies that if altruism increases the good 
overall, moral agents should be altruistic towards others, even when there is no chance of 
having any benefits repaid in any way.49 For example, if you benefit a stranger because you 
hope the stranger will benefit you later, this is not altruistic. De Lazari-Radek and Singer make it 
clear that they do not use the term ‘altruism’ in the sense that biologists use it. In biology, an act 
is altruistic simply because the actor gains no immediate benefit from the act it performs. The 
ability to perform biologically altruistic acts evolved because such altruism ultimately benefits the 
survival of the actor, the actor’s genes or other members in the actor’s group.50 The actor’s 
motives (even if it has any) are irrelevant. De Lazari-Radek and Singer’s ‘altruism’ excludes 
such acts. 
SI claims that ‘any agent has a reason to do what makes her life go better, the strength of 
the reason varying in proposition to the extent to which her well-being will be improved’.51 This 
is not the same as Sidgwick’s rational egoism, since the mere fact that I have a reason to do 
                                                             
48 E.g. Enoch (2011), pp. 163-175; Clarke-Doane (2015). 
49 De Lazari-Radek and Singer (2014), pp. 185-187. 
50 Dawkins (2006) describes how biologically altruistic acts can promote the survival of the actor’s genes. Sober and 
Wilson argue that biologically altruistic acts can promote the survival of the actor’s group ((1999), p. 9). 
51 De Lazari-Radek and Singer (2014), p. 190. The idea comes from Roger Crisp ((2006a), p. 73), but I use de Lazari-
Radek and Singer’s formulation of the principle. 
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what improves my life does not mean that I cannot have stronger reasons to do things that 
make my life go worse. Reasons can conflict, and some reasons can be stronger than others. 
Still, rational egoism implies SI, so if SI is false, then rational egoism is false. 
De Lazari-Radek and Singer claim that Street’s EDA debunks SI, but not Benevolence. 
Since utilitarianism is justified by Benevolence, and rational egoism implies SI, we therefore 
have good reason to believe that utilitarianism is correct, and no reason to believe that rational 
egoism is. This solves the dualism of practical reason. 
Street’s EDA debunks SI, claim de Lazari-Radek and Singer, because SI clearly has 
evolutionary advantages. It is not difficult to see why organisms would perform acts that 
benefited themselves – avoiding pain, obtaining nutrition, finding shelter from hostile 
environments, and so on. Successful organisms survive, and survival usually increases the 
chances of reproduction. Evolutionary development has therefore ‘programmed’ us to have the 
intuition that SI is true, because it results in reproductive success. SI is a value judgement, and 
Street argues that if evolutionary development is the cause of our value judgements, this is not 
because such judgements track evaluative truths. The fact that evolutionary development 
programmed us to believe that SI is true has nothing to do with SI’s actual truth value. So there 
is no reason to think that SI is true. 
If Street’s EDA debunks SI, why believe that it is ineffective against Benevolence? De 
Lazari-Radek and Singer think that we have the following reasons to believe Benevolence: 
 
a) It is the result of careful reflection. 
b) It is accepted by many different cultures and religions that have carefully reflected on it, 
from Christianity to Hinduism. 
c) There is no plausible evolutionary reason why we believe Benevolence. It does not 
appear evolutionarily advantageous for us to do so.52 
 
These criteria generalise to cover ‘any process of establishing that an intuition has the highest 
possible degree of certainty’: 
 
                                                             
52 De Lazari-Radek and Singer (2014), p. 193. See also p. 195. 
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1) Careful reflection leading to a conviction of self-evidence; 
2) Independent agreement of other careful thinkers; and 
3) The absence of a plausible explanation of the intuition as a non-truth-tracking 
psychological process.53 
 
De Lazari-Radek and Singer claim that Benevolence passes all these tests. They also appeal to 
other a priori beliefs we have that track truths, where the truth of the belief confers no 
evolutionary advantage. They say that ‘[l]ike our ability to do higher mathematics, [our belief in 
Benevolence] can be most plausibly explained as the outcome of our capacity to reason’.54 
Street’s EDA is important for the above criteria because of (3). There is a plausible 
evolutionary story about why we are inclined to endorse SI. Even if we endorsed SI after careful 
reflection, and even if most people would endorse SI after careful reflection, SI would still be 
less reliable than Benevolence, as Benevolence fulfils every criterion for an intuition to be 
reliable, and SI only fulfils the first two at most. 
De Lazari-Radek and Singer’s argument can be criticised by the core-aposteriorist on the 
grounds that even if their argument works, it is an a posteriori argument. We therefore use a 
posteriori methods to ascertain that Benevolence is more likely to be true than SI, and so the 
reason to prefer utilitarianism to rational egoism is also a posteriori. 
Look again at (3). De Lazari-Radek and Singer claim that the ability to make moral 
judgements is similar to our ability to make higher mathematical judgements. Their point is that 
the ability to do higher mathematics is not a direct result of evolutionary development. Few, if 
any lives have been made more reproductively successful by knowing the truth of the 
Taniyama-Shimura Conjecture. There is no reason for evolution to directly give us the ability to 
understand the Conjecture or to prove it.  
Since we do have the ability, though, there must be a reason why. There is a simple rough 
answer, though naturally it takes much biological work to provide the details. Whatever the 
survival value of knowing the Conjecture is, the ability to reason, even minimally, has a huge 
survival value. It helps organisms predict what predators will do, where best to find food, what to 
use for shelter, and so on. Basic mathematics may also be useful. However, once we have got 
                                                             
53 De Lazari-Radek and Singer (2014), p. 195. 
54 De Lazari-Radek and Singer (2014), p. 193. I assume here that mathematical beliefs can be a priori. 
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the ability to reason simply and to make basic mathematical calculations, a whole new world 
opens up, and we are that much closer to using our abilities in ever more complex ways that 
have no direct survival value at all. The same type of process occurs with other human traits 
that do not involve reasoning. There is no direct evolutionary advantage in finding a three-star 
Michelin restaurant’s food more pleasurable than the food at a Burger King. Both will ensure 
that you do not die of starvation, so why do we perceive such a large difference in culinary 
value? All that is evolutionarily needed is that nutritious substances taste good, and non-
nutritious substances taste unappealing or bad. But evolutionary development is not so limited. 
Evolution does not plan; evolutionary development is the result of a reaction to 
circumstances, and that reaction may have unexpected consequences later on, for better or 
worse. The EDA defender (who wants to argue that Street’s EDA works for all value 
judgements, including Benevolence) may argue that Benevolence is similar. Our belief in 
Benevolence does not directly promote survival, but it is the consequence of a set of abilities 
that did promote survival, just as our ability to solve differential equations has been built from 
abilities that promote survival. The EDA defender claims further that our belief in Benevolence is 
the consequence of other non-truth-tracking beliefs that we have thanks to evolutionary 
development, so our belief in Benevolence is itself non-truth-tracking. 
For de Lazari-Radek and Singer to refute this claim, and argue that criterion (3) supports 
Benevolence, they first have to confirm criterion (1). We can only divorce our belief in 
Benevolence from evolutionary influence once we have made a careful examination of 
evolutionary influence. And unfortunately for the core-apriorist, this examination must be made 
a posteriori. First, we must ascertain how evolutionary development works. How can we 
reasonably expect evolution to shape our beliefs? Does it shape different types of belief in 
different ways? Second, we must discover the a posteriori consequences of adopting 
Benevolence. Are the results beneficial from an evolutionary point of view, and if they are, in 
which environments? If de Lazari-Radek and Singer are correct, then our investigation will show 
that evolutionary development has not influenced beliefs in Benevolence, but it has influenced 
beliefs in SI, so it is more likely that we are justified in believing Benevolence. The trouble now 
is that the adoption of Benevolence becomes dependent on a posteriori investigation. 
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De Lazari-Radek and Singer can reply that although evolution gave us the ability to believe 
Benevolence, this does not imply that there was specific direct evolutionary pressure to believe 
it or not. Our reasoning pressures us to believe it, not our evolution. But even if de Lazari-Radek 
and Singer are correct about evolutionary pressure, this ignores the fact that there are other 
non-truth-tracking psychological processes that may also pressure us to believe Benevolence. 
We may believe that it is true because of the effect of holding the belief, rather than because of 
any rational reasons. For example, one might think that the world is filled with enough 
selfishness, spite and indifference to suffering. Being told that it is every man for himself would 
be depressing, especially if you are always the loser. A belief in Benevolence may be 
comforting. If this view sounds overly cynical, we can make it less bleak. The world is full of 
risks and dangers. For whatever reason, which may have nothing to do with reasoning, we have 
powerful inclinations to help the lives of others, just as we may have other powerful inclinations 
to do things that do not directly benefit us from an evolutionary point of view. It might not 
actually be that much of a leap to go from caring about our families (which is evolutionarily 
advantageous) to caring about our friends and then, for whatever reason, starting to care about 
strangers. 
The wider problem here is that de Lazari-Radek and Singer only look at possible 
evolutionary explanations of Benevolence. (3), however, is not limited to evolutionary 
explanations. It claims that an intuition can only be reliable ‘in the absence of a plausible 
explanation of the intuition as a non-truth-tracking psychological process’. This does not only 
include evolutionary processes. We can run a posteriori investigations on the effect of social 
influence on our acceptance of Benevolence, political influence, religious influence, and so on. 
A defence of Benevolence therefore may require a number of a posteriori tests to help us 
ascertain its reliability. Maybe we find Benevolence plausible not because of evolutionary 
influence, but because of social influence. This is similar to David Hume’s claim that the reason 
why we developed the virtue of justice was that it helped to stabilise large societies. A growing 
society will eventually become so large that it is impossible for a single citizen to know 
everyone. Some citizens will be strangers to each other, and we need justice to ensure that they 
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will treat each other fairly, because they have no other ties of family or friendship to ensure that 
they will do so.55 
This gives rise to a whole range of social/political/religious debunking arguments, which have 
a similar structure to Street’s EDA. In effect, they claim that we hold our belief in Benevolence 
or SI because the beliefs are useful, not because they are true, and so we are not justified in 
believing that they are true. Furthermore, if discovering an evolutionary explanation a posteriori 
for our belief in Benevolence would damage de Lazari-Radek and Singer’s argument, so would 
the a posteriori discovery of a social/political/religious explanation. In all these cases, 
Benevolence would fail to meet criterion (3). 
(2) also relies somewhat on (1), as de Lazari-Radek and Singer claim that reliable intuitions 
require ‘independent agreement of other careful thinkers’. This requirement is subject to how 
carefully we have reflected, how many others disagree, what their reasons for disagreement 
are, and so on. If we have good reason to be very confident about our reflection, then even 
large amounts of disagreement may not be enough to force us to re-evaluative our position. 
Why not just use (1), then? Why do we need to rely on (2) and (3) as well? It is important 
here not to confuse two issues. The first is to ascertain the truth of an intuition. To do so, it may 
be that all we need is careful reflection. This is not what de Lazari-Radek and Singer are 
concerned with here, though. They are looking at whether we are justified in holding the 
intuition, and so what we consider to be careful reflection may not be enough (The rational 
egoist can insist that he has carefully reflected as well.). This means that even though (2) and 
(3) rely on (1), (1) also relies on (2) and (3). If many people who have carefully reflected 
disagree with us, maybe our own reflection was not that careful. If our intuition has a non-truth-
tracking explanation, maybe we should hesitate to think it correct. Our reflection may be biased. 
(1) is still the most important criterion, however. If we take it away, (2) becomes a simple appeal 
to numbers, and (3) implies that if a belief does not have a non-truth-tracking psychological 
explanation, it is more likely to be correct. This is not quite right, as many beliefs may have non-
truth-tracking explanations that are not psychological. 
Simply dropping criterion (3), though, is not an option. If we do, we get the result that we 
should believe Benevolence rather than SI because we and other careful thinkers agree that 
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Benevolence is more plausible. Suddenly the EDA is doing no work at all. If de Lazari-Radek 
and Singer could show that a priori reasoning alone is enough to do the job of showing that 
Benevolence is preferable to SI, they would not need to bring in the EDA. In fact, dropping (3) 
would entail leaving Sidgwick’s problem unsolved. The entire point of his problem was that 
rational reflection alone does not appear to rule out rational egoism. 
If we are very uncertain whether Benevolence meets criterion (3), then, this gives us reason 
to believe that we cannot isolate Benevolence from the EDA. If the EDA refutes our grounds for 
believing SI, we need to make sure that it does not refute our grounds for believing 
Benevolence as well. However, it turns out that this investigation of Benevolence is a posteriori. 
Furthermore, even if de Lazari-Radek and Singer insist that evolutionary development had no 
influence on our belief in Benevolence, it is difficult to dismiss all non-truth-tracking 
psychological explanations for the belief unless we make more investigations, which will also be 
a posteriori. 
The prospects of solving the dualism of practical reason thus look bleak for the core-
apriorist, as the SLS theory’s solution relies on a posteriori information. Sidgwick’s suggestion 
that we weaken our epistemic standards appears to depend on a posteriori observations of 
actual agents. His suggestion that we turn to God will be unattractive to anyone who thinks that 
moral truths and moral knowledge have no connections to a deity. Many purported ways to 
argue for the existence of a deity also depend themselves on a posteriori premises or 
observations. 
If the SLS theory is right to use Street’s EDA, we have the following method to justify the 
normative content of determinate core moral propositions. We start with Sidgwick’s axioms. The 
axioms appear to justify either utilitarianism or rational egoism. Careful reflection alone leaves 
us uncertain which is correct. So we look around for widespread agreement on the axioms, and 
we examine whether SI or Benevolence is vulnerable to explanations of them that do not imply 
that they track any truth (which is an a posteriori investigation). Benevolence turns out to be 
better justified than SI according to the three criteria that de Lazari-Radek and Singer list, so we 
should choose utilitarianism over rational egoism, and we can include Benevolence as a 
determinate core moral proposition. We can also use the ‘other resources’ of utilitarianism 
combined with the axioms to justify other determinate moral propositions. 
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However, we only know that Benevolence is justified because of a posteriori investigation, so 
our acceptance of utilitarianism is based to a great extent on a posteriori investigation. The SLS 
theory is therefore not a core-apriorist theory. 
 
There is one more part of the SLS theory that we have not yet looked at. Utilitarianism requires 
us to maximise the good, but we have not examined what the good is. Sidgwick identifies it as 
happiness, or pleasure, and so he endorses a hedonist theory of the good. De Lazari-Radek 
and Singer agree with him. Could the core-apriorist argue that we must identify the good a 
priori? In the next section, I will outline de Lazari-Radek and Singer’s defence of hedonism, and 
show that their arguments are a posteriori. The core-apriorist will get no comfort from them. 
 
7 – Theories of the good 
 
It would take too much space to fully discuss theories of the good, so I will begin with only 
briefly outlining why de Lazari-Radek and Singer reject non-hedonist theories of the good. I will 
then move on to their defence of hedonism. 
They identify three different types of theory of the good. The first is desire-based theories, 
according to which it is good for agents to have their desires satisfied. The problem with such 
theories, claim de Lazari-Radek and Singer, is that agents can have desires that later they will 
regret satisfying, and that if we try to restrict the types of desire that constitute the good, we 
cannot get a clear, definite set of desires that exclude all the problematic ones. For example, if 
an agent prefers A to B, B to C, and C to A, desire-based theories have no easy way to work 
out which desire for A, B or C should be satisfied.56 Furthermore, if the satisfaction of an agent’s 
actual desires is good, this might entail that the satisfaction of any crazy desires that the agent 
has is good. If we avoid this by saying that the satisfaction of the desires that the agent would 
have if he were ‘rational and aware’ is good, then what is good for the actual agent might be the 
satisfaction of desires that he never has. He may never actually be rational and aware.57 
The second type of theory claims that there need be no connection between the good and 
anything that the agent would find attractive. The most prominent of these theories is 
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89 
 
perfectionism, which holds that the good is the perfection of something. Typically, this is taken 
to be some human quality, such as wisdom, courage or virtue. So if the good is the perfection of 
virtue, it is good for an agent to be virtuous, even if he never finds virtue attractive or desirable. 
Sidgwick explicitly claims that perfectionism has fatal difficulties. For example, if the perfection 
of courage is good, then we need to know when courage becomes foolhardiness, as 
foolhardiness is not perfect. But we can only do this if we know when courage is no longer 
good. Since courage-perfectionism holds that courage is identical to the good, it denies that this 
could ever happen. Sidgwick believes that most qualities will lead to a similar problem, but he 
identifies a few that do not: wisdom, universal benevolence and justice. The trouble here is that 
we can only define these qualities by already presupposing the good. For example, if the 
definition of ‘justice’ implies the impartial distribution of what is good according to the right rules, 
then justice itself cannot be the good.58 The right and the good are conceptually prior to justice. 
Furthermore, there is a risk that the reason why we should perfect something is become of the 
consequences that it will produce. This means that the theory is one of instrumental good, 
rather than intrinsic good. 
Sidgwick, de Lazari-Radek and Singer choose instead to endorse a hedonist theory, which 
promotes pleasure as good and pain as bad. Sidgwick states that happiness is the ultimate 
good, where happiness is the attainment of pleasure and the avoidance of pain. The greatest 
possible happiness is ‘the greatest attainable surplus of pleasure over pain’.59 Some 
philosophers, such as the utilitarian John Stuart Mill, believe that there are different types of 
pleasure, and some are more valuable than others. Enjoying a performance of Richard III is a 
more valuable pleasure than enjoying a drug-induced stupor, even if the pleasure given by the 
drugs is more intense. As Mill puts it, ‘[i]t is better to be a human being dissatisfied than a pig 
satisfied; better to be Socrates dissatisfied than a fool satisfied’.60 Sidgwick disagrees, as we 
can only make distinctions by appealing to something other than pleasure. So if Mill were right, 
good could not be identified with pleasure.61 
Sidgwick gives the following definition of pleasure: 
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‘[a] feeling which the sentient individual at the time of feeling it implicitly or explicitly 
apprehends to be desirable; - desirable, that is, when considered merely as feeling, and not 
in respect of its objective conditions or consequences, or any facts that come directly within 
the cognisance and judgment of others besides the sentient individual.’62 
 
De Lazari-Radek and Singer endorse this definition, and spend some time defending it. 
Curiously, much of their defence appeals to psychological research. For example, they cite 
psychological experiments to demonstrate that the satisfaction of a desire need not produce any 
pleasure.63 They think that the experiments help to show that hedonism is separate from desire-
based theories of the good, and so is not vulnerable to the problems that desire-based theories 
face. 
One prominent objection to hedonism is Robert Nozick’s ‘experience machine’ thought 
experiment.64 Nozick imagines a scenario where scientists are able to plug your brain into a 
machine that would make you think and feel that you are having pleasurable experiences, such 
as successfully pursuing any goals you have. You would think that it was real life, as you would 
have forgotten that you were plugged into the machine. If you were made the offer to plug in, 
would you accept? Nozick thinks not, for three reasons. First, we want to actually do things 
rather than just think that we have done them. Second, someone hooked up to the machine is 
just ‘an indeterminate blob’.65 In a sense, she loses her identity, as she loses all the 
characteristics and traits that make her ‘courageous, kind, intelligent, witty, [and] loving’ when 
she is plugged in. Third, living in a ‘man-made’ reality is a poor substitute for the real thing. 
Nozick concludes that what is important to people is not merely their perceived experiences 
alone. This poses a problem for hedonism, because if the experience machine can give you 
more pleasure than you would get in your real life, hedonism would advise you to plug in. But 
most people, claims Nozick, would recoil from doing so. 
De Lazari-Radek and Singer aim to show not that Nozick’s intuition is wrong, but that we 
should not rely on it. Their aim is to show that the intuition cannot be used as an argument 
against hedonism. They point to two main flaws that the intuition apparently suffers from. The 
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first is that as Nozick phrases the thought experiment, it may involve a status quo bias.66 Status 
quo biases are biases towards what we already have or states that we are already in. We are 
reluctant to change, even when we would benefit from doing so. So if we were already using the 
experience machine, and were asked if we would like to return to the real world, our reaction 
may not be what Nozick would expect. De Lazari-Radek and Singer cite an experiment 
conducted by Felipe de Brigard that tries to eliminate the bias. Test subjects were told that they 
were already plugged into the experience machine, and were asked if they would like to leave. 
Each subject was given one and only one of three vignettes that could influence their choice. In 
the neutral vignette, subjects were not told anything about real life outside the machine. In the 
negative vignette, they were told that in ‘real life’ they were an inmate at a maximum security 
prison. In the positive vignette, they were told that in ‘real life’ they were a multi-millionaire artist 
living in Monaco. 50% of the subjects given the positive vignette chose to remain plugged into 
the machine – apparently, being a multi-millionaire in real life was not tempting enough to 
leave.67 
It should be said that considerably more work has to be done to confirm de Brigard’s results. 
Only 46% of test subjects who got the neutral vignette chose to stay connected to the machine, 
so apparently people are more likely to leave the machine if they are told nothing about their 
real life then if they know that they are a multi-millionaire in real life (Incidentally, 84% of 
subjects with the negative vignette chose to stay connected.). This could be the effect of small 
sample sizes, as each vignette was only given to 24 subjects. The subjects were all non-
philosophy undergraduates at an American university, which could also have skewed the 
results. It was not tested whether the test subjects’ choices would have been different before 
they were plugged in, rather than after. We can also question the framing of the vignettes. A 
person plugged into the experience machine does not interact with anything outside the 
machine, but then prisoners do not usually interact much with anything outside prison. In such 
circumstances, why not take the option that makes you think that you can do what you like in 
freedom? As for the neutral vignette, where subjects were given no information about their life 
outside the machine, might they not have assumed that life outside the machine would be 
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exactly like the life they actually had? Does the actual life of the test subjects skew the 
results?68 
De Brigard’s experiment is interesting, but it is not clear how far it refutes Nozick’s argument. 
De Brigard holds that it falsifies the following hypothesis: 
 
‘people care more about reality than they care about how their life is experienced from the 
inside… [so] regardless of how reality turns out to be, they would choose it over a simulated 
life.’69 
 
Regardless of how reality turns out to be? If life were uniformly terrible for most people, then 
Nozick’s original thought experiment would not be very convincing in the first place. Plugging in 
would be a way to escape misery. But as the quality of life increases, then even given the 
results of de Brigard’s experiment, fewer people would want to plug in. More subjects chose to 
leave the machine in the neutral and positive vignettes than in the negative vignette. Maybe 
there is a limit above which an extra increase in the quality of life would not influence more 
people to leave the machine, but de Brigard is testing a far stronger claim than the one that 
Nozick is arguing for. Furthermore, as de Brigard mentions, his results appear to cause 
problems for hedonism as well.70 If our intuitions are to pursue pleasure and avoid pain, or at 
least avoid the reduction of pleasure, then the percentage of test subjects who would unplug 
from the machine in the neutral vignette should be lower than those who would in the positive 
vignette. In fact, it is slightly higher. 
An important consideration that de Lazari-Radek and Singer do not mention, and that might 
damage both Nozick’s argument and de Brigard’s experiment, is that your personal goals may 
have an effect on whether you agree to be connected to the experience machine. If you want to 
write a symphony, then arguably you could do so both in real life and if you were connected to 
the machine. But there are many goals that you cannot accomplish inside the machine. You 
cannot be loved by a real person. You cannot genuinely help others. You cannot make 
previously unknown astrophysical discoveries (Why think that the experience machine will give 
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accurate information about previously unknown astrophysics?). You cannot see the genuine 
Mona Lisa. When I donate to charity, I want my money to actually help people, and that could 
not happen in the experience machine. So if our reactions to Nozick’s though experiment 
depend on what goals we actually have, then de Brigard’s experiment can show us very little, as 
it does not take the goals of the test subjects into account. So many people have so many 
different types of goals that relying on intuitions about those goals to help identify the good is 
not helpful, even if we only use those intuitions as a first step towards a theory of the good. It is 
thus very unclear how far the hedonist can rely on de Brigard’s experiment. He cannot use the 
results to argue that we care more about what we experience than about our connection to the 
real world. 
A final point about de Brigard’s experiment is that it is not even clear that he avoids status 
quo bias. In his set-up of his thought experiment, the test subjects are already plugged into the 
experience machine. Therefore the status quo bias would predict that they would prefer to 
remain plugged in. The amount of pleasure they get from the machine may therefore not be the 
deciding factor in their decision to stay. 
The upshot of de Brigard’s experiment is that it has too many problems to support hedonism. 
It might, however, be enough to show that Nozick is too quick to use the experience machine to 
show that hedonism is wrong. Since de Lazari-Radek and Singer are content to have this 
weaker conclusion, the problems I have raised may not worry them. But we do need more 
compelling reasons to think that their own position on hedonism is any better than Nozick’s. 
The second flaw that de Lazari-Radek and Singer identify with Nozick’s argument is that we 
may be very nervous about agreeing to plug into the experience machine. Why are the 
scientists operating the machine so keen to make us the offer? What if the machine breaks? 
What if there is a power failure? Would you really trust the people operating the machine?71 De 
Lazari-Radek and Singer do not mention any experiments that ask subjects about experience 
machine scenarios that deal with these matters, but presumably such experiments could be run. 
If it turned out that people would be more likely to plug in if they had sufficient reassurance, de 
Lazari-Radek and Singer could use the results in their favour. 
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The trouble with the flaws that de Lazari-Radek and Singer identify is that they are identified 
a posteriori. If test subjects typically rejected the experience machine in de Brigard’s experiment 
in all the vignettes, then it could not be used to claim that Nozick’s intuition about the machine 
was wrong. It should be said that de Lazari-Radek and Singer do not merely point at people’s 
actual intuitions to refute Nozick’s point. They do not try to find out what is good just by checking 
what most people think.72 But their methodology here is very close to the methodology they use 
to solve the dualism of practical reason. That is, we can check to see whether Nozick’s intuition 
can be plausibly explained as a non-truth-tracking psychological process. It will not track the 
truth if it can be explained as a mere preference for the status quo, or if it has been massively 
influenced by fears about the experience machine’s reliability, or the motives of the people 
running the machine. De Lazari-Radek and Singer even mention as a possibility Roger Crisp’s 
suggestion that our intuitions about the experience machine are vulnerable to an evolutionary 
debunking argument.73 This means that their defence of hedonism against Nozick suffers from 
the same doubts as their solution to the dualism of practical reason. It is not a priori because 
they are using a posteriori psychological research to defend hedonism. If they can find separate 
a priori means to defend hedonism as well, this is not a problem for the core-apriorist, but if they 
do not, it entails that their theory of the good is not a priori. Unfortunately, we will not see that 
they do not. 
Could we not use evolutionary debunking arguments against hedonism? De Lazari-Radek 
and Singer think not. The EDA against hedonism would be something like this: our belief that 
pain is bad and pleasure is good has an evolutionary explanation. By avoiding pain and 
engaging in pleasurable activity, an organism typically has a greater chance of survival and 
reproductive success. So it makes evolutionary sense for people to believe that pleasure is 
good and pain is bad. But these beliefs are evolutionarily useful whether they are justified or 
not. A moral belief is not justified simply because it is useful. There is thus no reason to think 
that such beliefs are justified.  
De Lazari-Radek and Singer object that we know that pain is bad because we can directly 
experience it.74 We cannot be mistaken that violent headaches are bad, no matter what the 
cause of the headache is. The headache might have good consequences, but it cannot be 
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intrinsically good. De Lazari-Radek and Singer create a thought experiment to make their point. 
Thalia Wheatley and Jonathan Haidt ran an experiment in which they hypnotised test subjects 
to feel disgust when they read the word ‘often’. The subjects then read a scenario about Dan, 
who runs student discussions about academic topics at a university. Dan ‘often’ chooses topics 
which participants would find attractive. The test subjects who had been hypnotised were more 
likely to think that Dan was doing something wrong.75 Presumably, de Lazari-Radek and Singer 
claim, once the subjects found out the full details of the experiment, they would change their 
minds. They would know that the only reason they felt that Dan had done something wrong was 
that they had been hypnotised.  
Suppose, though, that they had been hypnotised to have a headache when they read the 
word ‘often’. When they read the scenario, they would feel pain, and they would think that they 
had a bad experience. If they were then told that the reason for the headache was because of 
the hypnotic suggestion, would they decide that they were wrong to judge the experience as 
bad? No, because it does not matter how the pain was caused. The fact that they were in pain 
would be enough. 
It is not clear just what this example is intended to show. If de Lazari-Radek and Singer are 
trying to argue from analogy, then their point is that the test subjects would admit that their 
judgements about Dan were wrong, but not that their judgements about their headaches were 
wrong. However, this analogy breaks down rapidly. Wheatley and Haidt’s experiment and the 
thought experiments are not testing for the same type of thing. The thought experiment 
concerns an experience; the test subjects are asked about their headaches. Wheatley and 
Haidt’s test subjects are asked about a scenario, though, and not their experience of disgust. It 
would be extremely plausible for their test subjects to admit after the experiment that whilst they 
now knew that Dan had done nothing wrong, they still really did feel disgust. It does not matter 
how the disgust was caused, any more than it matters how the headache was caused – the 
disgust was real. 
What if de Lazari-Radek and Singer are not using Wheatley and Haidt’s experiment to make 
an analogy? If so, they can discard any mention of the experiment and simply point out that we 
judge pain as intrinsically bad no matter how the pain was caused, and no matter what the 
                                                             
75 Wheatley and Haidt (2005). 
96 
 
consequences are. We cannot doubt that it is intrinsically bad, and that pleasure is intrinsically 
good. The SLS theory may even hold that we ascertain a priori that pain is bad and pleasure is 
good. Furthermore, even if pain has good consequences, it can only be at most an instrumental 
good depending on the situation. For example, a chest pain could motivate me to call an 
ambulance, which saves my life because the pain was the first sign of a heart attack. Once we 
accept this, we can bring in Benevolence to reach a moral theory. Suppose that someone offers 
you £1 to whack me on the head with a hammer, and the benefit to you will be less that then 
pain caused to me. Without Benevolence, you cannot deny that I will have a bad experience 
that I would prefer to avoid, but you can deny that you have a reason to care. You can adhere to 
Prudence and insist that you have a reason to pursue your own good, even if it negatively 
affects mine. If you accept Benevolence, though, you are morally obliged to turn down the offer. 
My well-being is just as valuable as yours, despite the fact that you cannot experience my 
pleasure or pain. Unfortunately, though, this brings us back to the dualism of practical reason, 
and the difficulties with the SLS theory’s solution to the problem. On its own, hedonism cannot 
give a reason to care about other people’s pleasure and pain. We need to solve the dualism of 
practical reason first. 
Another point is that our belief that pain is bad need not be based on any rational or non-
rational beliefs. The experience of pain and our reaction to it can be immediate. If you 
accidentally put your finger on an open flame, you will pull it away without thinking. It takes far 
more concentration and thought to keep it there. This does not mean that your reaction is 
irrational, but that it is non-rational. There are plenty of reasons why we do not like pain, but 
according to hedonism the reason why pain is bad is not because it has various consequences 
or evolutionary origins, but simply because we experience a certain sensation. We do not like 
feeling pain, and there is nothing more to be said. To say that this is rational or irrational misses 
the point, as physical sensations are not the sort of thing that can be rational or irrational. This 
means that the hedonist cannot rationally argue a priori that pleasure is good and pain is bad. 
We can see why by drawing an analogy with visual perception. Suppose I perceive a patch of 
blue because I am hallucinating, whereas in fact I am standing in front of a white wall. You can 
rationally argue that my perception is defective, that nothing blue is in front of me, that my 
hallucination has a particular cause and so on, and I can agree with all of it. But your arguments 
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will not make the hallucination go away. You cannot rationally argue that I do not perceive the 
colour blue. Equally, you cannot claim that I am irrationally perceiving the colour blue. 
Perceptions, being sensory experiences, are neither rational nor irrational. My belief that 
something blue is in front of me may be irrational, but my sensory experience is not. Similarly, if 
I feel pain, you may argue that the pain is unimportant or I should try ignoring it. And I can agree 
with you, but agreement will not make the pain go away.76 Neither will it change my instinctive 
negative attitude towards it (I may agree that the pain is useful instrumentally, but that does not 
mean that I have a positive attitude towards the pain as pain. I have a positive attitude towards 
its usefulness, not the pain itself.). Pain, being a physical sensation, cannot be shown to be 
rational or irrational. De Lazari-Radek and Singer seem to implicitly agree with this point, 
because their arguments for hedonism are either that alternatives to hedonism do not work, or 
that objections to hedonism are mistaken. They do not provide a positive argument for 
hedonism. This may be because if we talked to agents who could never experience pleasure or 
pain, there would be no way to rationally demonstrate that hedonism is true. 
Hedonism may still be correct, but it now appears that we identify what is good through our 
immediate experiences, which entails that we identify what is good a posteriori. The good of an 
agent who is incapable of feeling pleasure or pain would have to be something different, or 
perhaps the hedonist would claim that nothing would be good or bad for such an agent. This 
argument would be based on the fact that there are certain a posteriori experiences that the 
agent could not have. Ultimately, de Lazari-Radek and Singer’s hedonist theory is based on a 
posteriori observations about the biological organisms we examine. 
This feeds into a wider point, which is that de Lazari-Radek and Singer’s conception of 
pleasure and pain does not have a lot of content. There is nothing that connects all pleasurable 
things other than that they are pleasurable. What, then, does it actually mean for something to 
be pleasurable? How do we identify what is pleasurable? The obvious answer is that we go out 
and look. We try different experiences, and we become good at estimating whether we would 
enjoy something based on similar past experiences. The proposition ‘Pleasure is an intrinsic 
good’ is not very determinate, because pleasure is more or less just what the agent finds 
pleasurable. It does not tell us what is pleasurable, and so the application conditions of 
                                                             
76 I may agree that I should remove the cause of the pain or try to reduce it some other way, but this agreement will not 
eliminate the pain. Acting on the agreement may do so.  
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‘pleasure’ are very imprecise. We must therefore investigate a posteriori what agents find 
pleasurable, and fortunately there are a lot of pleasures that most people share – a pleasure in 
social contact, having varied interests, keeping busy with enjoyable tasks, various physical 
sensations, and so on. This means not that hedonism is an empty concept, but that it depends 
on a posteriori study of actual agents to flesh it out. 
The core-apriorist could respond by trying to provide a priori tests for pleasure. We do not 
need to look at actual agents, he claims. Instead, we can work out from our armchairs that 
pleasure is intrinsically valuable. One way of doing so may be something like G.E. Moore’s test. 
We take the concept of pleasure and ask whether a universe containing only pleasure would be 
good. Moore asks ‘what value we should attach to [pleasure], if it existed in absolute isolation, 
stripped of all its usual accompaniments’.77 Moore thought that the test shows that there are 
many things more valuable than pleasure; a pleasurable contemplation of beauty, for example, 
has an immeasurably greater value than the consciousness of pleasure alone.78 Assume, 
though, that this test vindicated the hedonist. Since we worked this out a priori, does this not 
also vindicate the core-apriorist? No, claims the core-aposteriorist, because we did not actually 
work it out a priori. We cannot understand what pleasure is in the abstract, because there is 
nothing that connects all the pleasurable things other than that they are pleasurable. How, then, 
are we supposed to work out what a universe that only contained the value of pleasure would 
be like unless we brought our own experiences of pleasure to the test? If we had no idea what 
pleasure felt like, we would have no way of knowing whether it was good or not. 
I have not reached the conclusion that the SLS theory’s hedonism is wrong, though one may 
think that there are too many problems with it to be plausible. For example, one might agree 
with Mill that certain types of pleasure are more valuable than other types. My main aim has 
been to show that the SLS theory’s hedonism has too little content to work as a theory of the 
good unless we add more content to the term ‘pleasure’ regarding what things are pleasurable 
and how we know that they are pleasurable. We can only do so, though, by examining a 
posteriori information about what agents find pleasurable. This theory of the good is thus not 
purely a priori. 
 
                                                             
77 Moore (1993), p. 142. See also p. 236. 
78 Moore (1993), p. 145. 
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8 – Summing up 
 
We can now sum up. The argument I have been making in this chapter seeks to develop the a 
posteriori strategy against the SLS theory. Return to the first two steps of the strategy: 
 
a) At least some true determinate core moral propositions are not a priori self-evident. 
These determinate core moral propositions are either a posteriori self-evident, or can be 
known by using other propositions as premises. 
b) At least some of these propositions are not knowable solely by using a priori 
propositions as premises. Any attempt will fail either because some of the purportedly a 
priori propositions contravene the principle Sufficient Determinacy or are really a 
posteriori propositions. 
 
As far as (a) goes, three of the axioms are not determinate moral propositions in their original 
formulation. Aim, Impartiality and Treatment face the same problem. The terms in the axioms 
lack sufficiently precise application conditions, and thus cannot be determinate core moral 
propositions. They also risk contravening Sidgwick’s criteria (1) and (4) for being self-evident 
axioms. Furthermore, the only way we can alter them so that they can be used to justify 
determinate moral propositions is by using the ‘other resources’ of a normative moral theory, 
such as rule utilitarianism. This is when step (b) becomes relevant. Whether those resources 
are a priori is an important question, as if they are not, the altered axioms cannot be either. So 
even if the altered axioms are determinate, we cannot assume that we can attain knowledge of 
them a priori. They may depend on a posteriori assumptions about actual agents, and hence 
they will not be a priori.  
Prudence is a special case. According to Sidgwick, it is self-evident, but it conflicts with 
Benevolence and leads to the problem of the dualism of practical reason. We badly need a 
solution to this problem, otherwise we have no way to refute rational egoism. Unfortunately the 
SLS theory’s solution is not going to help the core-apriorist. Its reliance on Sharon Street’s 
evolutionary debunking argument to cast doubt on rational egoism implies that Benevolence 
must be defended a posteriori. If the solution works, then it works on a posteriori grounds. 
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Meanwhile, if the dualism of practical reason is not resolved, then the SLS theory has a major 
hole. Neither option helps the core-apriorist. 
De Lazari-Radek and Singer attach a particular hedonist theory of the good to their 
utilitarianism and their metaethics. Unfortunately their theory appears to be a posteriori, which is 
further bad news for the core-apriorist. Hedonism states that pleasure is good and pain is bad, 
but the only way we can ascertain the truth of the SLS theory’s hedonism is to examine our 
personal experiences, and this examination is a posteriori. The SLS theory’s hedonism does not 
have an a priori basis. 
I conclude that de Lazari-Radek and Singer fail to show that the SLS theory can be used to 
provide a set of a priori self-evident axioms that can be (or can be used to justify) a priori 
determinate core moral propositions. However, there may be another way that the core-apriorist 
can use moral intuitionist theories. Matthew Kramer proposes that we can accept or reject 
certain metaethical claims by examining the moral consequences that they produce. If 
accepting a purported claim leads to accepting morally repugnant consequences, we should 
reject the claim. Nazism is morally repugnant, so any set of purported claims that allow it must 
be wrong. Metaethical claims are not simply claims about morality, but are moral principles 
themselves. In the next chapter, I will examine Kramer’s metaethical theory, and argue that 
even if it works, it likely does not work specifically as a core-apriorist theory. 
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Chapter 4 – Matthew Kramer’s moral realism 
 
1 – Basic moral principles 
 
Matthew Kramer endorses a metaethical theory that he calls ‘moral realism as a moral 
doctrine’.1 He claims that true moral principles (such as the principle not to torture babies for 
pleasure) are based on certain basic principles that are self-evident. These basic principles are 
synthetic and knowable a priori. By ‘knowable a priori’, Kramer means that the principles are 
knowable non-empirically.2 They include principles such as moral supervenience and moral 
objectivity. Kramer bases his definition of moral supervenience on Simon Blackburn’s, having 
slightly modified it. Roughly speaking, moral property M supervenes on natural property N if M is 
not identical to N, and either: 
 
a) it is impossible for M to change without N also changing; and 
b) it is impossible for two things to have N to the same degree without them both 
possessing M to the same degree, or both failing to possess M.3 
 
When Kramer claims that moral principles are objective, he means that they are mind-
independent, determinately correct, uniformly applicable to all moral agents, true at all times 
and everywhere, impartial, and agreed upon by most people without biases or corrupting 
influences. Statements of moral principles are truth-apt.4 
The claims of moral objectivity and moral supervenience are not only metaethical claims, as 
they are also moral principles. Whilst there are a few exceptions (which we will see later), 
Kramer thinks that metaethical claims are substantive moral principles, such as the principle not 
to torture babies for pleasure is. This is an uncommon move. Metaethical claims are typically 
seen not as moral principles, but claims about moral principles, facts and properties. The claim 
that moral facts are objective, say, is not seen as a moral principle itself. To Kramer, though, 
this is a false distinction. The claims discussed in metaethics are themselves moral principles, 
                                                             
1 Kramer (2009); (2017). 
2 Kramer (2009), pp. 94-95. 
3 Kramer (2009), pp. 304-305; Blackburn (1973), pp. 114-115. 
4 Kramer (2009), p. 35. 
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and can only be defended morally. We cannot, for example, argue that moral supervenience is 
true via logical or non-normative metaphysical argument.5 Instead, we must defend 
supervenience on moral grounds. The metaethical claim that moral properties supervene on 
natural properties is itself a moral principle, and not just a non-normative metaphysical claim 
about moral principles. Basic metaethical claims – in other words, self-evident metaethical 
claims – are therefore basic moral principles, and they justify various non-basic moral principles, 
such as the principle not to torture babies for pleasure. 
Basic moral principles are a priori. The basic moral principles that Kramer examines, 
supervenience and objectivity, also seem to be expressed in fairly determinate ways. We can 
therefore say that core moral propositions express basic moral principles, and some of these 
propositions are determinate. So, because basic moral principles are a priori, Kramer’s 
metaethics is a core-apriorist theory. In this chapter, I shall argue that Kramer’s metaethics 
cannot successfully defend the CAT. 
Why think that we can only defend basic metaethical claims as moral principles? Kramer 
endorses a version of what he calls Hume’s Law, which claims that 
 
‘[t]here is no valid argument in which all the premises are non-moral (and logically 
consistent) and in which the conclusion is a substantive moral proposition.’6 
 
Kramer thinks that there is no way that we can defend moral propositions by appealing solely to 
non-moral premises. Hume’s Law thus entails two things. First, if a moral proposition can only 
be defended by appealing to basic metaethical claims, then the basic claims must themselves 
be moral. Second, since basic metaethical claims are basic moral principles, Hume’s Law 
implies that they can only be defended morally themselves. We should be clear here about what 
such a defence would look like. The fundamental reason why moral supervenience is true is 
because moral supervenience is true; being a basic moral principle, it is self-evident. Basic 
moral principles ‘are their own rock-solid foundations. True in all possible worlds, they and their 
                                                             
5 Since various metaethical and moral claims can be metaphysical claims (such as the claim that moral supervenience 
is true), Kramer’s moral realism implies that various moral principles can be expressed as metaphysical claims. But they 
must be irreducibly normative metaphysical claims, otherwise it may be possible to argue non-normatively that these 
claims are correct. This is impossible if they can only be defended morally. 
6 Kramer (2009), p. 6. The law’s name is a reference to Hume (2000), section 3.1.1.27. 
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objectivity are unremittingly self-sustaining’.7 However, there are other reasons to believe that 
basic moral principles are true as well, and Kramer thinks that such reasons are a ‘superlative 
means for enhancing one’s grasp of [the principles’] content and of the attractiveness of [their] 
content’.8 Basic moral principles are not true because we can grasp them, or because moral 
agents find them attractive, but our grasp of the principles gives us reason to believe the 
principles. 
Kramer’s views may not be the most popular, but it is important to note that he is not alone. 
Ronald Dworkin is another prominent philosopher who argues that issues traditionally taken to 
be metaethical issues, such as moral epistemology and the possibility of mind-independent 
moral truths, are moral issues. One can only argue for mind-independence by using a moral 
argument, as opposed to, say, a non-normative metaphysical argument. Actually, Dworkin goes 
further than Kramer does, as he claims that metaethics entirely collapses into first-order 
normative moral philosophy.9 At the first-order, our arguments are moral, and are designed to 
tell us which moral beliefs we should have and how we should morally behave. At the second-
order, arguments are about the nature of moral properties, or how we can attain moral 
knowledge, or what we are actually doing when we engage in moral discourse and the like. 
Metaethical arguments do not directly tell us what our moral beliefs or moral behaviour should 
be, though they may have an effect on first-order moral arguments. Whilst Kramer explicitly 
refuses to collapse metaethics into first-order moral philosophy, both philosophers appeal to 
Hume’s Law in their work. One might think that, since Hume’s Law tells us that we cannot get 
moral conclusions from exclusively non-moral premises, we should be moral sceptics. There is 
no way of ‘breaking into’ morality from outside, via logical or non-normative metaphysical 
argument and the like. But Kramer and Dworkin believe that Hume’s Law simply limits the 
methods with which we can attain moral knowledge.10 It does not prevent us from attaining 
moral knowledge. 
So Kramer is not making a lonely journey by himself. In fact, we may not need to completely 
accept his position in order to have some sympathy with it. For example, Simon Blackburn 
                                                             
7 Kramer (2009), p. 2. Kramer means morally possible worlds, not logically possible worlds. I will return to this point 
later. 
8 Kramer (2009), p. 363. 
9 Dworkin (2011), pp. 8-11. Another recent example of a moral argument for a metaethical position is Melis Erdur’s 
argument that moral realism fails on moral grounds (2016), 
10 Dworkin (2011), p. 17. 
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writes that philosophers such as David Wiggins and John McDowell compare explanations of 
the practice of ethical judgement by ‘invok[ing] the very commitments of that practice’. They 
thus refuse to ‘stand outside ethics’, and Blackburn is not one to complain. He claims that 
 
‘[e]thical notions require ethical sensibilities to comprehend them… [W]hy should it not 
require an ethical sensibility to comprehend an explanation of the views we hold? Only those 
who perceive friendship as good will understand why we do so…’11 
 
However, Blackburn’s analysis of supervenience, which he applies to moral properties, is a 
logical analysis.12 He therefore parts company with Kramer regarding the moral status of the 
analysis, even though he indicates that metaethics can require specifically moral arguments. 
Blackburn’s words here echo Hume again, this time concerning Hume’s Sensible Knave. The 
Knave asks why he should not be immoral when he can get away with it and when it does not 
cause so much damage that it endangers society. Hume’s response if that if the Knave really 
has no inclinations against immorality, there is no way to reason with him. We will never be able 
to convince him that he should act morally.13 Kramer would say that this is what we should 
expect, given Hume’s Law. If we do not accept moral notions in the first place, we cannot argue 
for moral conclusions. 
We should briefly note that whilst Kramer does not call himself a moral intuitionist, we can 
very easily read his metaethics as an intuitionist theory, because basic moral principles are self-
evident. This means that it fits Hallvard Lillehammer’s definition of intuitionist theories that we 
saw at the start of chapter 3. 
 
2 – A metaethical collapse? 
 
An initial objection to Kramer’s metaethics is that if metaethical principles are actually moral 
principles, then he cannot prevent metaethics collapsing into first-order normative ethics. If this 
difficulty is a fatal one, then the core-aposteriorist can use it to argue that we cannot use 
                                                             
11 Blackburn (1988), p. 174. See also McDowell’s comments on understanding the viewpoint of a moral community 
((1998), pp. 198-218). 
12 Blackburn (1973), p. 115. 
13 Hume (1998), sections 9.22-9.25. 
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Kramer’s metaethics to support the CAT. However, we shall see in this section that Kramer can 
resist it. 
Kramer makes a distinction between abstract and concrete moral principles. Moral principle 
A is more abstract (and less concrete) than moral principle B if and only if the falsity of A would 
affect the truth value of a wider range of moral principles than the falsity of B would.14 Kramer 
believes that metaethical theories carry with them ‘highly abstract’ moral implications, so they 
are highly abstract moral doctrines.15 Consequently, a metaethical theory can be consistent with 
many conflicting moral principles that are more concrete. However, even if the theory is 
consistent with both of the concrete moral principles ‘Telling white lies is morally permissible’ 
and ‘Telling white lies is not morally permissible’, it can have many other moral implications.16 
The fact that the theory has moral implications, however abstract, makes it a moral theory. 
Despite this, though, Kramer is at pains to deny that metaethics is just first-order ethics. A 
metaethical theory is not simply a first-order moral theory. First, some metaethical questions can 
be answered with non-moral arguments. Kramer believes that metaethical expressivism seeks 
to explain ‘the sundry practices in which people form and communicate moral judgements’.17 
This is a metaethical issue, but it is not a moral one, because it asks nothing about the nature of 
moral principles and properties. Metaethical theories that do examine such issues, such as 
moral realism, are moral theories for this reason.18 Second, moral realism and other metaethical 
theories still make ‘metaphysical and substantive and epistemological enquiries’, even though 
such enquiries are also ‘substantive ethical enquiries’.19 They are both types of enquiry at once, 
and presumably a key difference between, say, quasi-realism and utilitarianism is that 
utilitarianism says little about the metaphysics of moral properties or the possibility of moral 
knowledge. Quasi-realism says considerably more, which separates it from first-order moral 
theories. 
                                                             
14 Kramer (2009), p. 10. 
15 Kramer (2017), p. 198. 
16 See also Kramer (2009), p. 4, which points out that philosophers who share the same first-order moral theory may 
have very different metaethical views. 
17 Kramer (2017), p. 204. 
18 Huw Price (2004) would disagree. He endorses ‘subject naturalism’, which claims that questions about the nature of 
objects and properties can only be answered by examining how actual humans use language. So in order to examine 
moral properties, it is necessary to (naturalistically) examine how we use moral language. Kramer’s separation of 
theories such as expressivism from theories such as moral realism is thus mistaken. However, since this does not affect 
Kramer’s arguments for his moral realism, I will set this issue to one side. 
19 Kramer (2017), p. 208-209. 
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In my discussion of Kramer I will follow him in restricting terms such as ‘metaethics’, 
‘metaethical’ and the like to metaethical theories that in Kramer’s opinion are moral theories. I 
will not be arguing that theories such as expressivism are core-aposteriorist theories. Kramer 
would not concede that such theories profit very much from a posteriori evidence in any case. 
He believes that ‘the questions addressed by anthropologists and sociologists who study human 
beings’ practice of moral discourse are not the questions addressed by expressivists’, and that 
whilst expressivism does contain a posteriori elements, these elements are ‘elementary 
platitudes’.20 This relegates the a posteriori to a rather unimportant role, but this is not a battle 
that the core-aposteriorist has to fight. ‘What do agents do when they express moral 
judgements?’ is not an epistemological question. For epistemological questions, Kramer 
believes, we have to turn to theories such as moral realism. 
Kramer also argues by analogy with logic and mathematics. Meta-mathematical and meta-
logical theses, he claims, are second-order, but lie ‘squarely within the mathematical or logical 
domain’.21 He does not provide any examples, but an obvious choice is Gödel’s incompleteness 
theorems. The theorems describe the limitations of mathematical systems under various 
conditions (and they thus describe something about the nature of those systems), but the 
theorems themselves are justified mathematically. If meta-mathematical enquiries are 
nevertheless second-order, then there is no reason why metaethical enquiries cannot be. 
 
3 – Moral repugnance 
 
It seems unlikely that the core-aposteriorist can argue against Kramer by claiming that he 
makes metaethics collapse into first-order moral enquiry. We should therefore move onto other 
criticisms. The next one I shall examine is interesting not because it works (I will show that it 
probably does not), but because its solution points to a more troubling objection to Kramer’s 
metaethics. This new objection is based on the a posteriori strategy, and it is the one that the 
core-aposteriorist should push. If the new objection is right, then Kramer’s metaethics cannot be 
a core-apriorist theory. 
                                                             
20 Kramer (2017), p. 205, fn 17. 
21 Kramer (2017), p. 206. 
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If Kramer meets someone who does not see why objectivity must be a basic moral principle, 
how can Kramer defend his position? He cannot defend objectivity on logical, non-normative 
metaphysical or other non-moral grounds, because that would contravene Hume’s Law. So 
there must be some way to defend objectivity on moral grounds. Kramer’s answer is to appeal 
to moral repugnance.22 
To argue for or against a purported basic moral principle, Kramer claims that we should 
examine the moral consequences of adopting or rejecting the principle. Consider a candidate 
basic moral principle, that moral relativism is true. Kramer points out that if this principle were 
right, then it could be morally permissible to torture babies for pleasure. This is so morally 
abhorrent that we should reject the principle.23 Our ‘concrete moral judgements’ – that torturing 
babies for pleasure is wrong, that we should oppose racism, and so on – forbid us from 
accepting the principle. Kramer explicitly uses this method when defending moral 
supervenience. We have a moral reason to accept moral supervenience, he claims, because if 
we do not accept it, we risk our ‘moral world… spinning out of control’. If moral supervenience 
were false, it would provoke ‘unprincipled moral chaos’.24 We would have no way to work out 
reliably what the moral implications of our actions were, and our choice of which actions to 
perform would be morally arbitrary. This chaos would falsify many other moral principles that we 
want to retain. Moral values such as ‘fairness and equity and integrity’ would be ‘largely or 
wholly inoperative’.25 Denying supervenience would be morally intolerable, says Kramer, so 
moral properties must supervene on natural properties.  
Similarly, we should accept moral objectivity because of the consequences that would arise 
if morality were not objective. Whilst Kramer cannot appeal to logical absurdity when arguing 
against moral relativism (as moral relativism is logically possible), he draws analogies with 
logical principles. Accepting moral relativism, he claims, is like denying the logical law of non-
contradiction.26 Deny the law of non-contradiction, and you get an utter logical free-for-all. No 
matter what you prove, you can still affirm the opposite. Proving that p does nothing to disprove 
not-p. This leads to logical inconsistency, as it would be possible, if we rejected the law of non-
contradiction, to accept it as well. We can thus defend the law by objecting to the consequences 
                                                             
22 E.g. Kramer (2009), pp. 362-364. 
23 Kramer (2009), pp. 30-36. 
24 Kramer (2009), p. 360. 
25 Kramer (2009), p. 363. 
26 Kramer (2009), pp. 45-46. 
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of rejecting it. This defence of the law is not a justification of it, since the law is its own logical 
foundation. It relies on no other premises for its justification. 
Moral relativism also results in a free-for-all, this time moral. Whatever moral principle is true 
for you, it may have no moral significance for anyone else. If moral relativism were true, thinks 
Kramer, morally bad consequences would result, because no moral argument would show the 
baby-torturer to be wrong unless the torturer voluntarily accepted the argument’s premises. It 
would only show him to be morally wrong based on contingent, mind-dependent facts, such as 
which moral principles he himself accepted. This is not logically inconsistent, so we cannot say 
that moral relativism is logically mistaken, but it is morally mistaken. 
The law of non-contradiction is necessary in classical logic, because classical logic would 
collapse without it. Would morality collapse if relativism were true? We could still make moral 
arguments that would be logically valid, so the problem is not a logical one. Nevertheless, 
Kramer holds that morality would collapse in such a case. Moral arguments would depend on 
contingent, mind-dependent premises, and Kramer rejects such a possibility because the 
consequences of this moral relativism are morally repugnant. They (morally, rather than 
logically) cannot be wrong. Morality would collapse without them. This, incidentally, is why 
Kramer says that basic moral principles are true in all morally possible worlds, rather than all 
logically possible worlds. A world is morally possible if and only if ‘every normative state of 
affairs within it is consistent with the existence of all the basic principles of morality’.27 As 
torturing babies for pleasure is not consistent with the existence of some basic moral principles, 
a world where it is morally permissible would be morally impossible. 
To be clear, Kramer is not saying that moral relativism is repugnant because it will inevitably 
lead to people torturing babies for pleasure. It could be that every agent in the world was a 
relativist who firmly believed that torturing babies for pleasure was morally wrong. No agent 
would ever actually do it. However, as relativists, they would have to accept that if any society 
did believe the proposition ‘Torturing babies for pleasure is not morally wrong’, that belief would 
be true for that particular society. Furthermore, they would have to accept that if the universe 
contained no minds whatsoever, the statement ‘It is not the case that torturing babies for 
pleasure would be morally wrong’ would be true. Kramer rejects this, holding that some moral 
                                                             
27 Kramer (2009), p. 158. 
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propositions are true or false regardless of whether the universe contains any minds or not. So 
Kramer’s objection to relativism is not based on any consequences of relativism that may well 
arise in the actual world. Relativism is morally repugnant because of its moral implications, 
rather than because of any actual or possible danger it poses to actual agents. Even if we were 
certain that no relativist would torture babies for pleasure, relativism would still be morally 
repugnant.28 
The most obvious objection to Kramer’s argument needs a little development to really stick. 
The initial idea is that Kramer seeks to simply establish moral truth by ‘horrified assertion’, as 
Samuel Clark puts it.29 Torturing babies for pleasure is so morally shocking to us that we reject 
any metaethical theory that implies that it could be morally permissible. However, our shock will 
not convince any society that does not find it shocking that it is morally impermissible. Such a 
society may use perfect logical and non-normative metaphysical reasoning, but that will not 
show the members of that society that torturing babies for pleasure is morally wrong, because 
Kramer has already said that we cannot reach moral knowledge purely through such reasoning. 
Kramer certainly does not need to claim that our immediate or automatic responses to moral 
problems infallibly tell us which moral principles are correct. There are situations that appear or 
do not appear to be morally wrong at first sight, but we subsequently change our minds when 
given time to reflect on them, or when we discover new non-moral facts about the situations. 
Performing operations without anaesthetic sounds barbaric, but if we find out that no 
anaesthetic is available, and that the operation is the only way to save the willing patient’s life, 
we are less likely to think it unethical. Any remaining discomfort is not moral discomfort. But it 
seems possible for a society to decide, even after a long period of reflection and non-moral fact-
checking, that a particular metaethical principle is wrong because it has morally repugnant 
consequences, whilst another society in the same position would not find the consequences 
morally repugnant. There is no non-moral argument to show that one society is right and the 
other is wrong. 
Clark therefore believes that the objection is fatal for Kramer’s metaethics. We cannot 
discover a correct metaethical or moral system simply by checking what ‘horrifies’ us, even if we 
have perfect reasoning abilities and know all the relevant non-moral facts. 
                                                             
28 Kramer (2009), pp. 32-33. 
29 Clark (2011), p. 426. 
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I am not going to argue that this objection is correct. In fact, I will shortly show that it fails. My 
purpose in developing it is not to show that Kramer’s metaethics fails, but to concentrate instead 
on the solution. I will examine two possible solutions. The first is to appeal to what I will call the 
self-supporting condition, which concerns how basic moral principles relate to each other. The 
second defence is to draw a comparison between metaethical principles and first-order moral 
principles. The second defence is much more successful than the first, and Kramer can use it to 
withstand the objection. The trouble now is that the core-aposteriorist can use the a posteriori 
strategy to argue against Kramer’s metaethics as a core-apriorist theory. 
 
4 – The self-supporting condition 
 
Basic moral principles do not stand individually. They are connected to each other. If two 
purported principles give morally good results individually but conflict irreconcilably over various 
moral questions, Kramer would think that we must revise them. This would be sensible, 
otherwise basic moral principles might conflict with each other. If two basic moral principles 
imply that we should act in contradictory ways, we would have no way to discover which 
principle to follow. We would also be unable to know which actions to perform.  
One problem with calling sets of basic moral principles ‘consistent’ is that it seems to imply 
that it is possible to defend the sets by simply appealing to logical or non-normative 
metaphysical consistency, when Kramer denies that we can defend moral principles purely on 
logical or non-normative metaphysical grounds. Kramer allows that two moral propositions can 
logically contradict each other, but he also claims that no purported moral principle is wrong just 
because it is logically mistaken or inconsistent.30 Incorrect moral principles are not necessarily 
logically irrational, but they are unreasonable, and logically irrational principles are a type of 
unreasonable moral principle. Unreasonable moral principles fall ‘below a threshold of moral 
extenuability or intellectual credibility’.31 So I will refer instead to the self-supporting condition, 
which states that all other things being equal, we should prefer a set of basic moral principles 
that all mutually support each other over a set that does not. The principles mutually support 
each other if and only if they do not justify contradictory non-basic moral principles, and they do 
                                                             
30 Kramer (2009), pp. 289-294.  
31 Kramer (2009), p. 293. 
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not justify non-basic moral principles that collectively it would be unreasonable for a moral agent 
to hold. To be clear, it is the set of basic moral principles that is self-supporting, not the 
individual principles themselves. A set is self-supporting if and only if all the principles in the set 
mutually support each other. 
The self-supporting condition should be used as a means to understand the basic moral 
principles that we accept. Like the appeal to morally repugnant outcomes, it is not the 
fundamental reason why a particular set of purported basic moral principles is correct or 
incorrect. It simply explains the attractiveness of the set. 
Kramer can try defending the basic moral principles that he favours by appealing to moral 
consequences and the self-supporting condition. However, the second defence collapses into 
the first, because of the reason why we should endorse the self-supporting condition. As noted 
above, the self-supporting condition cannot be an appeal to logical or non-normative 
metaphysical consistency. There must therefore be another reason why the condition can be 
used as a defence of basic moral principles, and the reason can be found in the results of 
adopting the condition. If we did not adopt it, then we could endorse sets of basic moral 
principles that justify contradictory non-basic moral principles. This set might both justify ɸ-ing 
and not ɸ-ing in identical circumstances, in which case we would be unable to decide what to 
do. If we picked which principles to follow arbitrarily, this could have a morally repugnant result. 
So Kramer will reject sets of basic moral principles for not being self-supporting. Their lack of 
self-support is a reason to reject them. 
However, this is an appeal to moral consequences. If we decide to act arbitrarily, we may act 
in a morally repugnant way. Meanwhile, if we cannot decide between two principles (assuming 
that it is logically possible to pick neither), then we may choose not to do anything, which itself 
may be morally repugnant. If a set of basic moral principles is not self-supporting, there are too 
many opportunities for morally repugnant consequences to arise, so we should accept the self-
supporting condition to avoid these consequences. The appeal to the condition is thus not a 
separate defence from the appeal to morally repugnant consequences, but a variation of it. We 
can only defend basic moral principles by appealing to the moral consequences of accepting 
them directly or indirectly (i.e. via the self-supporting condition). 
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So appealing to the self-supporting condition will not defuse Clark’s objection. We now turn 
to the second response to the objection, which develops a comparison between basic moral 
principles and first-order moral theories. 
 
5 – First-order moral theories 
 
Kramer thinks that a large number of different non-basic moral principles are consistent with 
basic moral principles. Basic moral principles, as we have seen, may be logically neutral 
amongst many conflicting non-basic moral principles, such as whether or not to tell white lies to 
save face in social situations.32 It seems clear, though, that the basic moral principles you 
choose will affect what the correct first-order moral theory is. Kramer considers whether a form 
of utilitarianism could allow that it could ever be morally right to torture children for fun. It is not 
logically inconceivable, but it is inconceivable in the sense that it would be beyond ‘the limits 
imposed on any decent person’s imagination by [its] overwhelming unreasonableness’. Any 
utilitarianism that allows torturing children for fun cannot be ‘a doctrine that can be endorsed 
under any optimal conditions for moral deliberation’.33 
If a first-order moral theory lies outside the bounds of moral reasonableness, it cannot be 
correct. So if a first-order moral theory conflicts with basic moral principles, resulting in morally 
repugnant consequences, it cannot be correct either. This only holds, though, if we are more 
confident about the basic moral principles we choose than about the first-order moral theory. If a 
first-order moral theory clashes with the principle of objectivity, Kramer would abandon the 
theory. Objectivity is too morally important to give up. However, if we are more confident about a 
first-order moral theory than a purported basic moral principle that it conflicts with, then the 
purported principle may have to give way. 
Though Kramer does not mention it, he might be able to use reflective equilibrium as a 
method with which we can reconcile basic moral principles and first-order moral theories. When 
we are morally evaluating a situation, and we find out that our moral judgements conflict, it is 
not always clear which judgements are the right ones, and so we do not know which moral 
principles are correct. John Rawls proposes that we should use reflective equilibrium, which 
                                                             
32 Kramer (2009), pp. 9-10. 
33 Kramer (2009), p. 159, fn 2. 
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involves revising our judgements in acceptable ways until they conform to each other. We may 
also be able to revise what we understand the situation to be. Rawls claims that ‘eventually we 
shall find a description of the initial situation that both expresses reasonable conditions and 
yields principles which match our considered judgements duly primed and adjusted’.34  
Suppose that we have good reason to accept basic moral principle A and first-order moral 
theory B, but A and B are in conflict. By examining them more closely and looking at the 
outcome of the situations to which they apply, we may be able to amend them to become A* 
and B*, which do not conflict. Kramer appears to be favourable to this, though as I noted he 
does not explicitly use reflective equilibrium. If it helps us to avoid morally repugnant 
consequences, then it seems to be a tool that Kramer can use. 
Kramer suggests that first-order moral theories provide an ethical purpose. This purpose 
might be to promote a certain result when moral agents interact, or to promote a particular aim 
that moral agents have, or some other outcome. First-order moral theories tell us what the 
purpose is. Kramer claims that in order to achieve this purpose, we need to accept various 
basic moral principles. The basic moral principles are attractive because they help us achieve 
this purpose. 
 
'Any imputation of a general point or purpose to ethics… is a substantive ethical thesis. It 
attaches fundamental ethical value to an end, which transmits that value to the ethical norms 
and decisions by which the end is promoted. A focus on the intercourse amongst human 
beings – with an orientation towards advancing their positive interaction or limiting their 
negative interaction – is one attractive route for arriving at the cardinal value or purpose of 
ethics. Writers within the broad utilitarian tradition in ethics… generally favour such a route, 
but so do many others. Some writers within the Kantian tradition concentrate instead on the 
integrity of the individual rational agent as the primary concern of morality. Given that the 
deliberations and judgements of such an agent cannot partake of integrity unless the 
requirement of supervenience is heeded, a Kantian justification for that requirement is readily 
available.’35 
 
                                                             
34 Rawls (1999), p. 18. 
35 Kramer (2009), p. 333. 
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The final sentence is important. If Kantianism implies that the primary concern of morality is the 
integrity of rational agents, and if this can only be the case if moral supervenience is true, then 
Kantianism cannot work without moral supervenience. Cue morally repugnant consequences, 
as no moral agent would be able to have integrity. Once more, the truth of Kantianism is not the 
fundamental reason why moral supervenience is true, because moral supervenience is a basic 
moral principle. The fact that Kantianism implies moral supervenience merely tells us why the 
Kantian finds it attractive. She cannot have Kantianism without it. 
It is the same for consequentialism. Simon Blackburn also talks of morality having an aim, 
saying: 
 
‘[I]t is natural to associate projectivism with consequentialist moralities, in the following way. 
A projectivist [will attempt to give]… an explanation of the practice of moralizing. This turns to 
its function, and particularly to its social function. In [J.L.] Mackie’s terms, morality is an 
invention that is successful because it enables things to go well among people with a natural 
inheritance of needs and desires that they must together fulfil.’36 
 
Kramer states that the purpose that Blackburn finds is ‘broadly consequentialist in character’, 
and that ‘the invocation of such a purpose is integral to Blackburn’s account of 
supervenience’.37 Once more, a first-order moral theory is used in support of a basic moral 
principle. 
How does this help against Clark’s objection? It points to a similarity between first-order 
moral theories and metaethical theories in Kramer’s metaethics that he can exploit. It seems 
quite unremarkable to argue for and against first-order moral theories on moral grounds. For 
example, many problems associated with direct act utilitarianism are not that it is logically 
impossible for a moral agent to be a successful direct act utilitarian, but that it would lead to 
morally bad outcomes. One such problem, according to Bernard Williams, is that it entirely 
ignores the integrity of moral agents and their personal projects.38 This is not an appeal to 
logical incoherence or non-normative metaphysical difficulty. It is a normative problem. Nobody 
                                                             
36 Blackburn (1985), p. 164. 
37 Kramer (2009), pp. 347-348. Blackburn thinks that moral supervenience is logically or conceptually necessary (e.g. 
(1984), p. 184), whilst Kramer thinks that it is morally necessary, but otherwise Kramer endorses Blackburn’s definition 
of supervenience. 
38 Williams (1973), pp. 108-118. 
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would claim that Williams is wrong because his objections are not logical or non-normative 
metaphysical objections. To demand that they be so would miss the point. 
It would be quite possible for the utilitarian to agree that Williams is right, but claim that it is 
unimportant. Maybe the utilitarian does not care about our integrity. This is not an attractive 
position, and the utilitarian will not find many supporters. But without further work, we cannot 
claim that the utilitarian is logically irrational. What we can claim is that no sane, reasonable 
person would entirely dismiss the importance of our personal integrity. This is why Williams’s 
argument should worry utilitarians. They should be trying to rebut it, not rejecting it just because 
their moral position is logically possible. 
Suppose that the utilitarian says that under some conditions it would be morally permissible 
to torture babies for pleasure. Kramer steps in, saying that this simply is not morally plausible. 
No sane, reasonable person could truly believe it. Now suppose that a metaethicist declares 
that moral relativism is true, and that all of the horrors that Kramer fears are therefore true. 
Many morally repugnant acts, claims the metaethicist, are morally possible. Moral relativism is a 
metaethical position, but metaethical positions are substantive moral positions – as we have just 
seen, your metaethical position affects your first-order moral position and vice versa. Once 
more, Kramer puts his foot down. If moral relativism implies that morally repugnant acts are 
morally possible, then no sane, reasonable person would truly think that moral relativism is true. 
This is no more wishful thinking than Williams’s claim that people should have their integrity 
respected by a first-order moral theory. 
The point here is that first-order moral propositions can be criticised and defended on moral 
grounds. Therefore, if metaethical propositions are substantive moral propositions, we should 
be able to criticise and defend them on moral grounds as well. In fact, if Hume’s Law is true, 
then this is exactly what we should expect. People who seriously believe that it is morally 
permissible to torture babies for pleasure, to drive over pedestrians for sport and to stab people 
for the thrill of it are morally unreasonable to the point of moral insanity. Their position may be 
logically coherent, but this is morally irrelevant. The fact that someone might not be able to 
recognise that a moral principle exists is not evidence that the principle is unknowable, any 
more than people suffering from dyscalculia prove that mathematical axioms are unknowable. 
Any metaethical theory that allows morally insane outcomes is a moral catastrophe. 
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We now have a response to Clark. Kramer states that metaethical claims can only be 
defended morally. Clark objects to this, claiming that such methods are far too weak. If two 
agents disagree over whether something is morally repugnant, there is no way to resolve the 
disagreement. The problem for Clark now is that if we have no problem using moral methods to 
defend substantive moral claims made by first-order moral theories, we should have no 
problems using moral methods to defend substantive moral claims that are also metaethical 
claims. In effect, Kramer can say the following: we can object morally to the substantive moral 
claim that torturing babies for pleasure may be morally permissible. This objection implies that 
any first-order moral theory that endorses the claim is wrong. Moral relativism, even though it is 
a metaethical theory, also endorses this claim. So the objection also implies that moral 
relativism is wrong. If there is something that stops the objection working against moral 
relativism, even though it works against first-order moral theories, it is up to Kramer’s opponent 
to show what that something is. This response makes a rather strong claim, but Kramer cannot 
argue for a weaker one. He cannot simply argue that there are moral arguments as well as non-
moral arguments against moral relativism. His acceptance of Hume’s Law, which implies that 
substantive moral claims can only have moral justifications, will not allow him to do so. 
This reveals a key point: Clark’s objection can only make headway if Hume’s Law is wrong. 
In effect, Clark asks ‘How do we identify metaethical truths?’ Kramer replies ‘We use moral 
methods’. Clark then responds ‘But we cannot use moral methods until we justify them, and we 
cannot do so by using other moral methods’. This implies that Clark is looking for a non-moral 
method, such as some sort of logical or non-normative metaphysical argument. Given how 
Kramer has set up his moral realism, though, Clark cannot do this without assuming from the 
outset that Hume’s Law is untrue. Hume’s Law claims that there is no non-moral method. There 
is no way to reach any moral conclusion without using moral premises, and one will only accept 
moral premises if one is already a moral agent. 
If Hume’s Law is correct, then Kramer can use similarities between first-order moral theories 
and metaethical theories to defend his view that we can identify moral principles by using moral 
repugnance. It appears uncontroversial that we can use our sense of what is morally repugnant 
to discover first-order moral truths; that is in effect what Williams’s argument against 
utilitarianism relies upon, for example. Kramer can use this to argue that the discovery of 
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metaethical truths is similar. We are constrained by what is morally possible. Suppose that a 
society rejected moral objectivity and had a bizarre first-order moral theory that allowed them to 
torture babies for pleasure. Their first-order moral theory would be intolerable. It is hard to 
imagine a reasonable moral agent who would condone baby-torture. Suppose further that the 
society thought that torturing babies for pleasure was morally permissible because they had 
rejected moral objectivity. Why can we not go further now and claim that the society’s 
metaethical theory must also be wrong because it is morally intolerable? We end up rejecting 
both the first-order moral theory and the metaethical theory for the same reason: they both 
make a substantive moral claim that is morally repugnant. If we can reject the claim on moral 
grounds when it is made by the first-order moral theory, why can we not do the same when the 
claim is made by the metaethical theory? 
It is no objection that two agents could still disagree over whether torturing babies for 
pleasure is morally impermissible, because one agent is morally repulsed by it and the other is 
not. In order to find out who is right, we can appeal to what decent people who recognise the 
boundaries of what is morally possible think. Decent people do not torture babies for pleasure. 
Furthermore, decent people are often able to identify moral truths. Kramer does not claim that 
decent people can have perfect moral knowledge, but they will generally know what morality 
requires of them, and they will certainly be able to identify that torturing babies for pleasure is 
morally wrong. 
Clark can reply that this just pushes the objection back a stage. How do we resolve a moral 
disagreement? By asking decent people what they would find morally repugnant. But then we 
need to know who the decent people are, otherwise we are no closer to finding out what is 
morally permissible. However, this objection again asks for a non-moral response. It assumes 
from the outset that Hume’s Law is wrong. In order to find out who the decent people are, we 
need evidence that their moral judgements are accurate. If Hume’s Law is correct, though, that 
evidence can only be moral. 
Hume’s Law implies that if an agent stands completely outside morality, there is no non-
normative metaphysical or logical or other non-moral method to convince him of moral truths. 
We can only know true moral principles if we are already moral agents, the ‘decent people’ that 
Kramer talks of. Decent people may disagree over various moral claims, but that does not imply 
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that moral knowledge is impossible either. Maybe a particular claim fails to have a determinate 
truth value, or the disputants do not have sufficient moral or non-moral information to find it. 
Another possibility is that they disagree over a ‘minor’ moral principle, such as whether it is 
morally permissible to tell a white lie to save face in a social situation. Kramer allows that such 
principles need not be morally necessary – the basic moral principles are morally neutral 
concerning the truth of minor principles, so moral agents can agree on all the basic moral 
principles without agreeing on all moral principles that have determinate truth values. However, 
a lot of the time the disputants will manage to reach an agreement over a particular moral 
principle. They can recognise the boundaries of what is morally possible, so they will be able to 
recognise (for example) that torturing babies for pleasure is wrong. 
This response can only work if Hume’s Law holds. If it does not, then there could be non-
moral methods to attain moral knowledge. Kramer would therefore be only telling us half the 
story if he continued insisting that we can recognise moral truths by discovering what is morally 
repugnant. He would owe us some non-moral explanation for why our sense of what is morally 
repugnant is a reliable guide to moral truth. But if Hume’s Law holds, then such a non-moral 
explanation is impossible. At most, we can only object that Kramer has not identified the correct 
moral method to attain moral knowledge. 
It is worth noting a weaker objection that Clark can make. Kramer appears to argue that 
being a moral agent is an all-or-nothing position; if you do not accept that something that is 
morally impermissible really is morally impermissible, then your moral position is morally 
impossible, and so you cannot be a moral agent. However, it may be possible for an agent to 
correctly ascertain everything that is morally possible or impossible except for one case. Usually 
this agent is entirely right when he says that something is morally possible, but it just so 
happens that when it comes to this particular case, he believes that it may be morally possible, 
and it is not. As an analogy, think of professional mathematicians who thought that Fermat’s 
Last Theorem was an unsolvable problem. This was a reasonable belief to hold, as the 
Theorem stubbornly resisted a solution for centuries, but the belief was wrong. This does not 
mean that the mathematicians were not mathematical experts in general. It just meant that they 
were wrong about a particular mathematical question. 
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Kramer need not have any problem with the erring moral agent, though. If somebody 
consistently gets moral possibilities wrong, then it is reasonable to argue that they are not really 
a moral agent, because they turn out to be unable to say what is morally possible and what is 
not. However, the erring moral agent appears to genuinely be a moral agent; after all, he 
consistently gets most moral possibilities right, though he is wrong about this particular case. 
Kramer has various ways to explain what is happening here. It could be that the erring moral 
agent gets it wrong because the moral principles he accepts are not fully mutually supporting. 
For example, if he thinks that it is always morally impermissible to torture people for pleasure, 
he will have a hard time reconciling this with his belief that it may be morally permissible to 
torture babies for pleasure. Another possibility is that he just has a moral blind spot. Something 
prevents him from realising that this particular case is necessarily morally wrong. This makes 
him morally deficient, since he gets the matter wrong, but it does not mean that he is always 
wrong about what is morally possible, or even wrong most of the time. Kramer has no reason to 
insist that moral agents must be morally perfect. All he needs is to insist that they are generally 
reliable. Mathematicians need not get everything mathematically right in order to be good 
mathematicians, but they should usually be right. 
Ultimately, if there is a problem with Kramer’s epistemology, it is not that it implies that moral 
agents cannot attain moral or metaethical knowledge. The problem would be with Kramer’s 
acceptance of Hume’s Law, and Clark’s objection does nothing to explicitly argue against it. It 
therefore has no particular bite against Kramer’s epistemology. However, it is still a useful 
objection to investigate, as it vividly illustrates the two main pillars that Kramer’s moral 
epistemology stands upon. Metaethical claims are substantive moral claims, and any argument 
for a substantive moral claim must be moral, rather than non-normatively metaphysical, logical, 
semantic, and so on.39 The implication is that Hume’s Law severely limits the ways in which 
agents can attain metaethical and moral knowledge, including knowledge of determinate core 
moral propositions. This renders Kramer’s metaethics vulnerable to a new objection from the 
core-aposteriorist. 
                                                             
39 This raises an interesting question: Hume’s Law is a metaethical claim itself, so does that mean that it can only be 
defended morally? It seems that Kramer has to say yes, as Hume’s Law makes the highly abstract substantive moral 
claim that no moral claim is justified if it cannot be defended morally. This emphasises the point that if you cannot 
understand moral concepts, you will have no way to attain knowledge of moral claims, so you would be unable to form 
moral arguments. 
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In order to develop this new objection, we first have to examine what exactly corresponds to 
core moral propositions in Kramer’s metaethics. It turns out that they are not exactly identical to 
Kramer’s basic moral principles. 
 
6 – The core-aposteriorist’s objection 
 
Though he is a thoroughgoing objectivist, Kramer makes it clear that he does not believe that all 
moral questions must have determinately correct answers (i.e. answers with determinate truth 
values), because he thinks that (for example) moral vagueness exists and some moral values 
are incommensurable.40 If every moral proposition was determinately true or false, there would 
be some determinate true moral principles that we would have to follow but that we could not 
possibly know, even in the best circumstances. This is impossible, because otherwise morality 
would be ‘ludicrous’. Furthermore, some moral principles would be true for completely arbitrary 
reasons, which is also impossible.41 However, determinate correctness plays a large role in 
Kramer’s discussion of objectivity. Objectivists need not think that all moral questions have a 
determinately correct answer, but Kramer does think that most moral questions do. He aims for 
‘a vindication of the general determinacy of morality’.42 Moral propositions that lack determinate 
truth values therefore form a fairly small subset of possible moral propositions. 
Kramer states that basic moral principles alone may not by themselves tell you what to do in 
particular concrete situations. Just because you know that moral supervenience and moral 
objectivity are true, that does not mean that you know whether it is permissible to lie or not in a 
particular situation. So the set of basic principles is only a subset of core moral propositions, 
because the set of core moral propositions will be able to justify the normative content of all 
moral propositions that are determinately true. We need something more, and we find it with the 
normative first-order moral theory that we add to the basic moral principles. The basic moral 
principles plus the first-order moral theory will collectively justify the normative content of many 
moral propositions. 
We can now see a similarity between Kramer’s metaethics and the SLS theory. It turned out 
that whilst Sidgwick’s moral axioms were core moral propositions, they could not be the only 
                                                             
40 Kramer (2009), pp. 109-113, 121-122. 
41 Kramer (2009), pp. 111-112. 
42 Kramer (2009), p. 121. 
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core moral propositions in the theory. They could not by themselves justify the normative 
content of many moral propositions, as we needed to add the ‘other resources’ of a normative 
moral theory in order to do so. For example, in section 3 of chapter 2, we found that Aim, as it 
was originally stated, could not be a determinate core moral proposition. It lacked sufficient 
determinacy, and was consistent with different types of utilitarianism that could not all be true 
together. They only way that we could give Aim more detail and hence turn it into a determinate 
core moral proposition was to use the ‘other resources’ of a particular utilitarianism – say, rule 
utilitarianism – to alter Aim appropriately. The trouble was that these resources appeared to 
only be ascertainable a posteriori. They implied that Aim had to take into account what moral 
agents were like, and that they were capable of doing. Similarly, if we use first-order moral 
theories to help ascertain how we should morally act, we risk doing so on the basis on a 
posteriori observations. Kramer says that basic moral principles are highly abstract by 
themselves, so (for example), they do not tell us whether lying to save face in social situations is 
permissible or not. So if less abstract (that is, more concrete) principles are ascertained via first-
order moral theories, and such theories can be influenced by a posteriori observations, then our 
knowledge of the principles is a posteriori. 
The SLS theory also holds that the first-order theory, not the self-evident axioms, is what 
provides a theory of the good. Without a theory of the good, we are left utterly in the dark about 
how to behave, as we do not know what our actions should aim at. Kramer’s moral realism is 
similar, in that it is the first-order moral theory we choose that provides us with the purpose or 
aim of morality. 
There is one further point: we must select the correct first-order theory. If a first-order moral 
theory tells us that it is morally permissible to torture babies for pleasure, then it is morally 
repugnant, and we should reject it. It is also the case that, thanks to moral objectivity, a first-
order moral theory cannot be true for me and false for you. Furthermore, if a moral question has 
a determinately correct answer, but two first-order theories give different answers to the 
question, then at least one of the theories is incorrect, otherwise the question does not have a 
determinately correct answer. So either there is only one correct first-order theory or there are 
two or more first-order moral theories that differ, but give the same answer to every such 
question. As there is no practical difference between the theories as far as the core-
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aposteriorist’s objection is concerned, I shall assume from now on that there is only one correct 
first-order moral theory.  
The core-aposteriorist can now set up the following argument against Kramer’s moral 
realism as a core-apriorist theory: 
 
1) Most moral propositions have determinate truth values. 
2) We must be able to know many moral propositions that are determinately true, 
otherwise we could not know how to morally behave, and that would be morally 
repugnant. 
3) The normative content of all determinately true moral propositions is either justified by 
the basic moral principles, by the correct first-order moral theory, or by both together. 
4) The normative content of all determinately true moral propositions are justified by the 
set of core moral propositions. 
5) Therefore the set of core moral propositions is the set of basic moral principles and the 
principles of the correct first-order moral theory. 
6) The normative content of many determinately true moral propositions cannot be justified 
by the basic moral principles alone (If they could, Kramer would not need to bring in 
first-order moral theories.). 
7) Many of the moral propositions in (6) are determinate moral propositions, in the sense 
that the terms within the propositions have fairly precise application conditions. 
8) In order to help justify the normative content of these determinate core moral 
propositions, the first-order moral theory cannot contravene Sufficient Determinacy (i.e. 
the first-order moral theory must provide determinate propositions that can help justify 
the normative content of determinate moral propositions). 
9) It is only possible to select the correct first-order theory that abides by Sufficient 
Determinacy by using a posteriori information (This is shown by sections 3 and 4 of 
chapter 3, which showed how a posteriori information was necessary to make axioms 
such as Aim more determinate, and section 7, which showed that theories of the good 
may require a posteriori support.). 
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10) Therefore the correct first-order theory, in order to help justify the normative content of 
determinate moral propositions, must itself be (at least partly) expressed by determinate 
core moral propositions that can only be ascertainable through a posteriori or mixed 
methods. 
11) So the set of core moral propositions in Kramer’s moral realism must itself include 
determinate propositions that are only ascertainable through a posteriori or mixed 
methods. 
12) Core-apriorist theories deny that this is possible. 
13) So Kramer’s moral realism cannot be a core-apriorist theory. 
 
Kramer can make the objection that he only said that basic moral principles are a priori, not that 
first-order moral theories must be. However, this will not help this theory as a core-apriorist 
theory. Take the following proposition: 
 
Drink: Driving when your driving ability is affected by your alcohol intake is always 
morally impermissible 
 
This is a fairly determinate moral proposition; there may be borderline cases where it is unclear 
whether someone contravenes Drink, but one does not need to drink very much alcohol for it 
affect one’s driving ability. Suppose that Drink is true. We cannot infer it simply by appealing to 
basic moral principles. Instead, we can construct a moral argument for Drink by appealing to 
basic moral principles together with a first-order moral theory. For example, a Kantian might 
claim that if Drink were false, it would contravene the categorical imperative. 
If we work out the first-order moral theory we use with a posteriori or mixed methods, though, 
then we cannot say that we work out that Drink is true with an a priori method. The basic moral 
principles are not sufficient to imply the normative content of Drink on their own (partly because 
they cannot provide a theory of the good on their own). Kramer cannot use logical or non-
normative metaphysical a priori arguments to defend the first-order moral theory either, because 
that would mean using such arguments to defend a moral position. This would contravene 
Hume’s Law. 
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We have reached a position where the set of core moral propositions include basic moral 
principles and the principles of the correct first-order theory. The basic moral principles may all 
be a priori, but the correct first-order theory does not seem to be, because if they were they 
would risk contravening Sufficient Determinacy. In order to escape this conclusion, Kramer 
could try two versions of the same response. This response rejects premise (9) of the above 
argument, by claiming that it is possible to ascertain the correct first-order moral theory by using 
a priori information alone. Unfortunately, the response fails because Kramer does not tell us 
what this a priori information can be. 
The first version of this response denies that the principles of a first-order moral theory could 
ever be discovered a posteriori, so even though a first-order moral theory is not a collection of 
basic moral principles, it must be justified a priori (or be a priori self-evident). The second 
version is to say that the correct first-order moral theory can be ascertained at least in part a 
posteriori, but it can also be ascertained entirely a priori, and that this a priori method has 
explanatory precedence over any a posteriori method. The second version may be preferable to 
the first, because it allows that we may be able to work out the correct first-order moral theory 
by looking at a posteriori information about actual moral agents. That is, it allows for multiple 
methods to attain moral knowledge. 
The trouble with these arguments is that they need considerable development to look 
convincing. Unless we are actually told what this a priori method to attain determinate core 
moral knowledge is, dismissals of a posteriori evidence (following the first version) and appeals 
to explanatory precedence (following the second version) look rather weak. The key problem is 
that Kramer depends on the decent person’s imagination and what the decent person would 
regard as morally repugnant. He may think that this provides a priori information about moral 
principles, but he does not say very much about how the decent person’s imagination works 
and what a priori and a posteriori inputs it feeds off to generate moral judgements. Why could it 
not use the agent’s personal experiences as inputs, for example? Since Kramer says very little 
about what information decent people use to make moral judgements, he leaves it open that 
they could use a posteriori information to ascertain the normative content of moral propositions. 
This is not to say that basic moral principles or first-order moral theories are all wrong, or that 
moral propositions are relativist because their truth values depend on the decent person’s 
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imagination. Saying that we do not actually know a particular moral principle does not mean that 
the principle is false. Neither is Kramer committed to saying that the fundamental reason why 
particular moral principles are true is because the decent person’s imagination works in a 
certain way. Kramer could say that the decent person’s imagination merely tracks the principles’ 
truth value. It does not decide their truth value. However, Kramer does not give much attention 
to how the decent person’s imagination operates. In the case of basic moral principles, this may 
not be such a problem, because the principles are supposed to be self-evident. First-order 
moral theories are not self-evident, though. If we try to claim that one of them is – say, that rule-
utilitarianism is – then we can use Sidgwick’s criteria for self-evident moral axioms to see how 
plausible the claim is, and it would be a struggle to defend it. Even if we concede that decent 
people exist (i.e. that there are people who can identify at least some truly morally repugnant 
outcomes) and that they can be identified, this says nothing about how they identify morally 
repugnant outcomes. 
A minor issue to note is that we should not think that a priori truths are easier to identify than 
a posteriori truths. One argument in favour of Kramer could go as follows: moral truths are 
generally knowable, and if we cannot know whether a moral principle is true or not, that for 
Kramer is good evidence that it is not true. If there are too many unknowable moral principles, 
morality becomes absurd. It is far easier to know true moral propositions a priori, as we do not 
need to go out into the world and conduct difficult and costly experiments that are at the mercy 
of a thousand complications (Is our measuring equipment working properly? Have we allowed 
for all the confounding factors?). So there is a prima facie case that moral principles are more 
likely to be knowable a priori than a posteriori. 
This is not a convincing argument, because there is no particular reason why it should be 
easier to know anything a priori. To take an extreme example, what could be easier to discover 
than the colour of one’s skin simply by looking at one’s hands? Yet this observation is 
perceptual, and hence a posteriori. On the other hand, it can be hard for a mathematical layman 
to list the axioms of the arithmetic we use daily, even though this is an a priori task concerning 
something very simple. So we should not be tempted to think that there is a relationship 
between the a priori and how easy it is to attain knowledge. 
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I have so far been talking about the a priori and a posteriori status of the first-order moral 
theory that decent people use, and not about the a priori status of basic moral principles. I have 
therefore left open the possibility that basic moral principles are indeed a priori self-evident. The 
core-aposteriorist could reject this possibility by arguing that at least some of them are not self-
evident; instead, decent people identify these principles in the same way that they identify the 
correct first-order theory, and this involves using a posteriori inputs as well as a priori inputs to 
reach a conclusion. This objection is made more difficult by the fact that Kramer never lists the 
basic moral principles or really gives a method for identifying them; he concentrates mainly on 
examining the basic moral principles of objectivity and supervenience instead. It is therefore 
unclear how the core-aposteriorist’s objection should go, though the core-aposteriorist could 
point out that the onus is on Kramer to show that all the basic moral principles are a priori. 
However, the objection also goes further than the core-aposteriorist needs to go, given the 
above argument (1)-(13) concerning first-order moral theories. Since there are determinate core 
moral propositions that do not express basic moral principles, we do not need to show that 
basic moral principles are a posteriori. All we need to do is show that some determinate core 
moral propositions are a posteriori. These particular propositions are amongst those used to 
justify first-order moral theories. This shows that Kramer’s metaethics is not a core-apriorist 
theory, or at least that further argument is needed to show that it is. Therefore Kramer’s 
metaethics cannot help to defend the CAT even if every basic moral principle is knowable a 
priori. 
Kramer can argue that the core-aposteriorist’s arguments presuppose that knowledge of the 
normative content of moral propositions is based on contingent facts. If we use a posteriori 
evidence and that evidence could have been different, then the moral principles that the 
evidence justifies may have been different. But this opens the door to relativism, which is 
rejected because it would lead to morally repugnant consequences. Therefore the claim that a 
posteriori evidence could be used to ascertain the normative content of a moral proposition is 
wrong. 
We have already seen in section 1 of chapter 2 that Saul Kripke has argued that a posteriori 
metaphysical necessities exist, and that the core-aposteriorist can argue that moral necessities 
are sufficiently similar to metaphysical necessities so that they too can be a posteriori. If the 
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core-aposteriorist wants to use Kripke against the objection here that a posteriori moral 
propositions must all be contingent, the only thing to add is that we must be careful to keep non-
normative metaphysical necessities and moral necessities separate. According to Kramer’s 
metaethics, moral necessities cannot be non-normatively metaphysical, though they may be 
normatively metaphysical. If they were non-normatively metaphysical, it would be possible to 
generate a non-normative metaphysical argument for moral necessities, which would 
contravene Hume’s Law. But the core-aposteriorist can accept this condition without difficulty. 
She can still hold that, say, we may be able to work out the limits of what is morally possible by 
examining moral agents in the world and how they react in various situations. The fact that 
torturing babies for pleasure is beyond the limits of any decent person’s imagination is not 
something that can be ascertained a priori. To say that it is, we have to work out who the decent 
people are and on what grounds they reach the conclusion that torturing babies for pleasure is 
morally impermissible. It may turn out that the grounds are actually a posteriori. But just 
because decent people may use a posteriori information to work out normative conclusions, it 
does not entail that the conclusions that they reach are morally contingent. It does not imply that 
in a different morally possible world, decent people could have had imaginations that would lead 
them to think that it was morally permissible to torture babies for pleasure. Similarly, the fact that 
we discovered a posteriori that water is H2O does not mean that it is metaphysically possible 
that water could have been something else. We might have called a different substance ‘water’, 
but that does not mean that the different substance would have been water. 
One reason why the core-aposteriorist can argue in this fashion is because of the limits of 
what is possible. Kramer excludes all types of possibility except moral possibilities. Some types 
of possibility, such as logical possibility, appear to be knowable only a priori. It is usually thought 
that in order to work out if something is logically possible, you do not need to examine anything 
in the outside world. In classical logic, nothing can be A and not-A at the same time, and you do 
not need to look at any actual object to find this out. At the other end of the scale, there is 
physical possibility. If we define ‘physically possible’ as ‘conforms to all the laws of physics as 
they apply in our own universe’, we can often find out if something is physically possible or not 
based on a posteriori investigation. Could I fly if I jumped off a cliff? It is logically possible, but if 
we are right about the laws of physics (discovered through a posteriori research), then it is not 
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physically possible. Kripke tells us that metaphysical possibility lies between these two 
extremes; many metaphysical possibilities are discoverable a priori, but not all of them are. Why 
assume, then, that moral possibility has to lie at one extreme with logical possibility? If other 
types of possibility lie at various points along the scale between a priori knowledge and a 
posteriori knowledge, why can moral possibility not be one of them? 
The core-apriorist may still insist that some moral necessities must be knowable a priori, but 
this is not enough. So long as some determinate core moral propositions express moral 
necessities that are only knowable a posteriori, the CAT fails. Kramer cannot completely isolate 
his metaethics from a posteriori evidence, partly because he has so severely limited the ways in 
which we can argue for moral principles. If the only way we can argue morally for moral 
principles is by using a posteriori evidence, then Kramer cannot switch to other forms of non-
moral argument (logical, non-normatively metaphysical, etc.) to avoid the use of such evidence. 
In conclusion, the core-aposteriorist’s objection against Kramer is rather modest. The 
objection does not deny that basic moral principles exist, or that we can know them. All it does 
is point out that some of the determinate core moral propositions produced by Kramer’s 
metaethics are unlikely to be knowable a priori. We can only know what these propositions are 
by examining what decent people would think about them, but Kramer says very little about how 
decent people actually think. He leaves open the possibility that they use a posteriori evidence 
to make moral judgements. 
 
7 – Moral fixed points 
 
The core-apriorist could claim that the moral principles we hold as most important can be 
justified entirely a priori, and so a posteriori evidence will only help to justify more minor moral 
principles. By ‘most important’, I mean the moral principles that most people actually believe 
have the strongest moral hold on us, or that are absolutely inviolable moral principles that 
nobody with even a trace of moral sensibility would transgress. Actual agents may still be 
morally good in spite of occasionally telling white lies, or feeling brief pleasure at a rival’s 
embarrassment, but nobody morally good would torture babies for pleasure or become a serial 
killer. Anyone who thinks that it was morally permissible to be a serial killer would at best have a 
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moral system so bizarre that it may not really be a genuine moral system. The core-apriorist 
could claim that there is something ‘special’ about such principles such that we can only know 
them a priori.  
If this is correct, it does not show that Kramer’s metaethics vindicates the core-apriorist, 
because there still remain other true core moral proposition that are ‘less important’, and these 
propositions may only be ascertainable a posteriori. However, we should investigate this 
possibility, since it places limits on the set of moral propositions that can only be ascertained a 
posteriori, and it also limits the importance of the propositions in the set. The most important 
moral propositions are ascertainable a priori. 
The core-apriorist needs to tell us what is ‘special’ about the most important moral principles 
such that they are knowable a priori. Terence Cuneo and Russ Shafer-Landau call these 
principles ‘moral fixed points’, and they propose that these principles are conceptual truths. The 
principles are conceptually necessarily true, and therefore they are knowable a priori. This 
differs from Kramer, as Kramer talks of moral and not conceptual necessity. However, I will 
ignore this difference because I will argue in this section that Cuneo and Shafer-Landau do not 
show that the most important moral principles are knowable a priori. Some of them may be, but 
there is no necessary connection between importance and the a priori. 
A minimally eccentric moral system is ‘a reasonably comprehensive and consistent body of 
moral propositions that apply to beings like us in a world such as ours’.43 Any such system will 
include moral fixed points, such as: 
 
- It is pro tanto wrong to engage in the recreational slaughter of a fellow person. 
- It is pro tanto wrong to torture others just because they have inconvenienced you. 
- There is some moral reason to offer aid to those in distress, if such aid is very easily 
given and comes at very little expense. 
 
Cuneo and Shafer-Landau provide a longer list of moral fixed points, which they explicitly state 
is incomplete. The moral fixed points form the boundaries of the moral system, and if a moral 
                                                             
43 Cuneo and Shafer-Landau (2014), p. 404. 
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theory goes outside these boundaries (say, by sometimes allowing the recreational slaughter of 
fellow people), then it must be wrong.44 
Moral fixed points are conceptual truths. For example, take the first fixed point above. It 
belongs to the essence of the concept ‘being wrong’ that it applies to all and only those things 
that are wrong. If I killed a fellow person for recreation, my action would satisfy the concept 
‘recreational slaughter’. The concept ‘being wrong’ necessarily applies to recreational slaughter, 
so it is a conceptual truth that the recreational slaughter of a fellow person is wrong.45 
Cuneo and Shafer-Landau do not give complete criteria for what propositions express 
conceptual truths, but they do provide a partial list. For proposition P to express a conceptual 
truth: 
 
1) P must be necessarily true. 
2) P must help fix the boundaries of the subject matter. For example, if the proposition 
‘God is a perfect being’ fixes the boundaries of theological debate, then anyone 
rejecting that proposition would not be employing the theistic concept ‘God’. 
3) Denying that P would bewilder anyone competent with the constituent components of P. 
‘[I]ts denial would be almost crazy.’ 
4) P is knowable a priori.46 
 
Unfortunately, Cuneo and Shafer-Landau do not discuss these criteria in detail, so it is not 
always clear how we are supposed to interpret them. When Cuneo and Shafer-Landau say that 
P must be necessarily true, they cannot mean that P is conceptually necessary, because 
otherwise criterion (1) would say that conceptual truths must be conceptually necessary truths, 
which would be redundant. But then what necessity is relevant here? It may not be logical 
necessity, as they do not argue that moral fixed points, being conceptual truths, are logically 
necessary. It is also up for debate whether ‘God is a perfect being’ is logically necessary, if it is 
true. 
Perhaps they mean metaphysical necessity. As we saw in the previous section, we can 
argue that certain metaphysically necessary truths are only knowable a posteriori, so only a 
                                                             
44 Cuneo and Shafer-Landau (2014), p. 404. 
45 Cuneo and Shafer-Landau (2014), p. 410. 
46 Cuneo and Shafer-Landau (2014), pp. 407-408. 
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subset of metaphysically necessary truths can be conceptual truths, because of criterion (4). 
But this question will have to be left open for the moment. 
Criteria (2) and (3) bring their own problems. Cuneo and Shafer-Landau’s example of ‘God is 
a perfect being’ is not well-chosen. It is entirely reasonable to think that two people can have a 
coherent discussion about, say, God’s relationship to man without assuming either that God is a 
perfect being or that God is not a perfect being. It may have no bearing on the discussion, and it 
seems difficult to hold that in this case, they are not really talking about the same thing if they 
would disagree on whether God is a perfect being. 
The fact that the example is not well-chosen does not mean that there are no better 
examples. If someone denies that 3 is the whole number between 2 and 4, he not only rejects 
something that any mathematically competent person believes about the number 3, but the 
denial will infect practically everything he says or believes about the number. Even very basic 
arithmetic will produce wildly different results. The point, though, is that we have to be careful 
about what propositions actually fulfil criteria (2) and (3). It may be that ‘God is a perfect being’ 
satisfies criteria (2) and (3) when the people engaged in theological debate are theological 
experts.47 If two theological experts debate God’s attributes, they may implicitly assume that 
God is a perfect being, because within the group of experts this is taken as a necessary 
assumption for debate about the same thing to be possible. Maybe an expert would be 
reasonably expected to know this. One theologian would thus be bemused if another theologian 
denied that God was a perfect being. He may decide that he and the other theologian were not 
talking about the same thing. But if he met a layman who denied that God was a perfect being, 
would he assume that they were not talking about the same thing? Would he be just as 
bewildered by the denial? This is unlikely. More probably, he would think that the layman was 
just ill-informed. 
So criteria (2) and (3) have different interpretations. The first is the ‘layman’ interpretation, 
which fits the mathematics example. You do not need to be a mathematical expert to know that 
3 is the whole number between 2 and 4. If anyone denied this, whatever their level of expertise, 
we could reasonably claim that they were not using the concept ‘3’ like everyone else does. The 
second interpretation is the ‘expert’ interpretation, which fits the theological example. If a 
                                                             
47 I leave aside here the question of whether one actually needs to accept that God is a perfect being in order to be a 
theological expert. I am just assuming that one does for the sake of the example. 
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theological expert denied that God was a perfect being, he would be using different concepts 
from other theologians, and the other theologians would be bewildered by the denial. 
The ‘layman’ interpretation is more plausible for moral fixed points. It does not take a lot of 
moral competency to know that the recreational slaughter of fellow people is morally wrong, so 
even if someone with very limited understanding claims otherwise, we would hold that he is not 
using the same moral concepts that we do. 
Criterion (4) is the most important criterion as far as the core-aposteriorist is concerned. She 
claims that there is no necessary connection between a priori moral propositions and 
propositions that express ‘important’ moral truths. In other words, at least some propositions 
that express what we think are moral fixed points, and that help fix the boundaries of what is 
morally possible, are only knowable a posteriori, and so do not meet criterion (4). These moral 
fixed points are not moral conceptual truths. To make this argument, I will start with a different 
objection that Cuneo and Shafer-Landau explicitly address. Their response to it leaves them 
open to a new objection by the core-aposteriorist. 
The objection that Cuneo and Shafer-Landau discuss runs as follows: moral fixed points 
concern beings like us in worlds such as ours. So moral fixed points must presuppose 
information about human psychology. But ‘[c]onceptual truths are… supposed to be true in 
virtue of the essence of their constituent concepts’, and moral concepts do not imply anything 
about human psychology. The concept ‘being wrong’ carries no psychological implications. 
Therefore moral fixed points are not conceptual truths.48 
Cuneo and Shafer-Landau’s response to this objection concerns immediate and mediate 
conceptual essences. It is not entirely clear what they take an essence to be. They base their 
discussion on work by Kit Fine, who claims that 
 
‘[i]t is of the immediate nature, or essence of singleton Socrates [the set that contains only 
Socrates] to contain Socrates and of the immediate nature of Socrates to be a man, but it is 
only of the mediate nature of singleton Socrates to contain something that is a man. In 
general, the mediate nature of an object will be subject to chaining: the nature of any object 
(ineliminably) involved in its nature will also be in its nature. The immediate nature, by 
                                                             
48 Cuneo and Shafer-Landau (2014), p. 433. 
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contrast, will include only what has a direct bearing on the object, excluding what derives 
from the nature of the other objects.’49 
 
Cuneo and Shafer-Landau are well aware that Fine’s use of terms such as ‘immediate essence’ 
is different from theirs. According to Fine, it is objects (such as sets and people) that have 
essences. If Y is an essential property of X, claims Fine, then X exists only if Y does. Cuneo 
and Shafer-Landau, however, talk of concepts.50 Since they do not define what they mean by 
the essence of a concept, this raises the question of how we are meant to understand their 
comparison with Fine. Is it only an analogy? Is the essence of an object supposed to be related 
in some way to the essence of a concept? The problem of what the essence of a concept is 
meant to be remains unanswered. 
The examples that Cuneo and Shafer-Landau use help, even though they do not define 
‘essence’. Cuneo and Shafer-Landau claim that ‘it belongs to the immediate essence of the 
concept ‘human being’ that, if it applies to anything, then it applies to material objects’.51 The 
essence of a concept, then, may be simply what the concept necessarily applies to. It is of the 
immediate essence of the concept ‘human being’ that it necessarily applies to material objects. 
If anything is a human being, it is a material object. It is also of the immediate essence of the 
concept ‘material object’ that it necessarily applies to things that are spatially extended. So it is 
of the mediate essence of the concept ‘human being’ that it necessarily applies to certain things 
that are spatially extended.  
Consider the moral fixed point ‘Recreational slaughter is wrong’. The immediate essence of 
the concept ‘being wrong’ does not contain any information about beings like us, but it does 
apply necessarily to the behaviour of rational agents (It is hard to see how it could apply to the 
behaviour of trees or spiders.). The immediate essence of the concept ‘rational agent’ 
necessarily applies to intentional agents, who meet certain criteria. Humans are necessarily 
intentional agents, so the immediate essence of the concept ‘intentional agent’ must apply to 
human beings. Consequently, it is of the mediate essence of the concept ‘being wrong’ that it 
necessarily applies to the behaviour of human beings. In effect, we go down a chain of concepts 
(‘being wrong’, ‘rational agent’ and ‘intentional agent’) that are linked by immediate essences. 
                                                             
49 Fine (1985), p. 281. See also pp. 276-280. 
50 Cuneo and Shafer-Landau (2014), p. 434. 
51 Cuneo and Shafer-Landau (2014), p. 434. 
134 
 
The moral fixed point ‘Recreational slaughter is wrong’ is a mediate conceptual truth, since the 
mediate essence of the concept ‘being wrong’ applies to the behaviour of human beings, and 
such behaviour can include recreational slaughter. Go down the chain of concepts starting with 
the concept ‘being wrong’, and you will eventually reach concepts that concern human 
psychology, even though the concept ‘being wrong’ does not immediately do so.52 
The core-aposteriorist can now start applying pressure to Cuneo and Shafer-Landau’s 
account of moral fixed points. First, what precisely is it that the concept ‘being wrong’ applies 
to? Rational agents can behave in all sorts of ways, many of which have no particular moral 
implications. If the moral fixed points are conceptual truths, the essence of the concept ‘being 
wrong’ has to apply to a very particular type of behaviour (Cuneo and Shafer-Landau do not 
define what they mean by ‘behaviour’, which makes it more vague what precisely the concept 
‘being wrong’ applies to. Behaviour may include different things according to different moral 
theories, such as the agent’s intentions, motives and character.). What exactly is it about our 
behaviour that the essence of the concept ‘being wrong’ applies to? 
At this point, the a posteriori strategy comes into play. The core-aposteriorist can try to claim 
that either moral conceptual truths contravene Sufficient Determinacy, or they are not 
conceptual truths as Cuneo and Shafer-Landau define conceptual truths. The result is that at 
least some moral fixed points are expressed by determinate moral propositions that are not 
knowable a priori. Therefore some moral fixed points are not conceptual truths. 
Cuneo and Shafer-Landau tell us that the essence of the concept ‘being wrong’ applies to 
recreational slaughter. It is therefore a conceptual truth that recreational slaughter is wrong, 
since the truth satisfies criteria (1)-(4) for being a conceptual truth. Since it is a moral conceptual 
truth, it is a moral fixed point. We can thus use the following propositions as expressions of 
moral fixed points: 
 
Slaughter: Recreational slaughter of fellow people is morally wrong 
Wrong: Certain types of human behaviour are morally wrong 
 
                                                             
52 Cuneo and Shafer-Landau (2014), pp. 433-435. 
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Wrong expresses a moral conceptual truth if Slaughter does, and therefore they both express 
moral fixed points according to Cuneo and Shafer-Landau. But Wrong is utterly hopeless as a 
determinate moral proposition. Slaughter is more successful, but we need to know much more 
about what exactly it is about recreational slaughter that is so morally terrible. We cannot find 
out simply by examining Wrong. Furthermore, the fact that it is obvious that Slaughter is true is 
irrelevant. The obviousness of a fact need not imply anything about the reasons why it is true, or 
how agents come to know it. 
Assuming that Slaughter is true, we can go back to the criteria (1)-(4) for being a conceptual 
truth. Does Slaughter satisfy them? Let us be as generous as possible here. Let us assume that 
criterion (1) is satisfied if a truth is metaphysically necessary, and that Slaughter is 
metaphysically necessary. Let us also assume that anyone who denied that Slaughter was true 
would not be using the term ‘morally wrong’ as morally competent agents do, and that morally 
competent agents would be bewildered by the denial. Anyone who knows anything whatsoever 
about what is morally right or wrong would accept Slaughter as true. No great moral expertise is 
needed.  
Does Slaughter satisfy criterion (4)? It seems that the core-aposteriorist can say no. If we 
take Slaughter as metaphysically necessary, then we can agree with Kripke that it may only be 
knowable a posteriori. Nor does there seem to be any necessary connection between satisfying 
criteria (2) and (3) on the one hand, and satisfying criterion (4) on the other. So why would we 
be forced to say that Slaughter is knowable a priori? We can flesh this point out a little by 
making a comparison between two particular moral systems. One is minimally eccentric, and 
the other is what I will call maximally eccentric. Cuneo and Shafer-Landau say that minimally 
eccentric moral systems ‘apply to beings like us in a world such as ours’. They provide a list of 
criteria for ‘beings like us’ (which include criteria of having similar biology, psychology and 
rationality to us) and ‘worlds such as ours’ (which include ‘the laws of nature and broad 
empirical statistical generalizations that are at least close to the ones that obtain here on 
earth’).53 We can conclude from these criteria that it would be possible for there to be beings not 
like us on worlds not like ours, who would not have a minimally eccentric moral system, relative 
to our own moral systems. 
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Importantly, it must be possible that such beings could nevertheless have a moral system. It 
is an open question how different a moral system would have to be from ours for it to fail to be a 
genuine moral system. The thought runs as follows: moral systems, in order to be moral 
systems, have to fulfil certain criteria. Our moral systems on Earth meet this standard. If a moral 
system was wildly unlike our own moral system, it would not meet this standard, and so 
therefore it would not be a genuine moral system. 
One way of developing this thought is what Gopal Sreenivasan calls the Hurley-Davidson 
argument.54 The strong version of the argument claims that there is no possibility of a genuine 
moral system which provides moral values entirely incommensurable with ours. The two 
different moral systems have to share similar criteria, and if a moral system is incommensurable 
with ours, it does not meet those criteria. So if massively different beings from us cannot share 
moral values with us, then they cannot have a genuine moral system. The weaker version of the 
argument claims that if there is such a moral system, we could never come to understand it, 
because we would not be able to agree with it, and therefore we would not be able to translate it 
into our own moral language so that it matches our own values.55 
Sreenivasan rejects both versions of the argument by claiming that in order to understand a 
moral system, we do not need to actually endorse it, and we do not need to be able to translate 
it into our own moral language either. Fortunately, I do not need to go into details because 
Cuneo and Shafer-Landau have not actually set up moral fixed points in a way that makes them 
vulnerable to the Hurley-Davidson argument. Though they leave open the possibility that there 
are moral systems with moral fixed points that are different from the ones that we human beings 
actually recognise, they do not go so far as saying that there are moral systems with values 
entirely incommensurable with ours. This allows us to talk of maximally eccentric moral 
systems, which I define as moral systems that are as different from our own moral systems as it 
is possible to be whilst still being genuine moral systems.  
Cuneo and Shafer-Landau are inclined to believe that the moral fixed points are the same 
across every possible world. Is it even possible that a genuine moral system could exist in 
which recreational slaughter would be morally permissible? However, they are reluctant to insist 
                                                             
54 The argument is named after Susan Hurley ((1989), p. 53) and Donald Davidson (1984). 
55 Sreenivasan (2011), pp. 3, 11, 24. 
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on this point, as they believe that it relies on modal intuitions that their critics may not share.56 
So they leave open two alternatives: if the moral fixed points are the same in every genuine 
moral system, then we can drop all talk of minimally and maximally eccentric moral systems. On 
the other hand, if even one moral fixed point can change between moral systems, then we must 
continue using the concept of eccentric moral systems. 
This reveals a complication for Cuneo and Shafer-Landau. The specific moral fixed points 
that they use as examples are the fixed points for minimally eccentric moral systems, and it 
seems possible for them to be different in maximally eccentric moral systems. But moral fixed 
points are supposed to be moral conceptual truths. How can conceptual truths be different in 
different possible worlds, and on what basis? What has happened here is that we have not 
been sufficiently precise in setting out the moral fixed points. Rather than saying that 
 
a) It is pro tanto wrong to engage in the recreational slaughter of a fellow person 
 
is a moral fixed point, we should strictly speaking say that 
 
b) For beings like us in worlds such as ours, it is pro tanto wrong to engage in the 
recreational slaughter of a fellow person 
 
is a moral fixed point.57 (b) can be true even if maximally eccentric moral systems do not hold 
that the recreational slaughter of a fellow person is wrong (Perhaps, as Cuneo and Shafer-
Landau suggest, there are possible worlds where people who are killed spontaneously 
regenerate soon afterwards. Would killing be so morally horrible or impermissible in such a 
world? Our opinions are more likely to diverge on this question.). Whenever Cuneo and Shafer-
Landau claim that (a) is a moral conceptual truth, it is just shorthand for saying that (b) is a 
moral conceptual truth, and this is true for all moral fixed points that they identify. We can ask 
whether a form of relativism does not start sneaking into their metaethics here, but the core-
aposteriorist does not have to pursue this matter. The objection to Cuneo and Shafer-Landau 
does not depend on relativism. 
                                                             
56 Cuneo and Shafer-Landau (2014), p. 405, fn 15. 
57 Cuneo and Shafer-Landau (2014), p. 405. 
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Suppose we meet people with a maximally eccentric moral system. For convenience, I will 
call such people ‘aliens’ and us ‘humans’, though this just means that they have a maximally 
eccentric moral system. Since they do, they would recognise different moral fixed points. The 
core-aposteriorist’s objection is that we can only find out what the moral fixed points are for 
humans, and for aliens, by investigating the humans, the aliens and the worlds in which they 
live. This investigation requires a posteriori observations, so our knowledge of the moral fixed 
points that apply to us (or to the aliens) must be a posteriori. 
What this means, in effect, is that somewhere along the chain of concepts a posteriori 
information can creep in. The immediate essence of the concept ‘being wrong’ applies to the 
behaviour of rational agents, fair enough. We can even concede that we discover a priori that 
this is so. But that only gets us as far as Wrong. It tells us nothing about what sort of behaviour 
is morally wrong. Wrong is not determinate, so it cannot justify the normative content of 
determinate moral propositions such as Slaughter. Furthermore, specific behaviour that is 
morally wrong may change its moral value if we switch from looking at humans to looking at 
aliens. We cannot just assume that the morally relevant differences between humans and aliens 
(or between the worlds that they inhabit) are discoverable a priori. The facts that Slaughter is 
obvious and that we humans would be bemused by agents who deny it are not sufficient 
evidence that knowledge of Slaughter is a priori. Consequently, it is possible for a proposition to 
satisfy criteria (1)-(3), but fail to meet criterion (4). This means that, if we stay with Cuneo and 
Shafer-Landau’s definitions, moral fixed points that are expressed by determinate propositions 
may not be moral conceptual truths. 
We may continue to insist that such moral fixed points really are moral fixed points, though 
they are not moral conceptual truths. Alternatively, we might decide that they are not moral fixed 
points after all. But does it really matter which option we pick? Assume that we pick the second, 
and call moral truths that fulfil criteria (1)-(3) but not (4) ‘moral quasi-fixed points’. Moral quasi-
fixed points appear to do everything that moral fixed points do, with the only difference being 
that we cannot discover them a priori. We must do so a posteriori. What reason, then, do we 
have to believe that there are moral fixed points, rather than just moral quasi-fixed points? 
None, claims the core-aposteriorist. It is up to the core-apriorist to show that there is one. For 
example, perhaps the core-apriorist can show that if a proposition cannot meet criterion (4), 
139 
 
then it cannot meet criterion (1). However, continues the core-aposteriorist, we currently have 
no particular reason to think that any advantage exists. 
This objection to Cuneo and Shafer-Landau is another example of the a posteriori strategy at 
work. It may be ascertainable a priori that the concept ‘being wrong’ necessarily applies to 
human behaviour, but this cannot be expressed as a determinate core moral proposition, 
because we have no idea which types of human behaviour it applies to. It contravenes 
Sufficient Determinacy. But if we give more detail to the concept, we have to look at human 
behaviour and the world in which humans live, and we have no assurance that we can work out 
a priori from our investigations what is normatively relevant about particular human behaviour. 
We may end up deciding that recreational slaughter is morally wrong based on a posteriori 
observations concerning human beings. This may provide us with determinate core moral 
propositions, but the propositions will only be knowable via an a posteriori or mixed method. We 
cannot obtain a priori determinate core moral propositions. 
 
Kramer claims that Hume’s Law holds and that metaethical principles are moral principles, but 
he can reasonably deny that this implies that metaethical theories collapse into first-order moral 
theories. Whilst his claim that metaethical theories can only be shown as true though moral 
argument seems to lead to Clark’s ‘horrified assertion’ objection, he has a viable defence 
against it. The trouble lies elsewhere, in the connection between basic moral principles and first-
order normative moral theories. He does not do enough to show that moral agents can attain 
determinate core moral knowledge a priori, and so his metaethics fails to support the CAT. 
After examining Kramer’s metaethics and the SLS theory, we have found that core-apriorist 
theories that postulate a priori self-evident axioms or principles can suffer from a troubling 
problem. Either the candidate core moral propositions in the theories are not determinate, or 
they turn out to use a posteriori information to justify the normative content of determinate moral 
propositions. Can coherentist core-apriorist theories do any better? In the next chapter, we will 
examine two such theories: Michael Smith’s moral realism and moral functionalism. 
Unfortunately for the core-apriorist, switching to moral coherentism does not help. 
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Chapter 5 – Moral coherentist core-apriorist theories 
 
Both Michael Smith’s moral realism and moral functionalism are moral realist theories, but they 
differ a fair amount in their details. Smith holds that there is a set of a priori moral platitudes that 
we must be disposed to endorse if we are to successfully master the correct use of moral terms. 
Whilst Smith does not define himself as a core-apriorist, the core-apriorist can read Smith’s a 
priori platitudes as a priori determinate core moral propositions. The core-aposteriorist seeks to 
object that some of these platitudes are in fact only knowable a posteriori, and so Smith’s moral 
realism cannot be a core-apriorist theory. Moral functionalism makes more use of a posteriori 
evidence than Smith does, as it claims that we can identify moral properties with particular 
descriptive properties by using a posteriori evidence. However, moral functionalism also 
purports to rely on a priori propositions, as it claims more generally that moral properties are 
identical to whatever it is that play particular moral roles, and this identification is made a priori. 
The core-aposteriorist’s objection to moral functionalism is that these a priori propositions are 
actually a posteriori. The core-aposteriorist thus takes the following approach to both theories: 
she does not aim to disprove them, but seeks instead to show that they cannot be genuine 
examples of core-apriorist theories. In sections 1-3 of this chapter, I will look at Smith’s moral 
realism in more detail. In sections 4-7, I will examine moral functionalism. In section 8, I will 
draw attention to an interesting feature that both theories share with the SLS theory and 
Kramer’s metaethics, and I will discuss why they do so. 
 
1 – Moral and colour platitudes 
 
Smith’s moral realism appeals to moral platitudes, which may be either a priori or a posteriori. 
Platitudes are claims that are platitudinous, in that they are claims that ‘capture the inferential 
and judgemental dispositions vis-à-vis [particular terms] of those who have mastery of [those 
terms]… To have mastery of [those terms] is to be disposed to make inferences and 
judgements along these lines’.1 Clearly this idea needs much more development, and in his 
book The Moral Problem Smith goes into detail about platitudes not only as they relate to moral 
                                                             
1 Smith (1994), p. 30. 
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terms, but also as they relate to colour terms. He uses colours as a way to explain generally 
what platitudes are before moving on to moral platitudes in particular. 
Colour platitudes are platitudes that people with normal colour vision accept. They include 
platitudes such as ‘Most everything we see looks coloured’, ‘Red is more similar to orange than 
to blue’ and ‘Unperceived objects are still coloured’.2 The obviousness of these platitudes is not 
the point.3 We can only have mastery of colour terms such as ‘red’ if we are ‘disposed to make 
inferences and judgements along [platitudinous] lines’. The platitudes might turn out to be 
‘incompatible or inconsistent with each other’, so they do not necessarily need to be true, but we 
would need strong a priori reasons to give them up. The platitudes themselves are knowable a 
priori, and giving them up means giving up on using colour terms at all. 
Mention of incompatibility and inconsistency brings up an important point. For Smith, to 
master a colour term, an agent must be disposed to accept a ‘maximal consistent set of 
platitudes constitutive of mastery of the [colour term]’.4 Since the set is maximal consistent, 
there is no platitude that can be added to the set that does not make it inconsistent. 
Furthermore, ‘it would take something like… inconsistency’ to make us give up the platitudes, 
as they are a priori. We can discover a priori whether they are collectively inconsistent or not. 
Examining the world a posteriori would not be necessary to discover the platitudes necessary 
for mastering colour terms.5 
By analogy, we attain mastery of moral terms through our grasp of moral platitudes, which 
are also knowable a priori. Being disposed to endorse the platitudes in the set gives an agent 
mastery of moral terms. Smith is a moral coherentist, which means that the moral platitudes 
within a set are justified by other propositions within that set. It would take ‘something like… 
inconsistency’ to make us change the platitudes we include in the maximal consistent set of 
platitudes necessary for mastering moral terms. Smith divides the moral platitudes necessary 
for mastery of moral terms into five types: 
 
1) Practical (e.g. ‘Weakness of will, compulsion, depression and the like may explain why 
someone isn’t moved in accordance with their moral beliefs’) 
                                                             
2 Smith (1994), pp 29-30. 
3 See also Smith (1994), p. 187. 
4 Smith (1994), p. 31. 
5 Smith (1994), p. 30. 
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2) Objectivity (e.g. ‘When A says that ɸ-ing is right, and B says that ɸ-ing is not right, then 
at most one of A and B is correct’) 
3) Supervenience (e.g. ‘Acts with the same ordinary everyday non-moral features must 
have the same moral features as well’) 
4) Substantial (e.g. ‘Right acts are in some way expressive of equal concern and respect’) 
5) Procedural (e.g. ‘We can work out which acts are right through a process of reflective 
equilibrium’)6 
 
If an agent is disposed to make moral judgements that are platitudinous, then she has mastery 
of moral terms. Smith claims that if an analysis of moral terms does not account for these 
platitudes, then it cannot be correct. It does not provide correct information about the concepts 
that the moral terms denote. This claim enables him to criticise reductive natural moral realism, 
which claims that moral properties can be defined solely in terms of non-moral natural 
properties. Forms of reductive naturalism that are subjectivist cannot account for platitudes of 
moral objectivity, and so must be dismissed. Forms of reductive naturalism that are objectivist 
cannot account for the platitude that we are often motivated by our moral beliefs, and so must 
also be dismissed. Therefore, Smith concludes, reductive naturalism is in trouble.7 
It should be noted that whilst Smith allows for the existence of a posteriori moral platitudes, 
he holds that the moral platitudes that are necessary for mastering moral terms are knowable a 
priori. This allows us to interpret his theory as a core-apriorist theory, though Smith does not 
explicitly do so himself. To master moral terms, we need to know how to use them and in which 
circumstances we can correctly apply them. We master moral terms if we are disposed to 
accept certain a priori moral platitudes. The core-apriorist claims that these a priori moral 
platitudes are core moral propositions, and further states that these a priori moral platitudes 
(core moral propositions) are necessary for agents to master moral terms, and that agents need 
to master moral terms in order to ascertain the truth of the normative content of non-core moral 
propositions. 
The core-aposteriorist’s objection to Smith starts with the assertion that if this is so, some of 
the a priori moral platitudes must be determinate. First, some of the non-core moral propositions 
                                                             
6 Smith (1994), pp. 39-40. 
7 Smith (1994), pp. 41-43. 
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are determinate. Second, in order to ascertain the truth of the normative content of these 
determinate non-core moral propositions, agents need to master moral terms. Third, the a priori 
moral platitudes, being core moral propositions, are necessary for the mastery of moral terms. 
Therefore, agents can use the a priori moral platitudes to ascertain the normative content of 
determinate non-core moral propositions. In other words, agents can use core moral 
propositions to ascertain the normative content of determinate non-core moral propositions. 
However, continues the core-aposteriorist, if all core moral propositions are non-determinate, 
this contravenes Sufficient Determinacy. Therefore some core moral propositions must be 
determinate, and so some a priori moral platitudes must be determinate if Smith’s moral realism 
is a core-apriorist theory. 
This result allows the core-aposteriorist to criticise the a priori platitudes that Smith identifies 
as necessary for the mastery of moral terms in three ways: 
 
a) The moral platitudes are false. 
b)  The moral platitudes are non-determinate. Therefore, grasping them does not entail that 
an agent can attain knowledge of true determinate non-core moral propositions, 
otherwise it would contravene Sufficient Determinacy. 
c)  The moral platitudes are really only knowable a posteriori. 
 
Option (a) would be a tricky line for the core-aposteriorist to take. In order to have moral 
knowledge, we have to be able to use moral terms, and we can only use moral terms correctly if 
we know how to apply them correctly. It is plausible that we have to accept some claims about 
these terms that Smith would identify as platitudes if we are able to use moral terms at all. The 
core-aposteriorist can object that Smith does not identify the correct moral platitudes for mastery 
of moral terms, but there are major obstacles to this. First, claiming that the platitudes about 
supervenience in particular are false risks refuting many core-aposteriorist theories as well. If 
moral properties do not supervene on natural properties, then there would be no way to 
investigate natural properties a posteriori in order to discover moral properties. The core-
aposteriorist may well not want this result, given that she believes that we ascertain the truth of 
the normative content of some determinate core moral propositions using a posteriori evidence. 
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As for the other types of moral platitudes, the core-aposteriorist may not want to reject them 
either, depending on the content of her own metaethics. Second, the task of proving the 
platitudes wrong is made more difficult by the fact that the platitudes collectively have very little 
in common other than that they are a priori propositions about morality. Say that they all have 
characteristic X, where X is not the characteristic of being a priori or being a proposition about 
morality. If the core-aposteriorist could show that we should reject all platitudes with 
characteristic X because, say, platitudes with characteristic X are logically incoherent, this 
would be a simple and direct way to pursue option (a). But what would this characteristic be? 
The moral platitudes that Smith identifies are split into five types, and these types make claims 
about different aspects of morality (For example, substantive platitudes say nothing directly 
about supervenience.). Furthermore, the core-aposteriorist can hardly argue that the platitudes 
are false just because they are a priori. So the core-aposteriorist will have to laboriously go 
through each of the five types of moral platitudes to show that all the relevant platitudes are 
false. 
As option (a) looks unpromising, the core-aposteriorist is left with options (b) and (c). In other 
words, the core-aposteriorist can try using the a posteriori strategy in order to show that Smith’s 
moral realism cannot be used to defend the core-apriorist. Option (c) appears to be the best 
option, because if we pick option (b), we have to show that all the moral platitudes that Smith 
believes are necessary for the mastery of moral terms are non-determinate, and so they cannot 
justify the normative content of determinate non-core moral propositions. It is in fact very difficult 
to argue for this, as some of the platitudes are clearly determinate. Take the platitude that Smith 
gives as an example of a platitude about moral objectivity: ‘When A says that ɸ-ing is right, and 
B says that ɸ-ing is not right, then at most one of A and B is correct’. Smith does not say 
whether moral propositions with indeterminate truth values exist, but even if they do, they would 
be rare compared to the number of moral propositions with determinate truth values. The 
platitude thus appears to be a determinate moral proposition.8 
If we choose option (c), though, we only have to show that at least one of the moral 
platitudes is only knowable a posteriori. If we can do this, this immediately shows that the 
                                                             
8 It should be noted that calling platitudes of objectivity moral platitudes can be controversial. We have seen that 
Matthew Kramer thinks that principles of objectivity are moral principles, but he does so by blurring the lines between 
metaethics and first-order ethics a great deal. If we want to keep the areas firmly separate, then we may believe that 
only Smith’s substantial moral platitudes are truly moral platitudes, rather than just metaethical platitudes. However, the 
core-aposteriorist’s objection to Smith in this chapter will follow a different path, so I will not pursue this thought. 
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Central Claim is correct given the moral platitudes that Smith endorses, and so his moral 
realism is not a core-apriorist theory. Option (c), then, is the best choice for the core-
aposteriorist to take. My intention in section 3 of this chapter is to show that many of the 
purportedly a priori moral platitudes that Smith uses are actually only knowable a posteriori. 
Since these platitudes are still necessary for the mastery of moral terms, it entails that if the 
platitudes necessary for the mastery of moral terms are core moral propositions, some core 
moral propositions are only knowable a posteriori. Furthermore, since some of these a posteriori 
core moral propositions are determinate, Smith’s moral realism cannot be a core-apriorist 
theory. 
Before making this argument, though, we can first ask whether the colour analogy that Smith 
uses is a good one. The analogy breaks down at the point where Smith claims that in order to 
attain mastery of colour terms, an agent requires perceptual experience of colour. This by itself 
is not enough to cause Smith any problems, but it points to an important commitment that Smith 
has concerning moral motivation. If we reject the commitment, we reject his moral realism. The 
core-aposteriorist may try doing so, but unfortunately her ability to criticise Smith on this ground 
depends on her own particular metaethics. However, if the core-aposteriorist uses the a 
posteriori strategy, and pursues option (c) instead, she will not have this problem. 
 
2 – The colour analogy 
 
Smith says of colour platitudes: 
 
‘[The platitudes governing the use of the term ‘red’] have a prima facie a priori status, and 
gain a priori status simpliciter by surviving as part of the maximal consistent set of platitudes 
constitutive of mastery of the term ‘red’.’9 
 
With this in mind, we can compare colour platitudes to moral platitudes. Certain colour/moral 
platitudes are necessary for mastery of colour/moral terms, and these platitudes must be a 
priori. There are a posteriori colour/moral platitudes, but such platitudes are not relevant. Take, 
                                                             
9 Smith (1994), p. 31. 
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for example, the a posteriori colour platitude ‘Red is the colour of blood’. This platitude is 
obvious and widely believed, but it is ‘still [a] contingent and a posteriori truth… about the 
colours, a [truth] whose rejection, in relevant circumstances, would be neither here nor there 
with respect to whether or not we possess and are capable of using colour concepts’.10 
To clear up a possible misunderstanding, Smith does not require agents to explicitly know all 
the platitudes necessary for the mastery of colour/moral terms in order to master them. All he 
requires is that agents are disposed to make inferences and judgements in line with the 
platitudes.11 Intuitively, this seems right; young children can master colour terms even though 
they would be hard-pressed to list all the platitudes that they make colour judgements with.  
Despite the fact that we need not know any particular a posteriori colour platitudes in order to 
master colour terms, such as ‘The clear sky is blue’ or ‘Ripe tomatoes are red’, agents cannot 
master colour terms simply by working out the necessary platitudes a priori. Smith states that 
 
‘we learn colour terms in part by being presented with paradigms of the various colours, 
paradigms which, for us, fit within a natural visual similarity space. In acquiring mastery of 
colour terms, we then acquire a disposition to judge visually presented cases of particular 
colours to be the particular colours that they are.’12 
 
We cannot attain mastery of colour terms simply by being disposed to accept a variety of a priori 
colour platitudes. We need to actually go out and look at colours so that we know how they, in 
Smith’s words, ‘hook up’ with the platitudes. 
The analogy between colour platitudes and moral platitudes breaks down here. Looking at 
colours is an a posteriori investigation, and it is essential for mastering colour terms correctly. If 
Bert says that he accepts every a priori platitude necessary for mastering colour terms, but gets 
all his perceptual colour judgements wrong, then it seems that Smith would deny that Bert has 
really mastered colour terms. If the analogy continues to hold between colour terms and moral 
                                                             
10 Smith (1994), p. 51. 
11 Smith (1994), p. 50. 
12 Smith (1994), p. 51. 
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terms, then, it appears that we must use a posteriori investigation as well as a priori moral 
platitudes in order to master moral terms.13 
Obviously, the core-apriorist will not say that we need to have a posteriori information about 
morality in order to master moral terms. So at this point he might drop the colour analogy, but 
Smith does not do this. He appears to hold that whilst the analogy breaks down at the point 
where perceptual experience is required in order to master colour terms, the analogy still 
usefully shows that simply being disposed to accept a priori moral platitudes is not enough. Just 
as we need something extra, a posteriori perceptual experience, to master colour terms, we 
need something extra to master moral terms. This ‘something extra’ is moral motivation. 
Smith calls himself an internalist. He holds the following two claims that make up internalism: 
 
Practicality Requirement: If an agent judges that it is right for her to ɸ in circumstances C, 
then either she is motived to ɸ in C or she is practically 
irrational. 
Rationalism: If it is right for agents to ɸ in circumstances C, then there is a 
reason for these agents to ɸ in C.14 
 
Practicality Requirement implies that if a practically rational agent has no motivation to ɸ in 
circumstances C, she cannot judge that it is right to do so. For example, she cannot truthfully 
claim ‘I know that it is right for me to donate to charity, but I have no motivation to do so’. A 
practically rational agent with no moral motivations may accept all true a priori moral platitudes 
(and reject all false a priori moral platitudes), but she would not have mastered moral terms. 
She fails to meet Practicality Requirement, and so she cannot make genuine moral judgements. 
David Brink rejects Practicality Requirement because he believes that agents who can make 
genuine moral judgements but who have absolutely no motivation to act morally are possible.15 
He calls such agents ‘amoralists’. Smith replies by using the colour analogy. Even if an agent 
who has been blind from birth can use colour terms more reliably than many other agents, ‘the 
                                                             
13 Smith’s thoughts on colour are reminiscent of Frank Jackson’s (1986) thought experiment about Mary, who knows 
every physical fact but has never seen colours. Despite her knowledge, Jackson argues, she could not know what 
colours look like. This is not the same as Smith’s points about colour platitudes, though, because Jackson is not trying 
to show that mastery of colour terms requires a posteriori information. His aim instead is to reject physicalism, which 
holds that if one knows all physical facts, then one knows all facts. Jackson claims that since Mary knows all physical 
facts but does not know what colours look like, physicalism must be false. 
14 Smith (1994), pp. 61-62. 
15 Brink (1989), pp. 27, 46-50. 
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ability to have the appropriate visual experiences under suitable conditions is partially 
constitutive of possession of colour concepts and mastery of colour terms… [The blind agent] 
does not really make colour judgements at all’.16 Similarly, an agent may make generally 
reliable moral claims and use moral terms, but unless he is motivated to abide by his moral 
judgements, he is not really making genuine moral judgements. 
Smith does not claim that the colour analogy proves that Brink is wrong, and he provides an 
independent argument for Practicality Requirement elsewhere. Rather, the analogy purports to 
show that Brink cannot just assume that the amoralist is possible. At this point, accepting 
Practicality Requirement is just as prima facie reasonable as rejecting it. 
We need not determine here whether Practicality Requirement is true or not. I bring it up to 
show a use that Smith has for the colour analogy, and to show that we can reject Smith’s 
metaethics by rejecting Practicality Requirement. If we reject it, then the colour analogy breaks 
down. We need something extra, a posteriori perceptual experience, to master colour terms, but 
if we reject Practicality Requirement, then we do not know what the ‘something extra’ is that we 
need in order to master moral terms. This creates problems for Smith’s metaethics because he 
cannot give up Practicality Requirement. If he does so, then various purportedly a priori moral 
platitudes about motivation that he wants to retain will turn out to be false. This means that the 
core-aposteriorist could criticise Smith’s moral realism by rejecting Practicality Requirement, 
and many philosophers have done so, whether they are core-aposteriorists or not.17 However, 
the core-aposteriorist might want to retain Practicality Requirement, depending on her own 
core-aposteriorist theory. Since I do not want to dictate what a core-aposteriorist must hold any 
more than I have to, I will drop this criticism and concentrate on how we can use the a posteriori 
strategy against Smith. As we will see, the a posteriori strategy only leads to the conclusion that 
many of Smith’s purportedly a priori moral platitudes are actually likely to be a posteriori. This is 
enough to show that his metaethics cannot be a core-apriorist theory, as it follows option (c) 
from the options that the core-aposteriorist can use to argue against Smith. It does not show, 
however, that any of the platitudes that he uses are wrong, or that Practicality Requirement is 
false (or true, for that matter). The core-aposteriorist is therefore free to endorse or reject it as 
she chooses. 
                                                             
16 Smith (1994), p. 69, emphasis in the original. 
17 E.g. Copp (1997), pp. 48-53, Shafer-Landau (2003), pp. 145-147; Nichols (2004), pp. 72-75. Nichols, as we have 
seen, is a core-aposteriorist. Shafer-Landau is a core-apriorist. 
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3 – A priori moral platitudes 
 
We have seen that Smith divides the platitudes necessary for mastery of moral terms into five 
types, and that the types need not necessarily share any connection that would make it easier 
for the core-aposteriorist to argue that they are also false. Neither do we have reason to believe 
that they all contravene Sufficient Determinacy. This leaves us with option (c), the strategy of 
showing that at least some of the platitudes are a posteriori. We can do this with at least three 
of the five types of platitude. The remaining two types, the platitudes of objectivity and 
supervenience, are more likely to be a priori, but this is not enough to show that Smith’s moral 
realism successfully works as a core-apriorist theory. The core-apriorist therefore cannot use 
Smith’s moral realism to defend the CAT against the core-aposteriorist. 
The three types of moral platitude that I will examine are practical moral platitudes, 
substantial moral platitudes, and procedural moral platitudes. Specifically, I will examine the 
examples that Smith himself gives of such platitudes. The example he gives of a practical moral 
platitude is 
 
Practical: Weakness of will, compulsion, depression and the like may explain why 
someone isn’t moved in accordance with their moral beliefs. 
 
One might be able to argue that we can define ‘weakness of will’ in such a way that it is 
knowable a priori that an agent with weak will is less moved to act in accordance with their 
moral beliefs (though how informative this definition will be is another matter – what is weak will, 
anyway?) Agents with weak will are less likely to perform difficult acts, and being moral is not 
always easy. But defining ‘depression’ in a similar way is trickier, not least because many 
depressed agents are very good at covering up their condition. They may act no differently from 
how they would if they were not depressed.18 It is true that many (though not all) depressed 
agents lack the motivation to act, but we find this out by observing them. Defining depression so 
that it necessarily involves lack of motivation is not the answer, as depression is recognised as 
                                                             
18 One might object that they still do not feel like acting, even though they do act, so their motivation is negatively 
affected. But it is difficult to flesh this out. If they freely choose to act morally and successfully do so, in what sense do 
they lack motivation? 
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producing a variety of symptoms, and an agent need not display all of them to be diagnosed as 
suffering from depression. Even if it is part of the definition of ‘depression’ that depression 
affects an agent’s will power, this appears to be an a posteriori discovery, made by observing 
depressed agents. And in fact the platitude goes further than just saying that depression may 
affect an agent’s motivation. It says that depression may affect an agent’s moral motivation. 
There may be many depressed agents who lack the motivation to perform some types of action 
without the depression affecting their moral motivation. 
A risk also arises for the core-apriorist with the word ‘may’, as it means that we are left 
uncertain just when depression, weakness of will and the like are going to affect an agent’s 
motivation and how they would do so. As depression need not affect motivation, we need to 
know under which conditions it does, and this varies from agent to agent. So not only does it 
seem that Practical is actually knowable in part a posteriori, but it turns out not to be 
determinate. Therefore because of Sufficient Determinacy it cannot by itself justify determinate 
moral propositions. ‘May’ is not the only term in Practical with this problem, either. If many 
agents disagree on the conditions under which, say, depression adversely affects motivation, 
how it does so, and what we should take motivation to be, then the term ‘depression’ has 
imprecise application conditions. This leads back to the problem that we can only reasonably 
give the term more precise application conditions by examining depression and depressed 
agents a posteriori. It is unlikely that we can know Practical via an a priori method. 
Substantial moral platitudes are also problematic for the core-apriorist. The example Smith 
gives of such platitudes is 
 
Substantial: Right acts are in some way expressive of equal concern and respect. 
 
The core-aposteriorist wants to argue that if Substantial is correct, then we can only find out a 
posteriori that it is correct. For example, perhaps we have to investigate actual societies to 
discover that Substantial is true.19 If Smith wants to say that Substantial is necessary for 
mastery of moral terms, on the other hand, then he has to argue instead that it is a priori. In this 
case, the core-aposteriorist can use option (c) in an indirect fashion. First, she can argue that 
                                                             
19 We shall discover later in this chapter that the moral functionalist can hold something like this claim. 
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Substantial contravenes Sufficient Determinacy. After that, she can argue that although we can 
amend Substantial to correct this problem, we can only do so by using a posteriori information. 
Substantial falls foul of Sufficient Determinacy because of the phrase ‘in some way 
expressive’. What is this phrase supposed to mean? Equal concern and respect are not the be-
all and end-all of morality, otherwise Smith could just say that right acts are acts that best 
display equal concern and respect (This may be problematic on other grounds as well, as 
saying this comes close to endorsing a reductive moral theory, and Smith rejects reductive 
theories.). How far, then, do right acts have to accommodate equal concern and respect? Does 
it vary from case to case? Could there ever be right acts that ignore them entirely? With so 
many questions, it becomes increasingly unclear just which determinate moral propositions can 
be justified with Substantial as a premise. 
Smith can of course say that the correct moral theory must be consistent with Substantial. If 
Substantial is true, then obviously moral theories that reject it cannot be accepted. The point, 
though, is that consistency is not enough. If an agent masters moral terms, then she knows how 
to use them correctly when making determinate moral claims. If all she knows is Substantial, 
then there will be many occasions on which she does not know whether she is using the term 
‘right’ correctly, or whether she is using it inappropriately. For example, take the moral 
proposition ‘It is right to treat your children in exactly the same way as you would treat any other 
children’. All children should be treated with equal concern and respect, according to this 
proposition, but very few people would actually agree with this proposition. Surely I should give 
my children preferential treatment, even if nobody else is obliged to give them preferential 
treatment.  
For Smith to avoid this problem, he needs to provide other substantive moral platitudes that 
are more determinate; maybe these are platitudes that replace the phrase ‘in some way 
expressive’ in Substantial with terms that have more precise application conditions. However, 
the onus is on Smith to show this. Furthermore, this move allows the core-aposteriorist to argue 
that we can only make the necessary changes by appealing to a posteriori information, and this 
is where option (c) comes back into the picture. If we want to exclude the possibility that it is 
morally right to treat your child exactly like you treat any other child, we need a reason to 
exclude it. What is to say that this reason can be identified a priori? As we saw with the SLS 
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theory, if we bring in a first-order normative theory to provide a reason, it may give an a 
posteriori reason. 
So far, the core-aposteriorist can use option (c) to argue against Smith’s use of certain 
practical and substantial moral platitudes. There are three other types of platitudes: procedural 
platitudes, platitudes of objectivity and platitudes of supervenience. Procedural platitudes may 
also be vulnerable to the core-aposteriorist, depending on what actually justifies an agent’s 
endorsement of a particular moral proposition or particular moral claim. For example, take 
 
Procedural: We can work out which acts are right through a process of reflective equilibrium. 
 
If substantial platitudes can be a posteriori, then we can work out which acts are right a 
posteriori. First, we work out what sort of characteristics right acts have, and then we work out 
which particular acts (such as donating to charity, helping the impoverished, and so on) have 
these properties. If reflective equilibrium helps us to work out what is morally right, we discover 
that it is successful a posteriori, since it relies on a posteriori evidence about rightness and the 
characteristics of various acts. 
The other two types of platitude that Smith thinks are required for mastery of moral terms, 
the platitudes of objectivity and supervenience, are much harder to question as a priori or 
determinate. It is difficult to see just what a posteriori evidence there could be to demonstrate 
the truth or falsity of such platitudes, and it is doubtful whether such platitudes must be non-
determinate. The examples that Smith gives are: 
 
Objectivity:  When A says that ɸ-ing is right, and B says that ɸ-ing is not right, then 
at most one of A and B is correct. 
Supervenience: Acts with the same ordinary everyday non-moral features must have the 
same moral features as well. 
 
Neither Objectivity nor Supervenience seems non-determinate. It is also unclear how the core-
aposteriorist could show that objectivity and supervenience can be defended a posteriori. She 
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could deny that the platitudes are true, but this would require an independent argument, and as 
I have mentioned above, rejecting platitudes of supervenience is particularly problematic for her. 
However, this is not a very large problem, because there is no requirement to show that all of 
the moral platitudes that Smith believes are necessary for mastery of moral terms are a 
posteriori or non-determinate. The Central Claim is true if there is a single determinate core 
moral proposition with normative content that can only be ascertained as true with an a 
posteriori or mixed method. Platitudes about supervenience and objectivity cannot by 
themselves justify the normative content of many true determinate moral propositions. For 
example, take the determinate moral principle ‘One should not drink-drive’. Platitudes about 
supervenience and objectivity cannot by themselves justify the normative content of the 
proposition. They can provide reasons why the proposition is true for every case of drink-driving 
if it is true, but not that it is true. One reason for this is that we cannot derive any sort of theory 
of the good or of the right merely from platitudes of objectivity and supervenience, but we need 
such theories in order to identify what is morally good or right. Theories of the good and of the 
right are more the business of substantial moral platitudes, so we must examine these 
platitudes as well in order to justify the normative content of the proposition. We may also need 
to consider practical and procedural platitudes. But we have seen that practical, substantial and 
procedural platitudes may not be ascertainable as true a priori, in which case we cannot justify 
the normative content of the proposition with an a priori method. Therefore the CAT is likely to 
be untrue, despite the fact that the platitudes about supervenience and objectivity may be both 
determinate and knowable a priori.  
The core-aposteriorist is helped here by how weak the Central Claim is. The Central Claim 
does not claim that the truth of the normative content of all determinate core moral propositions 
can only be ascertained with an a posteriori or mixed method, but only that the normative 
content of at least one determinate core moral proposition is. The core-apriorist wants to say 
that the moral platitudes necessary for mastery of moral terms are knowable a priori, and hence 
are a priori core moral propositions. All determinate core moral propositions are platitudes that 
are knowable a priori. However, there is good reason to believe that some of the platitudes 
necessary for mastery of moral terms are not knowable a priori, but a posteriori. The core-
apriorist therefore cannot use Smith’s moral realism to defend the CAT. Smith does not 
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successfully defend his claims that the platitudes necessary for mastery of moral terms are 
knowable a priori. 
Before moving on, we can raise the point here that the a posteriori strategy’s objections to 
Smith’s moral realism as a core-apriorist theory have something in common with its objections 
to the SLS theory and Kramer’s metaethics. The a posteriori strategy refutes none of these 
theories outright. It simply states that, despite appearances to the contrary, the theories can 
only work if they allow for determinate core moral propositions of which the normative content is 
only knowable via an a posteriori or mixed method. This does not imply that a priori determinate 
core moral propositions do not exist. Both Kramer’s metaethics and Smith’s moral realism, for 
example, can continue endorsing a priori determinate basic moral principles and a priori 
determinate moral platitudes respectively. However, none of the theories is successful 
specifically as a core-apriorist theory. 
In sections 4-7 of this chapter, I will turn to the final metaethical theory that I will examine, 
moral functionalism. The core-apriorist can read moral functionalism as a core-apriorist theory, 
and such a reading entails that the CAT is true. The core-aposteriorist’s counterargument is not 
that moral functionalism is wrong, but that this core-apriorist reading is untenable. 
 
4 – Moral commonplaces and A-extension propositions 
 
Moral functionalism was created by Frank Jackson and Philp Pettit, and I will examine it as 
Jackson builds on it following their initial joint paper that developed it.20 It claims that we are 
able to attain moral knowledge by ascertaining the commonplaces about morality that are 
typically accepted by people in general. Jackson and Pettit do not explicitly claim that moral 
functionalism is a core-apriorist or a core-aposteriorist theory, but it is easy to read it as core-
apriorist because of certain a priori commitments it endorses. After outlining moral functionalism 
and identifying what these a priori commitments are, I will examine two objections. The first 
objection is developed by Nick Zangwill, who claims that moral functionalism leads to an 
unacceptable relativism. We will find that Zangwill’s argument needs considerable tightening to 
really cause problems for moral functionalism, and it is not as strong as the second objection. 
                                                             
20 Jackson and Pettit (1995); Jackson (1998). 
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The second objection aims against moral functionalism’s a priori commitments by claiming the 
commitments are not really a priori. This implies that moral functionalism cannot show that 
determinate core moral knowledge is a priori. 
Moral functionalism claims that moral terms are ‘used in a way that presupposes a large 
network of connections with other terms, both evaluative and descriptive’.21 We accept 
commonplaces about the terms that we use, and this allows us to identify particular descriptive 
properties that ordinary moral thinking tells us are moral properties. We are thus able to grasp 
moral concepts. For example, when we use the term ‘fairness’, it is a commonplace for us that if 
an action is fair, that is usually a reason to do it. Any agent who can use moral terms 
competently will agree that various commonplaces such as this are true.22 
 
‘[T]he meaning of relevant moral terms will be fixed by roles which certain commonplaces 
give them, and so moral thinking is bound to involve the attempt to use commonplaces as a 
base, and holding on to as much as that base as possible, or at least to the parts considered 
most secure, to fix opinions on particular questions.’23 
 
Grasping the commonplaces correctly means that we grasp the concepts relating to the 
commonplaces correctly, which means that we can correctly use the terms that denote moral 
properties. Once we know about the roles that moral properties play, and the moral 
commonplaces that we accept, we can find out what descriptive properties we can identify with 
the moral properties. 
The reason why moral functionalism is a moral coherentist theory lies in the fact that moral 
terms are connected with certain evaluative and descriptive terms that are based on what our 
moral commonplaces actually are. There is no requirement that any of our commonplaces must 
be self-evident, so moral functionalism is not a moral intuitionist theory. Instead, morality is 
based on a network of commonplaces that we accept and that are all consistent with each 
other. 
What a priori commitments does moral functionalism have? Jackson claims that 
 
                                                             
21 Jackson and Pettit (1995), p. 22. 
22 Jackson and Pettit (1995), pp. 22-23. 
23 Jackson and Pettit (1995), p. 26. 
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‘[w]hat is a priori according to moral functionalism is not that rightness is such-and-such a 
descriptive property, but rather that A is right if and only if A has whatever property it is that 
plays the rightness role in common folk morality, and it is an a posteriori matter what that 
property is.’24 
 
‘Common folk morality’ is the moral theory that endorses the moral commonplaces accepted by 
most people in a particular society.25 Moral functionalism presupposes that we look at the 
commonplaces typically endorsed by people, and that we use that as the basis of a suitable 
moral theory. 
There are two ways to read Jackson’s remarks, and the one we choose affects whether we 
see moral functionalism as a core-apriorist or a core-aposteriorist theory. We might think that 
since Jackson says that we identify which descriptive properties are moral properties a 
posteriori by looking at common folk morality, moral functionalism must be a core-aposteriorist 
theory. However, if we dig deeper into Jackson’s metaphysics, we find more evidence for a 
second reading.26 To know what moral properties are, we must know a priori that moral 
properties play a particular role. Only after that can we use a posteriori evidence to ascertain 
which descriptive properties are moral properties, since they play the same role. The core-
apriorist can claim that the knowledge that Jackson claims is a priori in the above quote is a 
priori determinate core moral knowledge. The core-aposteriorist will object that the a priori 
knowledge is not actually a priori.  
Moral functionalism represents Jackson’s metaphysics as it applies to ethics. He believes 
that one important task of metaphysics is what he calls ‘the location problem’. If the proposition 
‘Kicking babies for fun is morally wrong’ is true, where can we find this property of moral 
wrongness? The property will have various features, and if our account of moral wrongness 
entails that the property has features A, B and C, then those features ‘have a place in the 
account’.27 
To demonstrate, Jackson provides an example concerning the supervenience of the 
psychological on the physical. He first defines ‘physicalism’ as the metaphysical doctrine that 
                                                             
24 Jackson (1998), pp. 150-151. 
25 Jackson and Pettit (1995), p. 24; Jackson (1998), pp. 117-118. 
26 Much of the following discussion relates to Jackson’s metaphysical views, and it should be noted that these may not 
be Pettit’s views. 
27 Jackson (1998), p. 5. 
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we can give a complete account of our world in terms of physical particulars, properties and 
relations.28 Given physicalism, the following is true: 
 
(b) Any world which is a minimal physical duplicate of the world is a duplicate simpliciter of 
the world.29 
 
Minimal physical duplicates are duplicates that have exactly the same physical properties and 
no further non-physical properties. Two worlds with exactly the same physical properties would 
not be duplicates if one of the worlds also contained extra non-physical properties (such as 
ectoplasm). 
Suppose that ɸ is a complete, true physicalist account of our world. It will also be true, given 
(b), of any world that is a minimal physical duplicate of our world. Suppose that ɣ is a true 
sentence about the psychological nature of our world, such that it would only be false if the 
world’s psychological nature were different. Given (b), every world at which ɸ is true would be a 
world at which ɣ is true, so therefore ɸ entails ɣ.30 Our physicalist account of the world entails 
the supervenience of the psychological on the physical, and hence we should accept this 
supervenience. 
Importantly, Jackson sharply divides the concepts that actual agents generally use from what 
he calls the ‘essence’ of what these concepts relate to.31 For example, what is essential about 
water is that it is H2O, but we do not need to know that in order to grasp the concept ‘water’. 
People grasped the concept perfectly well long before they knew its chemical composition. This 
distinction enables us to call moral functionalism a core-apriorist theory, as I will now show.32 
Jackson accepts that the investigation of which commonplaces we endorse can be a 
posteriori. The a priori element appears when we talk about the application of terms in the 
actual world or in counterfactual situations. Let T be a particular term. T may apply to various 
entities, events, relations, etc., and this defines its extension. It may have different extensions in 
different possible worlds. The A-extension of T in w is the actual extension of T in world w 
                                                             
28 Jackson (1998), p. 6. As I use this only as an illustrative example, I will not discuss what ‘physical’ means. 
29 Jackson (1998), p. 12, emphasis in the original. 
30 Jackson (1998), p. 25. 
31 For the avoidance of doubt, Jackson’s use of the terms ‘essence’ and ‘concept’ is unrelated to Cuneo and Shafer-
Landau’s use of the terms. 
32 One can try refuting Jackson’s metaethics by refuting his general metaphysics. This will not be my strategy against 
moral functionalism, so I will not examine this move. However, I will touch on it later in this chapter. 
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where w may be our world or another possible world. In our world, the A-extension of ‘water’ is 
all and only the occurrences of water. 
We may also ask, given the assumption that we are talking about our actual world, what T 
would apply to in various counterfactual situations. The answer would give us the C-extension 
of T, which would tell us what T would apply to in possible worlds. For example, the term ‘water’ 
applies to all the watery occurrences in the world, so in our actual world the A-extension of 
‘water’ would be all and only the occurrences of H2O. In another word, where substances of 
chemical composition XYZ are called ‘water’, the A-extension of ‘water’ in that world would be 
all and only the occurrences of XYZ. But since in our actual world water is H2O, the C-extension 
of ‘water’ in the actual world is the occurrences of H2O in any possible world.33 The C-extension 
would not, for example, include any occurrences of XYZ, even though people on possible 
worlds with XYZ may call XYZ ‘water’.  
For ‘water’, the A-extension and the C-extension in the actual world are the same. ‘Water’ 
applies to all and only the occurrences of H2O under both extensions. But, says Jackson, there 
is an epistemological difference. Before we found out that water was H2O, we did not know its 
essence. So we could not determine its C-extension. 
 
‘[I]n order to pick out water in a counterfactual world, we need to know something about 
relationships between the counterfactual world and the actual world that we could only know 
after discovering that in the actual world H2O plays the watery role.’34 
 
Before we found out that water was H2O – an a posteriori discovery – we could not say whether 
the stuff that plays the watery role in a counterfactual world was part of the C-extension of 
‘water’. For consider a counterfactual world that is identical with the actual world except that the 
stuff that plays the watery role in the actual world is H2O, and the stuff that plays the watery role 
in the counterfactual world is XYZ. Until we find out that in the actual world water is H2O, how do 
we work out that the stuff playing the watery role in the counterfactual world does not fall under 
the C-extension of water? 
                                                             
33 Jackson (1998), p. 49. 
34 Jackson (1998), p. 50, emphasis in the original. 
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Knowledge of A-extensions (in our actual world) need not be a posteriori knowledge of the 
actual world. ‘Water’ is whatever plays the watery role in the actual world. We do not need to 
know that water is H2O in order to know that. And this applies to any counterfactual world as 
well, because when we work out A-extensions of ‘water’ in counterfactual worlds, we do not 
compare watery substances in those worlds to the watery substance in any other world. 
Since we can know A-extensions in our actual world without knowing what the actual world is 
like, Jackson concludes that such knowledge is a priori. 
 
‘The sense in which conceptual analysis involves the a priori is that it concerns A-extensions 
of worlds… and accordingly concerns something that does, or does not, obtain 
independently of how things actually are. When we do conceptual analysis of K-hood, we 
address the question of what it takes to be a K in the sense of when it is right, and when it is 
wrong, to describe some situation in terms of ‘K’, and so we make explicit what our subject is 
when we discuss Ks. The part of the enterprise that addresses the question of what things 
are K at a world, under the supposition that that world is the actual world, is the a priori part 
of conceptual analysis, because the answer depends not at all on which world is in fact the 
actual world.’35 
 
In the actual world, it is a priori that the A-extension of ‘water’ is just the watery stuff of our 
acquaintance. Water is whatever happens to fulfil the watery role. What precisely that stuff is 
(H2O) is an a posteriori question, but we do not need to know that in order to know that water is 
the watery stuff of our acquaintance. 
Jackson cannot think that it is always true that K is whatever plays the K-role, as that is 
clearly wrong. London is not the city that happens to play the Londony role, because ‘London’ is 
just the name of that particular city. There is no Londony role, because London would be 
London no matter what its characteristics or properties were. Similarly, demonstratives (‘this’, 
‘that’ ‘those’ and so on) are not associated with any role. The proposition ‘This was given to me 
at lunchtime’ does not imply that anything plays a ‘this-y’ role, or that such a role exists. 
                                                             
35 Jackson (1998), p. 51. 
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So the proposition ‘’K’ refers to whatever plays the K-role’ is false if K is some name or some 
demonstrative. Nevertheless, Jackson wants to claim that for many entities and properties, such 
as water, ‘K’ does refer to whatever plays the K-role. The reason why ‘water’ refers to 
occurrences of H2O is because H2O plays a certain role. Various terms can have a priori A-
extensions, even if not every term can, and furthermore some of these terms are moral terms. In 
future, when I talk of terms referring to things that play certain roles, I will mean terms that have 
A-extensions and C-extensions in Jackson’s metaphysics. 
What is the property of fairness? The A-extension of the fairness property (at our actual 
world) will be the thing that we are acquainted with because it fulfils a certain ‘fairnessy’ role, 
and we know this a priori. What we must discover a posteriori is exactly what descriptive 
property fulfils the role. Jackson does not say who ‘we’ are, presumably because he does not 
think that we should be too precise. He is also wary of defining roles in a way that deviates too 
much from the way that the relevant terms are commonly used. If I define ‘number’ in a certain 
way, regardless of how others typically use and define the term, then it may be easy for me to 
define ‘number’ in such a way that entails that numbers actually exist, and hence that 
mathematical realism is correct. But as Jackson rightly points out, this is false progress. Nobody 
who did not share my definition would agree that I have proven mathematical realism correct, 
and it might turn out that very few people share my definition. It is only when we examine 
numbers ‘according to our ordinary conception [of them] or something suitably close to it that we 
can make any real headway’.36 
The very idea of examining moral commonplaces in order to ascertain moral properties is a 
priori. It is a priori that moral properties are simply the things that play the ‘moral property’ roles, 
which are particular roles in the eyes of moral agents. We can roughly say that moral properties 
are those things that fulfil certain functions according to our folk morality (As we will see shortly, 
this is somewhat a simplification, but it is a good starting point.). Metaethical theories that 
analyse moral concepts in ways that are completely alien to our ordinary conception of them are 
most likely wrong, and the way to find out what our ordinary conception of them is is to go out 
and look at what moral commonplaces to endorse. What is a priori is our knowledge of the A-
extensions of moral terms. What is a posteriori is our knowledge of the essence of moral 
                                                             
36 Jackson (1998), p. 31, emphasis in the original. 
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properties, and we investigate the outside world to discover what moral properties are actually 
made up of. 
It appears that both A-extension propositions (propositions that express A-extensions) and 
C-extension propositions can be commonplaces. ‘The property of moral rightness is whatever 
plays the moral-rightness role’ is a commonplace, and it expresses an A-extension. However, 
Jackson and Pettit also believe that for many people it is a commonplace that saving lives is 
more important than being fair.37 This is an a posteriori commonplace, since humans might 
have come to believe that it is a commonplace that being fair was more important than saving 
lives instead, and we would find that out through observing them. So commonplaces may either 
express A-extensions or C-extensions, and thus be either ascertainable a priori or a posteriori. 
Jackson’s views on colour properties also point to something important that we can carry 
over to his views on moral properties. He identifies colours with physical properties, and so 
makes them objective and observer-independent, in that they may still exist independently of 
any possible observers. What is not objective and observer-independent is precisely what 
particular descriptive properties are colours. That identification can only be made by examining 
which colour commonplaces are accepted by actual agents.38 
Despite the significant a posteriori elements in moral functionalism, it ultimately rests on an a 
priori foundation. There is more to say about this, but for the moment let us develop moral 
functionalism further to see more about how it treats the attainment of moral knowledge. 
 
5 – Folk morality 
 
A folk morality consists of the moral commonplaces that people generally accept. Obviously, 
most people are not philosophers, and they can hold moral commonplaces that badly conflict 
with each other. The answer to this problem is not to junk folk morality, but to recognise that this 
kind of folk morality is a common folk morality, a folk morality that perhaps has not been 
developed or worked out to any real degree. Instead of rejecting it, we must develop it into a 
mature folk morality. Moral functionalism claims that we can drop various commonplaces if we 
need to when they conflict with other more plausible commonplaces. We try to keep as many 
                                                             
37 Jackson and Pettit (1995), p. 23. 
38 Jackson (1998), p. 100. 
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commonplaces as possible, but we do not have to keep them all. As people continue debating 
moral issues and refining their moral views, we work out which commonplaces to keep and 
which to drop. This gets us closer to a mature folk morality, a ‘folk morality that has been 
exposed to debate and rational reflection’. 
 
‘The idea is that mature folk morality is the best we will do by way of making good sense of 
the raft of sometimes conflicting intuitions about particular cases and general principles that 
make up current morality.’39 
 
Suppose that it is a commonplace for Alice that allowing a morally wrong action to happen is 
just as morally wrong as performing it. Shooting someone is just as morally wrong as allowing 
your friend to shoot someone when you could stop it without any danger or inconvenience to 
yourself. Meanwhile, it is a commonplace for Bethany that allowing a morally wrong action to 
happen is not as morally wrong as performing it. You may be morally culpable to some degree 
for the shooting, but not as much as the actual shooter would be (After all, it is not your finger 
on the trigger.). If Alice and Bethany tried to work together through the reasons that they held 
their commonplaces, they may be able to agree on reasons to prefer one of the commonplaces 
to the other. Say that they agree that Alice’s commonplace is preferable. They would both reject 
Bethany’s commonplace and so they would be closer to having a mature folk morality than they 
were previously. They may also use the agreed commonplace as evidence for further moral 
claims that they could come to think of as new commonplaces. This raises the possibility that if 
we refine different common folk moralities, they will converge on a mutual folk morality. I will say 
more about this later. 
 
6 – Zangwill’s objection 
 
We have now seen enough of moral functionalism to starting considering objections to it. In this 
section, I am going to examine a criticism from Nick Zangwill. Zangwill wants to show that moral 
functionalism cannot avoid sliding into a disastrous form of relativism, and so it should be 
                                                             
39 Jackson (1998), p. 133. 
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rejected. Unfortunately, the objection as he develops it depends on an assumption that the 
moral functionalist can refuse to accept. We can, however, adapt the argument to avoid making 
the assumption by using the distinction between determinate and non-determinate propositions. 
This causes more trouble for the moral functionalist than Zangwill’s original objection, but it is 
still not enough to conclusively refute moral functionalism. 
Jackson and Pettit point out that actual speakers in actual societies use moral terms in a way 
that conforms with various commonplaces, even if the speakers cannot articulate those 
commonplaces. This inability is not automatically a mark against moral functionalism. Many 
English speakers use perfect grammar, but we cannot assume that they can list all the 
grammatical rules that they follow. However, as Zangwill points out, this assumes that actual 
speakers will broadly agree on what the commonplaces entail (A group of competent English 
speakers will broadly agree on when an English sentence is grammatically incorrect, even if 
they cannot list the rules of English grammar.).40 Jackson justifies moral functionalism’s use of 
commonplaces on the grounds that in order to have genuine moral disagreement, we need ‘a 
background of shared moral opinion to fix a common, or near enough common, set of meanings 
for our moral terms’.41 But if the disputants share no or very few moral commonplaces, then 
Zangwill thinks that according to moral functionalism there should be no genuine moral 
disagreement at all. The disputants would use the same terms, but they would be talking about 
different properties, because they would be using different concepts. Since it seems clear that 
the disputants can have genuine moral disagreements despite sharing so few moral 
commonplaces, Zangwill concludes, moral functionalism must be mistaken. The disputants 
have different folk moralities, and moral functionalism must concede that there is no reason for 
the disputants to give up their separate commonplaces. So the disputants can adhere to their 
different moral theories, and moral functionalism leads to relativism. 
Jackson hints at a solution by saying that there can be genuine moral disagreement between 
disputants who have a ‘near enough common’ understanding of moral terms. They talk about 
the same properties, but disagree as to the exact nature of those properties. The trouble with 
this response, Zangwill thinks, is that it is difficult to flesh it out in a way that does not cause 
more problems. He focuses on when the use of indexicals make a difference in moral 
                                                             
40 Zangwill (2000), p. 277. 
41 Jackson (1998), p. 132. ‘Genuine moral disagreement’ is genuine disagreement about a moral issue, where the 
disputants are not just talking past each other. 
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judgements. We typically accept that I can give preferential treatment to my child and not your 
child specifically because my child is my child and your child is not. But we do not accept that I 
should give preferential treatment to people of my race just because they are of my race. So 
when is it morally significant that I have a personal connection to something? Our society 
constantly faces this problem in one form or another. Can I keep refugees out of my country 
because they take away resources from my fellow nationals? May I eat different species simply 
because they are not human? 
Jackson thinks that it is a commonplace that acts of intentional killing are wrong.42 Zangwill 
objects that this depends on how one views the moral relevance of indexical differences. If 
intentional killing includes the killing of chickens for food, then meat-eaters might object to the 
commonplace. If we are not allowed to intentionally kill assassins in self-defence, this could also 
raise objections. And, Zangwill notes, if the commonplace means that we should not 
intentionally kill Jews, then ardent Nazis would object.43 Whether the commonplaces are ones 
that we find reasonable or not, it seems that even when moral commonplaces look perfectly 
legitimate there is always the risk that someone will say ‘Yes, except…’ 
We cannot just decree that Nazis are conceptually confused about the moral terms that they 
use. During his Nuremberg trial, Hermann Göring shocked the prosecutor by stating that loyalty 
to Germany was morally the most important thing, and to be absolutely loyal required intentional 
killing.44 It appears at first sight that we can reasonably disagree with him about this. He knows 
what loyalty and duty are just as well as we do, and we and he disagree over our moral 
judgements about them. 
According to Zangwill, this cases problems with moral functionalism. It seems that we can 
intelligibly debate the ethics of genocide with Göring. Göring’s moral views might be 
horrendously outlandish, but that does not mean that he cannot understand the moral terms that 
we use. However, it appears that since our moral views are so different, we and Göring accept 
very few of the same moral commonplaces about the moral terms used in the debate. Perhaps 
we mutually accept none of them. Moral functionalism must therefore hold that we cannot have 
a genuine moral disagreement. We and Göring cannot mean the same thing by the moral terms 
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44 I assume that Göring was being honest about his beliefs, and could actually grasp moral concepts, even if his moral 
judgements were horrendously wrong. If he was not, we can assume that he was for the sake of the argument. 
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that we use, and so we will just be talking past each other. Zangwill further claims that even if 
Göring has a mature folk morality, it is ‘not remotely plausible’ that he will ever come to agree 
with us.45 Since this is the case, and since there is no way of resolving the disagreement, there 
is no way to show that Göring is wrong. He and we accept different moral commonplaces, and 
that is all that can be said. Therefore moral functionalism leads to a disastrous form of 
relativism, which allows Nazism to be morally permissible depending on the moral 
commonplaces that agents accept. 
This objection needs considerable tightening. The problem with it as it is currently stated is 
that we and Göring may actually agree on many of the same commonplaces. More specifically, 
we may agree on many of the same determinate moral propositions that express 
commonplaces. We may agree, for example, that it is a bad thing to kick dogs for fun, and to 
allow one’s child to drown in a lake. Göring may generally be just as horrified by serial killers, 
selfish swindlers and destructive psychopaths as we are. So it just seems false that we cannot 
share moral commonplaces, or that we cannot have a genuine moral disagreement. This should 
lead us to tighten up Zangwill’s objection, which becomes the amended objection that we 
cannot have a genuine moral disagreement with Göring about the intentional killing of Jews 
because we do not share any determinate moral commonplaces that are relevant to whether it 
is morally permissible or not to kill Jews. 
The reason why I said that we may agree on many determinate moral propositions, and left 
non-determinate moral propositions to one side, is that it is easier to agree on what determinate 
propositions entail. We may agree with Göring that everyone should be nice, but if we interpret 
‘nice’ in wildly different ways, then we are not agreeing on very much, and so we do not share 
many of the same commonplaces regarding being nice. This problem is much smaller for 
determinate propositions. In effect, if we agree on a very determinate moral proposition, there is 
less room for someone to say ‘Yes, except…’ and so there is a greater chance that we do share 
the same moral commonplaces. 
The amended objection is still mistaken, though, because we probably can still have a 
genuine moral disagreement with Göring. Surely we and Göring can agree that intentional killing 
is generally wrong. The disagreement arises when we try to make the commonplace more 
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determinate. When we replace ‘generally’ with more specific criteria for ascertaining when 
intentional killing is wrong, we and Göring will disagree on what the criteria are. Nevertheless, 
the point remains that we agree on something. Most of the time, Göring would claim, intentional 
killing is wrong. This means that we do share a commonplace with Göring. The disagreement 
arises over how to flesh it out, and it seems implausible to claim that the disagreement cannot 
be genuinely moral because we share so few determinate commonplaces with Göring. 
So what happens if two disputants really do share none of the same moral commonplaces? 
In this case, moral functionalism really would imply that the disputants could not have a genuine 
moral disagreement, as they would be talking about utterly different things. But it is not clear 
why this should be a problem for moral functionalism. If the disputants did have a genuine moral 
disagreement, what would it be about? If they mean utterly different things by the terms that 
they use, how could they have a disagreement? Would they not just be talking past each other? 
Maybe we can alter Zangwill’s objection in another way to argue more successfully against 
the moral functionalist. We can try using the distinction between determinate and non-
determinate moral propositions that express commonplaces. Among the commonplaces that we 
and Göring share might be ‘Intentional killing is generally wrong’, or ‘We should work for global 
justice’. But these are non-determinate. The moment we start unpacking them (say, by defining 
what global justice is, and what it implies), we are going to start disagreeing. For Göring, global 
justice requires the supremacy of the Aryan race. For us, global justice requires ending the 
threat of Nazism. This means that we can have a moral disagreement with Göring on the issue. 
We share the same non-determinate commonplaces about global justice, and we may also 
share some determinate commonplaces that are consistent with endorsing global justice. The 
trouble is that we do not agree on all the commonplaces that are consistent with endorsing 
global justice, particularly those possible commonplaces that relate to racial issues. Due to the 
commonplaces that we do share with Göring, we can have a moral disagreement with him 
about those issues. The disagreement is what results when we take the non-determinate 
commonplace ‘We should work for global justice’ and try to work out what determinate moral 
commonplaces follow from it. 
At the moment, we do not share a folk morality with Göring. We might agree that we should 
work for global justice, but we certainly do not agree about the treatment of Jews. Our folk 
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moralities are going to diverge. Although Göring shares with us certain non-determinate 
commonplaces, our respective folk moralities endorse different determinate commonplaces. As 
soon as we try making the non-determinate commonplaces determinate, our moral views split 
from Göring’s. So how can the disputants reach determinate moral commonplaces that they can 
all accept? The moral functionalist says that the disputants can refine their commonplaces so 
that they come to mutually agree on a mature folk morality. The more we talk about our moral 
views, the more we gradually come to settle upon mutually-agreed determinate moral 
commonplaces. Perhaps if Göring were a rational person, we would be able to convince him 
that his way of fleshing out the non-determinate commonplaces he holds is wrong. We may all 
finally be able to agree that ‘Intentionally killing Jews is wrong’, a more determinate 
commonplace, is correct, rather than Göring’s determinate commonplace ‘Intentionally killing 
Jews is not wrong’. Or we might reach a point where Göring’s refusal to accept our 
commonplaces is just a sign of an irrational refusal to engage with us. Any reasonable observer 
would conclude that Göring’s commonplaces are the wrong ones to hold. 
This response assumes that different folk moralities are capable of converging in such a 
way. No doubt many can, but as Jackson admits, there is no guarantee that there is a single 
correct answer to a moral question. There could be two or more mature folk moralities that 
cannot converge any further, and which contradict each other over a particular moral question. 
There may be no way to decide between the two. Is this really a problem for moral 
functionalism, though? Jackson does not believe so. He hopes that the different folk moralities 
will converge, but he also concedes that they might not, in which case the commonplace that 
morality is objective will have to be dropped.46 So it seems possible that there are different, 
conflicting mature folk moralities. Moral functionalism is compatible with relativism, even though 
it does not necessarily imply it. The moral functionalist hopes, though, that convergence is 
always possible, and hence that moral objectivity is true. 
The fact that moral functionalism is compatible with certain forms of relativism is not 
automatically a strike against it. Neither does Jackson seem that concerned with relativist 
implications elsewhere in his metaphysics. When he writes of colour properties, he goes for a 
‘thoroughly anthropocentric’ view in which colour properties ‘typically interact… with normal 
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human perceivers in normal circumstances [in a particular way]’.47 This leaves it open for aliens 
to have a completely different folk colour theory than humans have, and Jackson appears to 
see nothing wrong with this possibility. 
Nevertheless, the amended objection should worry the moral functionalist. Zangwill tried to 
argue that moral functionalism implies a form of relativism because moral disagreement is 
impossible between disputants who have different moral commonplaces. There is thus no way 
to resolve the disagreement to show that one disputant’s moral commonplaces are superior to 
those of another disputant. The problem with this objection is that it is difficult to show that such 
moral disagreement is impossible, as it is more likely that the disputants share some non-
determinate moral commonplaces, and disagree over more determinate moral commonplaces. 
But this leaves open the possibility that different folk moralities may not converge after all, so 
Zangwill can still reach the same conclusion: there is no guarantee that Göring’s folk morality 
will converge with ours, and hence no guarantee that either folk morality is superior to the other. 
If Göring has his own mature folk morality, and there is no way that we can show that he is 
mistaken except by using our own mature folk morality, then we do not really have any way to 
morally argue against Nazi extermination camps without using our own mature folk morality. All 
Göring has to do is reject the determinate moral commonplaces that we hold, and he can rest 
content with his own. His folk morality might even be completely logically coherent. But his 
views are so morally perverse that surely this cannot be right. Something has gone 
catastrophically wrong with moral functionalism if it allows this possibility, and Jackson’s only 
defence is his optimistic hope that mature folk moralities will converge. If this hope is 
unfounded, than Zangwill has a point. He is wrong to say that moral functionalism is committed 
to the assumption that there can be no genuine moral disagreement between us and Göring. 
Since we can share many non-determinate moral commonplaces with him, there can be. But 
the attempt to show that we must be able to share determinate moral commonplaces fails, 
leaving the way open for a relativism which accords the same validity to genocidal racism as to 
humanitarianism. We can have moral disagreements with Göring, but neither of our mature folk 
moralities is morally superior to the other. The reason why we cannot reach an agreement is 
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because there is no justification for either mature folk morality that demonstrates that the other 
mature folk morality cannot also be justified. 
The moral functionalist might choose to bite the bullet and accept this conclusion. It would 
make moral functionalism much less attractive, but this does not automatically show that it is 
false. Neither does the objection show that relativism is a necessary result of moral 
functionalism. If the moral functionalist can demonstrate that mature folk moralities necessarily 
converge, then in the end only one mature folk morality will be left standing and the threat of 
relativism dissipates. Or even if different mature folk moralities cannot completely converge, 
they may converge sufficiently to the extent that they exclude all folk moralities that endorse 
moral atrocities. This would still leave us with relativism, but a comparatively harmless kind. 
Zangwill’s objection would become much weaker. The question now becomes how likely the 
possibility of complete or sufficient convergence is, though, and the moral functionalist will need 
to do much more work to make his case. 
Zangwill’s objection tries to show that we should reject moral functionalism outright. If we do 
so, then obviously it could not be used as a core-apriorist theory, so the core-aposteriorist may 
choose to press the objection as far as it can go. However, there is a different type of objection 
that is preferable. It does not claim that moral functionalism is false, but that it cannot be a core-
apriorist theory. I will develop this objection in the next section.  
 
7 – Moral functionalism’s a priori commitments 
 
The objection claims that the only way that we can show that moral functionalism’s a priori 
commitments are true is by a posteriori investigation, and therefore its commitments are not 
really a priori. This implies that even if moral functionalism works, it cannot be a core-apriorist 
theory.  
Return to Jackson’s metaphysics. Consider the following argument: 
 
a) Sixty percent of the earth is covered by H2O. 
b) Water is the stuff that plays the watery role. 
c) H2O is the stuff that plays the watery role. 
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 Therefore 
d) Sixty percent of the earth is covered by water. 
 
(a) and (c) are a posteriori. Before we could know (c), we had to check that H2O actually plays 
the watery role. (b) is a priori.48 It is something that we can know a priori about water. 
Consider now: 
 
e) Ben performed an act that maximised utility. 
f) The property of moral rightness is whatever plays the moral-rightness role. 
g) The property of maximising utility plays the moral-rightness role. 
 Therefore 
h) Ben performed a morally right act. 
 
(e) and (g) are a posteriori, as (g) acts as a commonplace that we must discover a posteriori. (f) 
is a priori, which is what we should expect, since it is an A-extension proposition. Jackson’s 
justification for (b) and (g) being a priori is that they are about reference fixers. As far as (b) 
goes, ‘water’ refers to what plays the watery role, the stuff that plays the role of a colourless, 
drinkable liquid that makes up the ocean, and so on. It does not indicate what actually plays the 
watery role or what the watery role consists of. In fact, there may be nothing that plays the 
watery role. 
The same points arise with (f). (f) may be a priori, but note how little information it contains. It 
does not tell us a great deal about moral properties or how we come to know what moral 
properties are. But without it, Jackson claims, we could not discover what descriptive property is 
identical with the property of moral rightness. The a posteriori discovery rests on a priori 
assumptions about moral properties. 
(b) and (f) are propositions that express the A-extensions of ‘water’ and ‘moral rightness’ 
respectively, and this is what makes them a priori. (c) and (g) are propositions that express C-
extensions, and so they are a posteriori. If the core-aposteriorist wants to argue that moral 
functionalism fails as a core-apriorist theory, she must focus on A-extensions by claiming that 
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they do not work as Jackson claims they do. We can set out the core-aposteriorist’s options for 
criticising moral functionalism as follows: 
 
1) Moral functionalism claims that A-extension propositions are a priori, and C-extension 
propositions are a posteriori. 
2) The moral functionalist wants to claim that we use A-extension propositions to justify C-
extension propositions. We can only accept the C-extension propositions that a 
particular descriptive property is a moral property if we accept the A-extension 
proposition that the moral property is whatever plays the appropriate ‘moral property’ 
role. 
3) So the core-aposteriorist has three options: 
a) Moral A-extension propositions are non-determinate and so they contravene 
Sufficient Determinacy. 
b) Moral A-extension propositions are false and so cannot help justify any C-
extension propositions. 
c) Moral A-extension propositions are really a posteriori, contrary to what moral 
functionalism claims. 
 
The options for criticising moral functionalism are the same as the options for criticising Michael 
Smith’s moral realism, and as with Smith’s moral realism, it is easiest for the core-aposteriorist 
to choose option (c). A-extension propositions are really a posteriori, and so moral functionalism 
cannot show that a priori determinate core moral knowledge is possible. Explaining why options 
(a) and (b) are difficult to pursue helps to show why option (c) is preferable. 
Option (a) implies that moral A-extension propositions cannot be used to justify determinate 
moral propositions, and if we add more content to them so that they can justify such 
propositions, the extra content turns them into a posteriori propositions. Take the following 
moral A-extension proposition: 
 
MRP: The property of moral rightness is whatever plays the moral-rightness role 
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What exactly is the moral-rightness role? We are not told, and many people may have very 
different ideas about what the role contains, even if everyone agrees that a moral-rightness role 
exists. So the possibility opens up that even if MRP is true, it may be insufficiently determinate 
to help justify any particular determinate moral proposition. Suppose that the moral functionalist 
wants to use the following argument: 
 
4) The property of moral rightness is whatever plays the moral-rightness role. 
5) The property of maximising utility plays the moral-rightness role. 
 Therefore 
6) The property of moral rightness is the property of maximising utility. 
 
(4) is MRP, an A-extension proposition. (5) is a posteriori, discovered by examining people’s 
moral commonplaces. Assume that the term ‘maximising utility’ has very precise application 
conditions. Does the argument (4)-(6) work? 
The term ‘the moral-rightness role’ currently does not have very precise application 
conditions. People can reasonably disagree on what the moral-rightness role contains, and so 
the argument (4)-(6) will only work if ‘the moral-rightness role’ contains sufficiently precise 
application conditions so that (5) is justified. Unless we do this, then two disputants can discover 
everything that they can a posteriori about the property of maximising utility, and agree on all 
the a posteriori discoveries that they make, but still disagree on what exactly the moral-
rightness role contains. 
As it stands, then, (4) and (5) are not sufficiently determinate. Concerning (4) in particular, 
we need something like 
 
4*) The property of moral rightness is identical with whatever plays the following role: 
[description of what the moral-rightness role contains] 
 
(4) is altered to become (4*) by being made more determinate, and (4*) is a determinate 
proposition. The core-apriorist may claim that (4*) is still an a priori proposition, but we can 
reasonably wonder whether it really would be. The core-aposteriorist may now try to claim that 
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making (4) more determinate must involve discovering a posteriori what the content of the 
moral-rightness role is. One possible way to do this is to focus on the fact that folk morality is 
built up out of the commonplaces that people accept, and that many of these commonplaces 
are a posteriori ones. The core-aposteriorist may hold that we need to discover a posteriori the 
various moral commonplaces people hold to determine what the content of the moral-rightness 
role is. 
Of course, the core-apriorist could simply refuse to accept this move. He could continue 
insisting that we have to work out a priori what the content of the moral-rightness role is. If we 
can do so, then (4) and (4*) are both a priori. The only way that the core-aposteriorist can refute 
this claim is to actually investigate what the content of the moral-rightness role is, and this may 
take a lot of effort. The alternative is to declare a stalemate, which is not enough if the core-
aposteriorist wants to show that moral functionalism cannot support the CAT. 
Option (a) may look attractive, but it turns out to require a lot of work to see whether it is 
actually successful. What about option (b), that moral A-extension propositions are all false? 
Moral A-extension propositions may be false because we are mistaken about the nature of 
moral properties, and hence about what ‘moral property’ roles should be. Suppose a scientist 
finds a new chemical that appears to dissolve plastic. For something to be this chemical, he 
believes, it has to play a role that includes the ability to dissolve plastic. It comes to be generally 
accepted that if something cannot dissolve plastic, it cannot be the chemical. But it is then 
discovered that the scientist has made a mistake, and the chemical does not dissolve plastic. 
The chemical role includes the ability to dissolve plastic, but the chemical itself cannot dissolve 
plastic, and so the chemical is not identical with whatever plays the chemical role. 
This is not the only way in which we might be mistaken about the relation of X to the X role. 
Take the example of water. We say that water is transparent, drinkable, found in rivers, and so 
on, and to Jackson these properties constitute the watery role. It was not necessarily the case 
that anything has all these properties, though, or that there was only one thing that did. We 
might have examined oceans and found out that what we call ‘water’ is actually a mixture of 
H2O and XYZ. Two things play the watery role, but can they both be water? 
Another possibility is that the thing that plays the X role also has other properties that X itself 
does not have, and so the thing that plays the X role cannot be X. D.H Mellor argues that H2O is 
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not identical to water, despite playing the watery role. Even if we allow that ice and steam are 
water, ‘no single H2O molecule can be water, since it instantiates hardly any of water’s laws, 
having no solvent powers, density, freezing or boiling points, or latent heats’.49 Of course, Mellor 
does not deny that water exists or that it is made up of H2O. What he denies is that H2O is 
identical to water, even though it plays the watery role. 
It is tempting to think that we can make similar objections about the truth value of moral A-
extension propositions. Take MRP again. We can try to pursue option (b) by questioning the 
truth of MRP in three possible ways. 
First, it may be the case that it is impossible for anything to play the moral-rightness role. 
This could happen, for example, if the role is logically inconsistent. If the property of moral 
rightness exists, MRP cannot be true. Not only that, but the moral functionalist is left trying to 
find another way in which moral agents can recognise moral properties. MRP offered a 
straightforward way to do so – check what descriptive properties play a certain role, and those 
properties are moral properties. Now another method must be found. 
This throws up two problems for the moral functionalist. The first problem is metaphysical – if 
moral properties are not the properties that play a particular moral role, then what are they? The 
second problem is epistemological – how can agents recognise moral properties if the 
properties are not what play a particular role? However, the moral functionalist need not worry 
yet, because it first has to be shown that it is impossible for anything to play the ‘moral property’ 
roles. The moral functionalist will of course deny that it is impossible, because we seem to 
identify moral roles all the time with the aid of the moral commonplaces that we accept. The 
‘fairnessy’ role is the role of being even-handed, unaffected by biases, and so on. Where does 
the logical inconsistency lie in this? And if we can identify an inconsistency, why can we not just 
alter our conception of the role to exclude it, thus getting closer to a mature folk morality? 
A second way that MRP might be false is if there is no special connection between the 
property of moral rightness and the moral-rightness role. Suppose that we discover a new non-
moral property, Y, and we ascribe a number of characteristics to it that come to define the Y 
role. We then discover that Y has close to none of these characteristics. The property of Y is not 
what plays the Y role. Could this not be the case for the property of moral rightness? The 
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trouble with this objection is that it once again does not allow for correction and refinement. As 
we find out more about Y, we refine our understanding of what the Y role is, so once we have 
realised our mistake we change our conception of the Y role to reflect the characteristics that Y 
actually has. Our conception of the Y role changes so that whatever plays the Y role is indeed 
identical to Y. This does not seem impossible, so the moral functionalist can say that same thing 
about moral properties. We may be currently mistaken about what the moral-rightness role is, 
but we can change our conception of it so that whatever plays that role is identical to the 
property of moral rightness. 
A third way that we could argue for option (b) is to pursue a variation of Mellor’s 
metaphysical objection. Something plays the moral-rightness role, and there may be such a 
thing as moral rightness, but the property that plays the moral-rightness role is not identical to 
the property of moral rightness. Moral-Mellor may say about MRP: 
 
Assume that there is a property that plays the moral-rightness role. Let us say that the 
property of maximising welfare plays it. That certainly does not mean that such a property is 
identical to the property of moral rightness, because it may not play that role at all times and 
under all conditions (Remember that H2O plays the watery role, but it does not always do 
so.). And we certainly cannot assume ahead of investigation that there is any single 
descriptive property that is identical to the property of moral rightness, or that there is a 
collection of descriptive properties that constitute the property of moral rightness. 
 
Call this ‘the Moral-Mellor objection’. It is consistent with the assumption that we can have moral 
knowledge. We may be able to know the proposition ‘Maximising the welfare of the homeless is 
morally right’, even though we do not identify the property of maximising utility with any 
particular moral property. The objection is also consistent with the idea that there are moral 
properties, that there are moral roles that descriptive properties play, and that we can know 
about them. What the Moral-Mellor objection rejects is the moral functionalist’s assumption 
without sufficient investigation that moral A-extension propositions are true, and that particular 
moral properties are identical to particular descriptive properties. 
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At this point, the moral functionalist can reasonably object that despite the Moral-Mellor 
objection, we cannot simply assume that moral A-extension propositions are false. That would 
just state by fiat that option (b) is correct. But we now have a way to argue that option (c), that 
moral A-extension propositions are really a posteriori, is correct instead. H2O is identical to 
water, says Jackson. Not so, says Mellor. Mellor’s objection appears to be a posteriori. H2O, as 
a matter of a posteriori fact, does not always act like water; for example, occurrences of H2O 
need not have any boiling point, and we discover this fact a posteriori. By observation we 
attribute various characteristics to occurrences of water and of H2O, and as a matter of a 
posteriori fact these characteristics are not always the same.  
So it appears that we discover whether ‘Water is the stuff that plays the watery role’ is true or 
false by a posteriori observation. H2O plays the watery role, but that does not necessarily mean 
that it is identical with water. We cannot discover a priori that it is water, and so we cannot 
discover a priori that water is identical to the stuff that plays the watery role. The proposition is 
therefore an a posteriori proposition, and we can argue analogously about moral A-extension 
propositions. We can only discover if, say, MRP is true by investigating a posteriori what people 
take the moral-rightness role to be, seeing what plays that role, and then checking whether it 
always conforms with the content of ‘the property of moral rightness’. The proposition thus 
becomes harmless to the core-aposteriorist. If the proposition is true, we can only discover that 
it is true by a posteriori investigation. If it is false, then obviously it cannot help justify any true 
moral proposition. This means that it might be the case that option (b) works, and that the A-
extension propositions that moral functionalism relies on are false, but we can only discover that 
option (b) works by first pursuing option (c). We discover a posteriori that MRP is false. 
The moral functionalist might argue that the analogy between moral and non-moral A-
extension propositions breaks down at a critical point. He might claim that whilst we discover a 
posteriori that water is not identical to what plays the watery role, this is not the case for moral 
properties. With water, we make the identification of water with whatever plays the watery role a 
priori, and we make the identification of water with H2O a posteriori. However, he continues, we 
make the identification of a moral property with whatever plays the ‘moral property’ role a priori, 
and we can also make the identification of the moral property with the descriptive property that 
plays that role a priori. The moral functionalist thus changes moral functionalism to claim that 
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moral C-extension propositions are a priori, not a posteriori. So even if moral A-extension 
propositions are justified by moral C-extension propositions, we can know moral A-extension 
propositions a priori, since all moral C-extension propositions are knowable a priori. 
But the moral functionalist is barred from making this move. The less important reason for 
this is that in Jackson’s general metaphysics, he states that C-extensions are a posteriori. 
However, the moral functionalist can refuse to accept Jackson’s general metaphysics whilst still 
accepting moral functionalism, and so this need not trouble him. The second reason, though, is 
more serious. We ascertain moral C-extensions by examining certain moral commonplaces, and 
these commonplaces are discovered a posteriori, by observing how actual agents behave and 
what moral judgements they make. Moral functionalism is committed to holding on to as many 
of these commonplaces as possible, so the moral functionalist is committed to saying that C-
extension propositions are knowable a posteriori. Moral functionalism would change massively if 
this claim were dropped, so the moral functionalist requires good independent reasons to do so. 
If no such reasons exist, it follows that our discovery of moral C-extensions is based on a 
posteriori discovery of moral commonplaces, and if we can only ascertain moral A-extensions 
by ascertaining moral C-extensions, then the discovery of moral A-extensions is based on a 
posteriori observations as well. 
Moral functionalism thus turns out to have a significant difficulty when we use the a posteriori 
strategy against it, as we have good reason to suspect that we can only verify the truth of moral 
A-extension propositions by using a posteriori investigation. Note that the a posteriori strategy 
does not imply that moral functionalism is completely implausible, because that is not its aim. 
The a posteriori strategy simply seeks to show that core-apriorist theories are wrong to claim 
that we can use a priori methods alone to justify the normative content of all true determinate 
core moral propositions. If a core-apriorist theory gives up that claim when it is put under 
pressure by the a posteriori strategy, it may be able to survive, even though it will no longer be a 
core-apriorist theory. Moral functionalism may be able to jettison the claim that moral A-
extension propositions are a priori without losing very much. However, this means that we can 
no longer read moral functionalism as a core-apriorist theory, and it cannot be used to support 
the CAT. 
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8 – Core-apriorist theories and templates 
 
We have now reached the end of the discussion of the four core-apriorist theories that I wished 
to test the a posteriori strategy on. I mentioned above that the theories have something in 
common: though the a posteriori strategy argues against their status as core-apriorist theories, 
it does not directly refute them. If the theories give up their commitment to the a priori, they may 
be able to survive without any trouble from the core-aposteriorist. For example, if Michael Smith 
changed his moral realism to allow that a posteriori moral platitudes as well as a priori moral 
platitudes are necessary for the mastery of moral terms, the core-aposteriorist would have no 
way to criticise him by using the a posteriori strategy. In this section, I will say a little more about 
how the a posteriori strategy works and why it will often have this result. 
Take moral functionalism. Moral functionalism depends on various moral A-extension 
propositions being true. The propositions have a template: 
 
Template: The property of <moral concept> is whatever plays the <moral concept> role 
 
Moral functionalism tells us that when we slot various moral concepts into the template, the 
result is moral A-extension propositions that we can know a priori. One example is MRP. To 
discover what precisely plays the moral-rightness role requires a posteriori investigation, but we 
do not need to conduct that investigation to know that MRP is true. 
The core-aposteriorist’s objection to this was not that MRP or other moral A-extension 
propositions were false, but that we could not know that they were true without doing a 
posteriori work. We need to find out what plays the moral-rightness role before we can know 
that MRP is true, and the moral functionalist has conceded that we find out exactly what plays 
the moral-rightness role by a posteriori investigation. So MRP is only knowable a posteriori. 
In other words, knowing the template and slotting different moral concepts into it as needed 
is not enough to show that various moral A-extension propositions are true. We must do further 
work. If they are true, then the core-aposteriorist simply points out that we cannot know that 
they are true a priori. The only way that we can perform this further work is to do so a posteriori. 
Alternatively, it might turn out that we have to alter the template in some other way so that it 
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works correctly and so that it can justify the normative content of determinate moral 
propositions. But, the core-aposteriorist points out, we can only discover a posteriori how the 
template should be altered. 
This point generalises. The four core-apriorist theories we have examined all depend on 
some type of template that they claim can be ascertained a priori, but in fact the template is only 
useful if it is developed with a posteriori information. To make this claim, I need to define what I 
mean by ‘template’, since so far in this section the only template we have seen relates to moral 
functionalism. A template for a core-apriorist theory is either a general formula that generates 
core moral propositions (Template is one example) or the set of core moral propositions in the 
theory. This second option is a catch-all for core-apriorist theories that have core moral 
propositions that have nothing in common other than that they are ascertainable a priori. 
Take the SLS theory and the self-evident axiom Aim. The SLS theory appears to have a 
template, which is Sidgwick’s criteria to determine a set of self-evident axioms (Of course, the 
SLS theory claims that this task can be performed a priori.). However, Aim cannot be used to 
justify determinate moral propositions, since it contravenes Sufficient Determinacy. The answer 
was to add more content to it by selecting a particular first-order moral theory, such as rule 
utilitarianism. But there are a posteriori grounds on which to criticise and defend rule 
utilitarianism, such as the difficulty of being a rule utilitarian if the rules are too numerous, and 
so there are also a posteriori grounds on which to criticise and defend the altered version of 
Aim. Filling in the template with a posteriori information thus alters the template. In order to use 
Aim successfully as part of a justification of a determinate moral proposition, it must be 
interpreted in a particular way, with the help of a first-order moral theory. The first-order moral 
theory we select will alter how Aim works; we saw that a reading of Aim based on direct act 
utilitarianism looks very different to a reading of Aim based on rule utilitarianism. Furthermore, 
some readings will look completely implausible. Those based on direct act utilitarianism are one 
example. Very few people are direct act utilitarians, partly because of the sheer practical 
difficulty of being one successfully. It is an immense task to try to work out the consequences of 
every action and whom they affect positively and negatively. 
This is similar to what we just saw with moral functionalism. Aim is generated by the SLS 
theory’s template, but to use the template so that Aim becomes determinate, we also need to 
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add something else to it, a first-order moral theory.50 For example, say I intend to drink-drive, 
because I want to enjoy myself at a party and I want to get home afterwards. I check Aim, and I 
discover that I am not aiming at good generally, as I am only aiming at my own good. So I 
should not drink-drive. However, in order to use Aim to say that I should not drink-drive, we 
need to use the ‘other resources’ of a first-order moral theory in order to interpret Aim in a 
plausible way. As I argued in chapter 3, the choice of the first-order moral theory is partially 
defended on a posteriori grounds. This does not mean that the template for the SLS theory is 
wrong. It means instead that if the template generates core moral propositions, we need to plug 
a posteriori information into it. Otherwise we cannot use the core moral propositions (which 
include Aim) to discover that I should not drink-drive. 
Some parts of a template may still be a priori. The template for Michael Smith’s moral 
realism is made up of the five types of moral platitudes that allow us to have mastery of moral 
terms. We saw that Smith’s moral platitudes concerning objectivity and supervenience were the 
most likely platitudes to withstand criticism from the core-aposteriorist. It is very difficult to see 
how they could only be known a posteriori. Other moral platitudes that Smith relies on are much 
more vulnerable, though, and that is all that the core-aposteriorist needs. If there is a single 
determinate core moral proposition that is only knowable via an a posteriori or mixed method, 
then the Central Claim is true. Nevertheless, the part of the template that generates platitudes 
of objectivity and supervenience is unaffected, because such platitudes can still be known a 
priori. 
With Matthew Kramer’s moral realism as a moral doctrine, it is more difficult to discover a 
template because he does not explicitly give one. He does not list what the basic moral 
principles are, choosing instead to focus on only two of them, moral objectivity and moral 
supervenience. However, the a posteriori strategy can still be used against his metaethical 
theory’s status as a core-apriorist theory. We have no particular reason to think that we can 
ascertain a priori everything that is morally possible or impossible, so we have no particular 
reason to think that we can ascertain a priori all true core moral propositions, or all true basic 
moral principles. Some of the basic moral principles, at least, may only be ascertainable a 
                                                             
50 Actually, we may not need something as structured as a complete first-order theory such as utilitarianism. Maybe the 
theory could just be a collection of various moral norms. The point is that we need something that we can use to alter 
the template so that Aim becomes determinate. If a simple collection of various moral norms can do that, then that is 
fine. 
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posteriori, which is far from saying that there are no basic moral principles. The a posteriori 
strategy need say nothing about whether there are or not. 
It now appears that we can give a generalised story about the a posteriori strategy, which 
goes as follows: the core-apriorist claims that there is a set of core moral propositions, and that 
the normative content of these propositions is knowable entirely a priori. The propositions are 
based on a template. We can use these core moral propositions to ascertain the normative 
content of all true non-core moral propositions. The a posteriori strategy does not claim that the 
template is wholly wrong, and therefore it does not need to claim that moral propositions 
endorsed by a core-apriorist theory are false. The template may be hopelessly mistaken, but 
that is a subject for a separate investigation. Instead, the a posteriori strategy targets the claim 
that the template generates all the determinate core moral propositions that justify the normative 
content of all true determinate non-core moral propositions. The strategy tries to show that the 
template cannot do this if it is only constructed a priori, because some determinate core moral 
propositions can only be known via an a posteriori method or a mixed method. If the template is 
to generate all the determinate core moral propositions that are needed, we need to alter the 
template appropriately, which requires the addition of a posteriori information. The core-
apriorist’s challenge is to create a template that does not have this problem.  
 
We have now tested the a posteriori strategy to see how it operates and how successful it is 
against various core-apriorist theories. In the next chapter, I will briefly sum up the results and 
conclude that the strategy is a useful tool for the core-aposteriorist to use. I will also ask where 
the core-aposteriorist and the core-apriorist should go from here. If the a posteriori strategy 
works, what does this imply for metaethical theories? 
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Chapter 6 - Conclusion 
 
1 – The Central Claim and the CAT 
 
In this section, I will sum up the results of the last four chapters, and I will conclude that we have 
good reason to prefer the Central Claim to the CAT. The four metaethical theories we examined 
in chapters 3-5 all have problems when we read them as core-apriorist theories, because they 
appear either to covertly rely on a posteriori information, or they cannot justify the true 
normative content of some determinate core moral propositions. 
The overall aim of this thesis was to defend the claim that there are at least some 
determinate core moral propositions that have normative content that can only be ascertained 
via a posteriori or mixed methods. In other words, the core-aposteriorist, who supports this 
claim, wants to prove that the Central Claim is correct. If the Central Claim is correct, then both 
parts (a) and (b) of the CAT, which is defended by the core-apriorist, cannot be correct. 
In chapter 2, we saw one attempt to prove the Central Claim positively, by arguing that since 
we can only discover a posteriori what our moral cognitive abilities are, we can only discover a 
posteriori which determinate core moral propositions are true. This attempt was a failure, 
though, as there was no way to get the conclusion from the premises. I then developed a 
second strategy, the a posteriori strategy, which is a negative approach. Rather than developing 
particular a posteriori or mixed methods that must be used to attain determinate core moral 
knowledge, it tries to show that some of that knowledge cannot be attained via an a priori 
method. Since moral agents can still attain such knowledge, though, this implies that it can only 
be attained via an a posteriori or mixed method. 
One reason why it is worth seeing if we can defend the Central Claim is because, as I noted 
in chapter 1, the CAT has been very popular historically amongst philosophers. Core-apriorists 
include philosophical heavyweights such as Kant, W.D. Ross and Derek Parfit. Conversely, 
core-aposteriorists have been comparatively few in number, and have not received as much 
attention. This position has been changing in recent years, but it is easy to see why 
philosophers have tended to be core-apriorists. Moral truths are normative, and historically it 
has been regarded as difficult or impossible to discover how we can know their normative 
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content a posteriori. A posteriori truths do not appear to be in the business of being normative 
truths. You can run as many scientific a posteriori experiments as you like on the development 
of morality in children, or how we actually make moral judgements, or at what point a species 
can be said to have developed a moral sense, but this will never tell you how to ascertain what 
is morally permissible. Even if you discover that all your test subjects reject something for moral 
reasons, they could just be wrong. For example, if humans usually make moral judgements 
emotionally rather than rationally, as Jonathan Haidt claims, this does not show that they are 
correct to do so or that they reach correct moral conclusions.1 
This is not to say that core-aposteriorists necessarily make mistakes like this. However, it is 
sometimes difficult to see exactly what they are doing when they use a posteriori research from 
areas such as psychology, anthropology, sociology, and so on. The risk is that they accidentally 
appeal to such evidence illegitimately. For example, as chapter 2 noted, there is a real danger 
of accidentally conflating two distinct claims, which must be kept separate or the core-
aposteriorist will be in trouble. They are 
 
1) We can ascertain a posteriori what methods to use to attain [some type of] moral 
knowledge. 
2) We can attain via a posteriori or mixed methods [some type of] moral knowledge. 
 
The phrase ‘[some type of]’ can be replaced with what the ethicist chooses; the core-
aposteriorist will course replace it with ‘determinate core’. The attempt in chapter 2 to use a 
posteriori research on cognitive abilities in order to reach an a posteriori method to attain 
determinate core moral knowledge is an example of what happens when one tries to use claim 
(1) as part of an argument for claim (2). This seemed to be, for example, part of what Flanagan, 
Sarkissian and Wong were attempting to do. There is in fact no necessary link between the 
claims, though it may be tempting to believe that there is. Claim (1) is easier to argue for. If 
actual agents can attain moral knowledge, we can observe which processes they use when 
they do so. However, for such an investigation to work, we have to already know which methods 
to attain moral knowledge are successful and which are not, and that may not be an a posteriori 
                                                             
1 Haidt (2001). 
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matter. The a posteriori observations that we make of actual agents when they make moral 
judgements are not sufficient to determine what determinate core moral knowledge consists of, 
so we cannot say whether we attain such knowledge via a priori, a posteriori or mixed 
methods.2 
The core-aposteriorist does not need to take any stance on (1), and she certainly does not 
have to claim that endorsing (1) is necessary for endorsing (2), or vice versa. However, (2) is 
much more controversial than (1), because of the perceived divide between the normative and 
the a posteriori. The core-apriorist and the core-aposteriorist may both agree that (2) is correct, 
but they would differ over how far it goes. The core-aposteriorist believes that there is some 
determinate core moral knowledge that can only be known via an a posteriori or mixed method, 
whilst the core-apriorist does not. 
By using the a posteriori strategy, the core-aposteriorist does not defend her position by 
producing an example of a determinate core moral proposition and then demonstrating that it 
can only be known a posteriori. Rather, she uses the a posteriori strategy to show that, for some 
determinate core moral propositions, if we do know the proposition, we cannot know it via an a 
priori method. If we can use an alleged a priori method to ascertain the truth of the normative 
content of the propositions, that is because the method is not really an a priori method. If it 
really were an a priori method, we would not be able to use it to know the proposition, as its use 
would entail contravening Sufficient Determinacy. 
So, concludes the core-aposteriorist, we must use a posteriori or mixed methods instead. It 
is true that the strategy does not automatically refute every core-apriorist theory. It cannot do 
so, because we can only use it against a core-apriorist theory once we know what the details of 
that theory are. We had to know what moral functionalism’s a priori commitments were before 
we could use the a posteriori strategy to argue that moral functionalism cannot be a core-
apriorist theory, and its a priori commitments are different to those of, say, the SLS theory. The 
core-aposteriorist’s hope is that if the a posteriori strategy is consistently successful against a 
variety of core-apriorist theories, this will make the CAT increasingly implausible, and so the 
Central Claim will become more plausible. As we saw in this thesis, the a posteriori strategy 
causes a lot of trouble for the core-apriorist theories that we looked at, and so we have 
                                                             
2 This point reminds us of Selim Berker’s (2009) objection that Joshua Greene’s (2007) a posteriori research actually 
has no normative implications. Berker claims that Greene’s normative conclusions do not rely on the research that 
Greene cites at all. The research is thus normatively redundant. 
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evidence that the CAT is not as well-founded as the core-apriorist claims. Consequently, we 
have good evidence in favour of the Central Claim. 
Furthermore, the core-apriorist cannot avoid this result by choosing between moral 
intuitionism and moral coherentism. The Central Claim does not presuppose that there are no 
self-evident principles or propositions; depending on the core-apriorist’s particular intuitionist 
theory, the core-aposteriorist could agree that the a priori self-evident propositions that the core-
apriorist identifies really are self-evident. What she denies is that the set of a priori self-evident 
propositions that the core-apriorist identifies is identical to the set of determinate core moral 
propositions. As for moral coherentist core-apriorist theories, even if the core-apriorist 
successfully gives us a maximally coherent set of determinate core moral propositions, the core-
aposteriorist can, for example, argue that some of these propositions are only knowable a 
posteriori. Neither moral intuitionism nor moral coherentism will protect a core-apriorist theory 
from the a posteriori strategy. The core-apriorist must look elsewhere for a defence. 
In section 1 of chapter 1, I claimed that my defence of the Central Claim does not imply that 
mixed methods are impossible or even unlikely. Though I have typically referred to a posteriori 
methods in this thesis rather than mixed methods, this is not to say that my arguments have any 
force against the possibility of mixed methods, and we can now see why. Suppose that we are 
testing whether the normative content of a particular determinate core moral proposition can 
only be ascertained via a mixed method. If so, it can only be ascertained with a mix of a priori 
and a posteriori premises. Might the use of the method contravene Sufficient Determinacy? 
Following Sufficient Determinacy, the proposition can only be determinate if the conjunction of 
the premises is determinate. This need not cause a problem. If the conjunction of the premises 
is non-determinate, we can in theory add more content to the premises until the conjunction 
becomes sufficiently determinate. Whether this extra content is knowable a priori or a posteriori, 
the mixed method remains a mixed method, since it still relies on both a priori and a posteriori 
premises. It thus does not become an a posteriori method or an a priori method. So we cannot 
reject mixed methods by appealing to Sufficient Determinacy. 
Nothing I have argued in this thesis implies that mixed methods cannot exist, or that any 
method to ascertain the truth of the normative content of a determinate core moral proposition 
must be either an a priori method or an a posteriori method. It might be that a particular 
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purported mixed method really is an a posteriori method, which would mean that all the 
purported a priori premises that it uses must actually be a posteriori. But we have no reason to 
assume from the outset that they must be. The a posteriori strategy does not show that they 
are. Therefore, since a posteriori methods use only a posteriori premises, mixed methods 
cannot be a posteriori methods. Neither, of course, can mixed methods be a priori methods, 
which use only a priori premises. 
Consequently, we cannot use the a posteriori strategy to argue against mixed methods. All 
we can do is examine the core-aposteriorist’s actual metaethical theory. If the theory is correct 
and excludes mixed methods to ascertain the normative content of any determinate core moral 
propositions, then we have no reason to suppose that mixed methods exist. If, however, the 
core-aposteriorist’s theory holds that we can only ascertain the normative content of some 
determinate core moral propositions with mixed methods, we will have to investigate the details 
of her theory to discover whether her use of mixed methods is valid. Perhaps the methods fail to 
work as the core-aposteriorist wants them to work, or perhaps premises that she takes as 
knowable a priori are actually only knowable a posteriori, but that will depend on the content of 
the particular theory itself, and as I have not examined any such theories in this thesis, I cannot 
claim that mixed methods should be rejected. So we should continue including mixed methods 
in the Central Claim. 
Two questions now arise. The first is that if we give up the idea that the CAT is correct, what 
do core-apriorist theories actually lose? The second question is how we can use the core-
aposteriorist’s results to defend or amend particular core-aposteriorist theories. 
 
2 – Where next for the core-apriorist and the core-aposteriorist 
 
I will start with the first question. A core-apriorist theory can be much more than just a claim 
about the a priori status of determinate core moral propositions. It may include other 
epistemological claims, metaphysical claims, semantic claims, and so on. How badly damaged 
a core-apriorist theory would be overall, if the CAT were false, would depend on how heavily the 
theory relied on it. I pointed out at the end of chapter 6 that none of the four core-apriorist 
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theories we examined with the a posteriori strategy need fail if the Central Claim is correct. They 
simply need to be altered. 
For example, suppose that Zangwill’s objection that moral functionalism is relativist were a 
fatal one, or that Clark’s ‘horrified assertion’ objection against Kramer were. In both cases, the 
metaethical theory targeted would simply fail to work, and this would suit the core-aposteriorist’s 
purposes. If all core-apriorist theories uniformly fail, then the core-apriorist is no longer a serious 
opponent.3 But by using the a posteriori strategy, the core-aposteriorist’s aim becomes much 
more focussed. All she needs to do is refute the core-apriorist’s commitment to the CAT. If the 
core-apriorist gives up this commitment, then the core-aposteriorist has made her point. She 
has no reason to refute the core-apriorist’s theory wholesale. Obviously, the core-apriorist’s 
theory will have to change if he gives up the CAT, but if he can make these changes 
successfully, the core-aposteriorist will not protest. 
Neither is it necessarily the case that all true determinate core moral propositions are only 
knowable via an a posteriori or mixed method. Sometimes they may not be; for example, we 
saw that Prudence, one of the axioms that the SLS theory relies on, may be knowable a priori. 
Similarly, it was difficult for the core-aposteriorist to argue that Michael Smith’s moral platitudes 
concerning objectivity and supervenience must only be knowable a posteriori. So we do not 
completely exclude the possibility of a priori determinate core moral knowledge. What we deny 
is that the normative content of all determinate core moral propositions is ascertainable a priori. 
Sometimes the normative content can only be ascertained via an a posteriori or mixed method. 
Ultimately, then, the results of the thesis are only really going to trouble the core-apriorist if 
he wants to retain the CAT. He could decide that it does not matter to his overall metaethical 
theory if determinate core moral knowledge can only be attained a posteriori, or he could argue 
that a limited subset of such knowledge can be attained a priori (Perhaps knowledge about 
moral supervenience can only be attained a priori, for example.). However, what he cannot do is 
dismiss the possibility that one can only ascertain the normative content of a particular 
determinate core moral proposition via an a posteriori or mixed method simply because the 
method is a posteriori or mixed. The mere fact that it is is not a blow against it. 
                                                             
3 It would not prove that the core-aposteriorist was right; maybe the moral error theorist would be, for example. 
Nevertheless, the challenge to the Central Claim would no longer come from the core-apriorist. 
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This brings us to the second issue of where the core-aposteriorist should go from here. I 
have made no claims about what precisely the correct a posteriori or mixed method to ascertain 
a particular determinate core moral proposition would be. This was intentional. If I simply 
worked out an a posteriori or mixed method to ascertain the normative content of determinate 
core moral propositions, the danger would be that the core-apriorist could claim that we can do 
so with an a priori method as well. This would do nothing to help the core-aposteriorist. The a 
posteriori strategy gets around this difficulty not by providing an a posteriori or mixed method, 
but by showing that a priori methods cannot always work. There will always be some 
determinate core moral propositions that moral agents can know, but that they cannot know via 
an a priori method. This means that a posteriori and mixed methods are necessary for agents to 
know the propositions, even though the a posteriori strategy does not say anything about what 
the content of these methods are. The task now for the core-aposteriorist is to provide her own 
methods to ascertain the normative content of determinate core moral propositions. There are 
many different ways that such a theory could go, and I do not propose to start the task here.4 
However, we can see that the core-aposteriorist can use the a posteriori strategy independently 
of her own theory. Whatever the content of her own theory is, the a posteriori strategy can help 
to lay the groundwork for it. For example, the core-aposteriorist can use it in the following 
argument: 
 
1) It is possible for actual agents to have moral knowledge (and thus be moral agents). 
2) So they must have some method to attain moral knowledge. 
3) It has often been theorised that moral agents can ascertain the normative content of 
core moral propositions a priori, and this has been seen as evidence that the CAT is 
correct. 
4) But the CAT is not correct, because the a posteriori strategy provides good reason to 
believe that the Central Claim is correct. 
5) So there must be some determinate core moral propositions that are only knowable via 
an a posteriori or mixed method. 
 
                                                             
4 A couple of alternatives that the core-aposteriorist could endorse are Richard Boyd’s moral realism (1988) and Peter 
Railton’s moral realism (1986). 
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This argument makes no reference to the content of the specific metaethical theory that the 
core-aposteriorist endorses. It works independently to eliminate the core-apriorist’s objections 
that core-aposteriorist theories cannot work, and it can do this before the core-aposteriorist 
introduces her own metaethical theory. The argument thus functions as a pre-emptive defence. 
It does not, of course, show that the core-aposteriorist’s theory identifies the correct methods to 
attain determinate core moral knowledge, but the a posteriori strategy was never designed to do 
this. It merely helps to show that a posteriori and mixed methods are necessary in order to 
ascertain the truth of the normative content of some determinate core moral propositions, not to 
show which particular methods are correct. 
Ultimately, the thought that there are a posteriori or mixed methods to ascertain the 
normative content of some determinate core moral propositions should not be an implausible or 
worrying one. Accepting that a posteriori or mixed methods exist does not entail that no a priori 
methods exist, and it certainly does not mean that philosophers must abandon ethical study to 
the scientists, anthropologists and sociologists. Rather, it means that when we examine how we 
attain moral knowledge, the area to explore is wider than originally thought. We do not need to 
limit ourselves to a priori methods. Instead, we must explore a posteriori and mixed methods as 
well. We cannot ignore such methods simply because they appeal to the a posteriori. 
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